Abstract
Introduction
This paper is introduced as the first in a series on a comparative study in phenomenology and Sāṅkhya. The issues intended to be investigated in this paper have been specified.
Intentionality
Brentano’s attempt to characterize the Cartesian division of the world with the help of his concept of intentionality, his theory of intentionality and difficulties associated with it are discussed.
Paradox and Remedy
Consciousness, which alone is argued to be intentional, is argued to make the world a paradoxical pseudo-totality preventing its theorization. The remedy for resolution of the paradox is presented.
Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality and ‘Paradigm of Consciousness’
The division of the world possible under the ‘Cartesian paradigm’ is shown to be of no help in resolving the paradox. Husserl’s theory of intentionality is shown to have distinguished itself from theories prior to it, in dividing the pseudo-totality that the world is, into genuine totalities under the ‘paradigm of consciousness’.
Phenomenological and ‘Natural’ Reduction
The possibility of the being of phenomenology as a science as well as, that of the ‘natural sciences’ comprising the physical sciences as well as psychology, is traced to their being sciences of genuine totalities made possible by the division under the ‘paradigm of consciousness’ by Husserl’s theory of intentionality.
Sāṅkhya
Sāṅkhya is argued to be a phenomenological discourse. In fact, it is argued to be a post-epoche discourse. Also, all cittavṛtti are argued to have their viṣaya, the concept which has been identified with ‘intentional object’ as the correlate of consciousness. Cittavṛtti, therefore, are argued to be intentional, and thereby equivalent to intentional mental processes. Parallels in Sāṅkhya to Husserl’s concepts of ‘matter’ and ‘quality’ of mental processes have been sought in Sāṅkhya.
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Notes
Love of learning.
Husserl, ‘Logical Investigations’, hereafter ‘LI’, followed optionally by the investigation no, section number, paragraph number in that section and line number in that paragraph, for example, in the present case: (LI V §10,2,7).
Husserl, ‘Ideas Pertaining to…’ hereafter ‘Ideas’, followed optionally by page number, paragraph no, line number, followed by section number, paragraph number, line number.
In fact, as per Husserl (cf. Ideas P 92,2,1; §49,3,1), it is absolute being, as against the being of objects, which can be thought of only as relative and relative again, to consciousness.
Mark the distinction from the manner in which term ‘intentional object’ has been used previously.
‘In the entire fullness of the concreteness within which they present themselves in their concrete context —- the stream of mental processes’ (Ideas, P61,2,1; §34,3,1).
Vṛtti-antaraviṣayikṛtatvam arthasya. (Tatva Vaiśāradī on Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.11 as given in Sāṅga Yoga Darśana, henceforth, SYD).
Henceforth, Sāṅkhya kārikā (2005) will be represented by ‘kārikā n’ at the end, where ‘n’ is the serial number of the kārikā. It will, if at all, be preceded by Kaumudī m, which stands for comment number m of Sāṅkhya tattva kaumudī. For example in this case (Koumudī 30 on kārikā 5).
Visinvanti viṣayiṇam anubadhnanti svena rūpeṇa nirūpaṇīyam kurvanti iti yāvat. (Koumudī 30 on kārikā 5).
Cittasya bāhyavastu-uparāgāt… (Vyāsabhāṣya on Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.7 as given in Sāṅkhya Yoga Dars´ana, hereafter SYD).
Cittaśabdena antaḥkaraṇam buddhim ca upalakṣayati. (Tattvavaiśāradī on Yoga sūtra 1).
While ‘buddhi’ is a technical term in Sāṅkhya, its dictionary meaning is ‘the power of forming and retaining conceptions and general notions, intelligence, mind, discernment, judgment, perception’. It derives from root ‘budh’ which means ‘to be aware, to be acquainted with’.
Monier-Williams (1899).
Vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ… (Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.5 in SYD).
Pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ. (Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.7 to 1.11 in SYD).
Trividham pramāṇam iṣṭam. (kārikā 4).
pratyakṣa-anumāna-āgamāḥ pramāṇāni. (Yogasūtra 1.7 in SYD).
Viṣayam viṣayam prati vartate iti prativiṣayam = indriyam. Artha-sannikṛṣṭam indriyam iti arthaḥ. (Koumudī 30 on Kārikā 5).
vṛttiḥ ca sannikarṣaḥ. (Koumudī 30 on kārikā 5).
Prativiṣaya-adhyavasāyaḥ dṛṣṭam. (kārikā 5) Tasmin adhyavasāyaḥ, tad āśritaḥ iti arthaḥ. Adhyavasāyaḥ buddhi-vyāpāraḥ jñānam. (Koumudī 30 on Kārikā 5).
Pramāṇasya viṣayaḥ vāstavaḥ. (Bhāsvatī on Yoga Sūtra1. 9 in SYD).
Pratyakṣasya sarva pramāṇeṣu jyeṣthatvāt tat adhīnatvāt ca anumānādīnām. (Koumudī 29 on kārikā 4).
Viparyayaḥ mithyā-jñānam atadrūpa-pratiṣṭhitam. (Yoga sūtra 1.8 in SYD) atadrūpa-pratiṣṭhitam, jñeyasya yad yathārtham rūpam na tad rūpa-pratiṣṭhitam, mithyajñānam iti. (Bhāsvatī on Yoga sūtra 1.8 in SYD).
Śabdajñāna-anupātī vastuśūnyaḥ vikalpaḥ. (Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.9).
Abhāvapratyay-ālambanā nidrā. (Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.10).
Anubhūtaviṣaya-asampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ. Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.7 to 1.11 in SYD).
Vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭa-akliṣṭāḥ (Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.5).
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Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this paper were presented, respectively, at Humanities-IIT-Kanpur, BPS-Philosophy-University of Mumbai and Philosophy-Pune University. I am thankful to the respective authorities and the respective audiences, for affording me opportunities of interaction. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Vineet Sahu of IIT, Kanpur, for his encouragement and to Prof Deepti Gangavane, for valuable criticism, which helped me in structuring my project. I am grateful to Prof S. M. Bhave. Prof Sibi George of IIT, Mumbai and Prof Pradeep Gokhle, Central University of Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, for several discussions and general guidance.
I would also like to remember with gratitude Prof S. D. Agashe, Prof S. S. Antarkar, Prof Ramakant Sinari, Dr G. Nagarjun and Dr K. Subrahmanyam for their encouragement particularly in the initial stages of my interest in philosophy.
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Burte, D.P. ‘Paradigm of Consciousness’, Phenomenology and Sāṅkhya. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 34, 19–32 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-016-0080-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-016-0080-8