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Abstract

The paper addresses three main issues drawing on Husserl’s writings on logic. First, what gives the logical objects their objective status, given the fact that these are intimately connected with human mental processes? Second, if logical objects are objective then how is logical knowledge at all possible? The answer to this question leads to a transcendental foundation of formal logic. Third, how do the principles of logic apply to the real world? This question can be addressed by positing a formal ontology. Against Russell and Whitehead, it has been pointed out that even if logical implication does not in any way depend on human mind, inference is definitely mind-dependent. But this thesis does not necessarily lead to psychologism, as has been pointed out by contemporary Indian logicians. Indian theories of inference deal with the question of truth and falsity but lack a formal ontology. Both pure logic and modern physics claim to be independent of human existence. This claim becomes evident in the conversation between Heisenberg and Tagore. Husserl had distinguished between logical grammar and logic of consequences. The notions of truth and falsity are relevant only in the context of logic of consequences. However, none of the well-known theories of truth, correspondence, coherence or pragmatic theory is free from defects. Following in the footprints of the Advaita Vedantins, it has been maintained that falsity is more fundamental than truth. In the process of cognitive history, a proposition is taken to be true, unless its falsity is proven. Hence the conclusion: since Philosophy is search for the truth, all Philosophy—infinitely—is a gradual rejection of all claims to truth and finally, destroys itself.

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Notes

  1. There is difference of opinions among logicians and epistemologists belonging to different philosophical schools regarding two issues: (a) whether the originating conditions of a piece of cognition are adequate for producing its truth/falsity and (b) whether a piece of cognition and its truth/falsity are apprehended together or not. Those who give an affirmative answer to the questions are called the svataḥ-theorists and those who give a negative answer to these questions are known as parataḥ-theorists. The Mimāṃsaka-s, the Vedantins and the Sāṃkhya philosophers propound the svataḥ-theories in respect of truth but parataḥ-theories in respect of falsity. While the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s and the Buddhists support parataḥ-theories in respect of truth, in case of falsity they diverge from each other. While the former offers a parataḥ-theory regarding the falsity of cognition, the Buddhists support a sataḥ-theory in case of falsity of cognition. According to the Jaina-s, the truth/falsity of cognition of a familiar object originates and is apprehended along with the cognition, while in case of cognition of an unfamiliar object some additional conditions need to be satisfied both for origination and apprehension of its truth/falsity.

  2. For this development, see Mohanty (1966); Especially sections IV and V of Introductory Essay and Appendices to the Second Edition.

  3. Vide Mohanty (1957).

  4. See Aurobindo (2005).

  5. From a lecture given at the Philosophy Seminar of the University of Göttingen on 2 July 1950; collated in Husserl (1929: 44).

  6. The Jaina-s would say that two sentences are inconsistent if their epistemic contents are incompatible in all possible dimensions. But determining that is impossible by an ordinary knower. For a detailed explanation of inconsistency in Jainism, see Sarkar (1997).

  7. See Mohanty (2000).

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Mohanty, J.N. Philosophy of Logic. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 35, 3–14 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-017-0107-9

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