Abstract
Thought experiments are one among the oldest and effectively employed tools of scientific reasoning. Hacking (Philos Sci 2:302–308, 1992) argues that thought experiments in contrast to real experiments do not have a life of their own. In this paper, I attempt to show that contrary to Hacking’s contentions, thought experiments do have a life of their own. The paper is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I review the reasons that Hacking sets out for believing in the life of experiments. Second section discusses Hacking’s characterization of thought experiments. The section also reviews his arguments for denying a life to thought experiments. In the third section, I argue for a life of thought experiments. In this section, I discuss the historical evolution of the EPR thought experiment and Galileo’s Free Falling Bodies in detail to show the untenability of Hacking’s arguments. The third section is followed by a conclusion that thought experiments do have a life of their own.
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Notes
The epistemic problem posed by thought experiments was best formulated by Thomas Kuhn. TEs by relying only upon familiar data produce knowledge about the external world. Kuhn then asks, “[H]ow, relying exclusively upon familiar data, can a thought experiment lead to new knowledge or new understanding of nature? (Kuhn 1977, 241). This, according to Kuhn, is the epistemological challenge posed by TEs. Broadly speaking one could identify four main responses to the above epistemological problem posed by TEs.
(1) Platonism: Some TEs enable the experimenter to perceive the laws of nature directly (See Brown 1991, 1992, 2002, 2004). (2) Argument View: TEs are picturesque arguments in disguise. The mechanism underlying TEs is nothing but argument (See Sorensen 1992; Norton 1991, 1996, 2004a, b; Reiss 2002; Clatterbuck 2013). (3) Mental Model account: Epistemology of TEs is that of model-based reasoning. The thought experimental narrative enables the experimenter to create and reason out with mental model/models of the scenarios in question (See Nersessain 2008, 1992; Gooding 1992). (4) Fictionalism: Thought experiments are stories with a moral. Competent followers will understand the moral once they are introduced to the TE (See Cartwright 2010; Davies 2010).
The discussion on the nature of TEs also revived the old debate between rationalism and empiricism. According to Brown, some TEs are windows to platonic universals and we could gain knowledge by employing mere thinking (See Brown 2004). Norton’s argument view emphasizes that TEs do not conjure up any knowledge that cannot be explained by an empiricist account (Norton 2004b).
Since this paper focuses explicitly on the notion of the “life of thought experiments,” I do not discuss the epistemological accounts of TEs any further.
The relation between theory and experiment is far more subtle and complex than that is discussed here. In the light of exploratory experiments, L.R. Franklin suggests that some experiments are theory-directed, but they do not test the theory. Exploratory experiments in general are merely directed and constrained by background theory (See Franklin 2005). If an experiment is only directed by the theory, then it is not necessary that the experiment tests the theory. Instead, the experiment is designed and executed from the perspective of the theories of the object in question (See Steinile 1997, 70). C. Kenneth Waters proposes another distinction between being theory-driven and being theory-informed. According to Waters, “If a scientist employs one kind of phenomenon to experiment on a separate kind of phenomenon, the experimentation on that separate kind of phenomenon is not necessarily directed by a theory of that separate kind of phenomenon. If it is not directed by such a theory, it would be more accurate to call the experiment theory-informed rather than theory-directed” (Waters 2007, 278, emphasis original). After proposing a threefold division of back-ground theories, model theories and phenomenological theories, Karaca argues that “in theory-driven type of experiments, all successive stages of experimentation, from planning and design up to data-analysis and data-interpretation, are performed by appealing to the theoretical accounts of the target phenomena. By contrast, I shall characterize the weak sense of theory-ladeness of experiment as being due to the utilization of theoretical considerations that have no guiding power on the progress of the experimental process” (Karaca 2013, 99). A detailed discussion about the relation between theory and experiment is beyond the scope of this paper. Since, the relation between theory and experiment suggested by Hacking suffices to argue for the life of TEs, I limit my discussion to Hacking.
According to Peter Galison (1987), experiments end when the experimenter believes that they have a result that will stand in the court. What are the laws of the court to which an experimenter has to submit his result? It is the court of scientific community, but the adjudication is a complex procedure. For example, it is evident that epistemic values alone cannot adjudicate between competing theories (Kuhn 1977). This suggests that an experiment per se would not help us in the situation of theory choice. Also, an experiment with a result beyond any possibility of interpretation, in ordinary circumstances, is a failed experiment. This means that the interpretation of the result or the data produced in an experiment is a crucial aspect of the experimentation process. Interpretation of data is a theory-dominant activity. For a discussion about the relation among data, evidence and theory, see Basu (2003). According to Basu, evidential relations are necessarily theory infected.
Since observation is an integral part of any experiment, theory-ladenness of observation also demands some explanation here. One of the issues is that the instruments for conducting experiments are built on the basis of theories. Therefore, observations made by employing such instruments are necessarily laden by the theories on the basis of which the instruments are built. In order to meet the above challenge, Chalmers argues that if the theory or theories on which the instruments are built have no direct bearing on the theory of the target object, then the observation could be considered as not theory-laden (See Chalmers 2003). Franklin (2007, 2012) has also set out detailed strategies for validating observation.
One could wonder about the different senses of “correspondence” here. But whatever be the nature of the correspondence, it has very little to do with the central point of this paper. So, I am not discussing it here.
Bohr has explained this by employing his principle of complementarity, which in a nutshell can be expressed as “a quantum system has no definite kinematical or dynamical state prior to any measurement” (Faye 2014). For a detailed but introductory account of Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, see Faye 2014.
Here, I am following a simple version of Bell's theorem explained by Leonard Susskind (2006) in his Stanford lectures on quantum entanglement. For the full lecture, follow http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlLsTaJn9AQ/10/10/2014. For a more simple version of the argument, follow http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAXxSKifgtU/10/10/2014. For a detailed but introductory account of Bell's theorem, see Shimony (2009).
Bohr's reply seems to have very little influence on the later developments of the EPR. In fact, those scientists who are dissatisfied with the Copenhagen interpretation and Bohr's reply contributed more to the development of the EPR and other interpretations of quantum mechanics. Since this paper focuses on the evolution of the EPR, Bohr's reply is not discussed in any detail. For a critical discussion of Bohr paper see Home and Whitaker 2007, 126–131.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Prof. Prajit Basu, Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, for correcting and commenting on the earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Dr. Prasantha Bandyopadhyay of the Montana State University for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper which helped me to shape the paper in its final form. Themeem T., my friend and fellow researcher in the Department of English, University of Hyderabad monitored my language. I am thankful to my friends in the Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad for patiently listening to the paper and voicing their comments. I am also indebted to the two anonymous reviewers of JICPR for helping me to improve the article.
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Shinod, N.K. Why Thought Experiments do have a Life of Their Own: Defending the Autonomy of Thought Experimentation Method. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 34, 75–98 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-016-0077-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-016-0077-3