Abstract
In this paper, I have explained free will (classical libertarian version) as the implied negation of our conscious physical actions (routine actions). What we come across is liberty, which is purposive. The existence of free will, if possible, can only be traced in those states where our consciousness is in least connection with external world (eg. dreams or above). The spontaneity and absurdity of free will ensures that it will never accompany any purposive action. I have pointed out that it is important to proceed in the inverted direction (from determining free will in mind, to non-moral and then to moral conditions), rather than taking it for granted in morality. I have also tried to give an explanation for the illusion of free will during moral conditions. The major principles which I have used during this conversation are Anomalous Monism (Donald Davidson), Benjamin Libet’s ‘Half-second short delay’, Decision-making theories of Antonio Damasio and Daniel Dennett, Patricia Churchland’s notion of ‘Self-control’, Frankfurt’s ‘Theory of the Hierarchy of desires’ and occasional references to Freud’s and Jung’s psychoanalytic concepts, and Advaita Vedanta’s ‘states of consciousness’, etc.
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Notes
Russell (1922), p. 221.
Dennett (2003), p. 93.
Harris (2012), p. 5.
There is a difference between sympathy and empathy, which could be precisely stated as one can empathize with other only if he, himself, had experienced that situation. Sympathizing, on the other hand, does not have this condition. For example, a born-rich person can only sympathize with a poor, but the one who has become rich from poor, can empathize with the poor. Hume (1896, pp. 166–70). However Hume uses contiguity for empathy.
Davidson (2001), pp. 207–225.
Radhakrishnan (1999), pp. 159–63.
Watson (1982), p. 9.
Frankfurt (1971), pp. 5–20.
Beck (1960), pp. 176–181, 207, 265–269.
Mill (1969), p. 219.
Dennett (1991), p. 401.
Damasio (1994), pp. xiii–xiv.
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Shukla, S. Free Will as the Implied Negation of Our Conscious Physical Actions. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 33, 315–326 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-016-0053-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-016-0053-y