Abstract
Many philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have held that the predominant modern western theories of ethics like Kant’s deontological theory and Mill’s Utilitarianism have failed to deliver as a “theory” of ethics. In other words, they are not successful as “decision procedures” whereby one can determine which action from a multitude of actions open before the agent would be right and therefore morally obligatory for him to do. In fact, the basic concepts of moral obligation, impartiality, and objectivity of moral standards has been questioned and pitted against the “personal point of view” of the agent. It has been held that the “moral goods” have to be given up for the sake of the “personal goods.” Is this a systemic fault which is linked with the normative nature of ethics? Or, can we understand ethics in a manner where it can be objective and yet not have to give up on the plurality of moral and nonmoral goods? Can ethical theory in this sense function as an “action guide to moral practice”? These are some questions that will be taken up in the paper against the backdrop of the views of the critics of ethical theory.
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Notes
I continue to call ethical theories as “theories” although it is their “theory status” that is at issue in the paper. I presume that the context would make this clear in each case. I have put the first letter of “theory” in caps when I wish to denote theory which uses decision procedures and is reductionist.
Brian Leiter, “Nietzsche and the Morality Critics”, Ethics, Vol. 107. No. 2 (Jan., 1997), pp. 250–285. All references to Leiter’s paper will be given in parentheses in the text of the paper henceforth.
In Indian Philosophy, there is no theorizing about ethics. In fact, Buddha in his teachings often emphasized the futility about raising metaphysical questions related to morality, for instance about the metaphysical status of the moral agent, etc. The emphasis was more on action guiding principles to improve moral character.
It appears that Bernard Williams in some of his writings is more of a Morality critic than a Theory Critic, but this is not so obvious.
The definition of “non-moral goods” is debatable as some philosophers include such goods as being within the purview of the standpoint of morality. Leiter calls nonmoral goods as “personal goods.”
I owe the coinage of these phrases to Prof. Bijoy Boruah in a discussion on these topics.
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Motilal, S. Is Ethical Theory Opposed to Moral Practice?. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 32, 289–299 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-015-0026-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-015-0026-6