Abstract
This paper studies the impact of cooperative R&D and advertising on innovation and welfare in a duopolistic industry. The model incorporates two symmetric firms producing differentiated products. Firms invest in R&D and advertising in the presence of R&D spillovers and advertising spillovers. Advertising spillovers may be positive or negative. Four cooperative structures are studied: no cooperation, R&D cooperation, advertising cooperation, R&D and advertising cooperation. R&D spillovers and advertising spillovers always increase innovation and welfare if products are highly differentiated and/or spillovers are sufficiently high. The ranking of cooperation settings in terms of R&D, profits and welfare depends on product differentiation, R&D spillovers and advertising externalities. Firms always prefer cooperation on both dimensions, which is socially beneficial only when advertising and R&D spillovers are sufficiently high.
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Notes
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are living organisms whose genetic material has been artificially manipulated in a laboratory through genetic engineering.
Spillovers refer to R&D and advertising spillovers.
The complementary view admits that advertising may contain information and influence consumer behavior accordingly. However, the consumer may value “social prestige,” and advertising by a firm may be an input that contributes toward the prestige that increases satisfaction when the firm’s product is consumed.
Advertising in this paper is not similar to advertising a price for a product, which is purely informative.
Detailed analysis and proofs are provided in the “Appendix”.
\( AE = \frac{{\partial \pi_{1} }}{{\partial a_{2} }} = \frac{{2\left( {2\theta - b} \right)\left[ {\left( {k - \alpha } \right) + \left( {1 + \theta } \right)a_{2} + \left( {1 + \beta } \right)x_{2} } \right]}}{{\left( {2 - b} \right)\left( {2 + b} \right)^{2} }} \).
\( RE = \frac{{\partial \pi_{1} }}{{\partial x_{2} }} = \frac{{2\left( {2\beta - b} \right)\left[ {\left( {k - \alpha } \right) + \left( {1 + \theta } \right)a_{2} + \left( {1 + \beta } \right)x_{2} } \right]}}{{\left( {2 - b} \right)\left( {2 + b} \right)^{2} }} \).
RA internalizes the sum of AE and RE, such that \( \frac{{\partial \pi_{1} }}{{\partial x_{2} }} + \frac{{\partial \pi_{1} }}{{\partial a_{2} }} = \frac{{4\left( {\theta + \beta - b} \right)\left[ {\left( {k - \alpha } \right) + \left( {1 + \theta } \right)a_{2} + \left( {1 + \beta } \right)x_{2} } \right]}}{{\left( {2 - b} \right)\left( {2 + b} \right)^{2} }} \).
This situation corresponds to the last two cases of Proposition 4 above, as already mentioned.
This corresponds to the first seven cases of Proposition 4.
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Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee, David Brown, Zhiqi Chen, Meredith Lilly, Aggey Semenov, Marcel Voia, Hashmat Khan, Patrick Coe, and Eric Kam as well as audience participants at the Meeting of the 53rd Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association (CEA), for useful comments which have improved the paper. The paper also benefited from the guidance of seminar participants at Carleton University.
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Appendix
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Taking the derivative of Eq. (A.1) with respect to own R&D and advertising and the competitor’s to evaluate the strategic interaction shows that:
- (1)
\( \frac{{\partial^{2} \pi_{i} }}{{\partial x_{i} \partial x_{j} }} > 0 \) if \( \left( {2\beta - b} \right) > 0 \); otherwise, it is negative.
- (2)
\( \frac{{\partial^{2} \pi_{i} }}{{\partial x_{i} \partial a_{j} }} > 0 \) if \( \left( {2\theta - b} \right) > 0 \); otherwise, it is negative.
- (3)
\( \frac{{\partial^{2} \pi_{i} }}{{\partial a_{i} \partial x_{j} }} > 0 \) if \( \left( {2\beta - b} \right) > 0 \); otherwise, it is negative.
- (4)
\( \frac{{\partial^{2} \pi_{i} }}{{\partial a_{i} \partial a_{j} }} > 0 \) if \( \left( {2\theta - b} \right) > 0 \); otherwise, it is negative.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Note that to simplify the analysis, \( \lambda \) is fixed at \( \lambda = 1 \) by assumption. Output is positive if \( k > \alpha \). Considering \( k = \alpha \;{\text{and}}\; \lambda = 1 \) and evaluating \( p \) at different parameter values indicates the validity of \( \gamma \) and shows that it meets the required thresholds where required.
Evaluating the above equations for any value of parameters shows that R&D spillovers have a positive impact on innovation, output, profit, and welfare when firms cooperate in R&D. Otherwise, the impact is positive if R&D spillovers are low enough.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Evaluating the above equations for any value of parameters shows that advertising spillovers have a positive impact on innovation, output, profit, and welfare when firms cooperate in advertising. Otherwise, the impact is positive if advertising spillovers are low enough.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Section 3 provides the formula for \( x_{i} \), \( \pi_{i} \), and \( W \) as a function of other parameters. Taking the deduction of each pair of equations shows that for any parameter set that yields a valid price value (\( p > 0 \)) the following holds.
- (1)
If \( b = \beta = 0 \) and \( \theta < 0 \), then \( X_{NN} = X_{RN} > X_{NA} = X_{RA} \), \( \pi_{NN} = \pi_{RN} > \pi_{NA} = \pi_{RA} \), and \( W_{NN} = W_{RN} > W_{NA} = W_{RA} \)
- (2)
If \( b = 0 \), \( 0 < \beta < 0.1 \), and \( \theta < 0, \) then \( X_{RN} > X_{NN} > X_{RA} > X_{NA} \) and \( W_{RN} > W_{NN} > W_{RA} > W_{NA} \).
- (3)
If \( b = 0 \) and \( \beta > 0.1, \) and \( \theta < 0, \) then \( X_{RN} > X_{RA} > X_{NN} > X_{NA} \) and \( W_{RN} > W_{RA} > W_{NN} > W_{NA} \).
- (4)
\( X_{NA} > X_{RA} \) if \( \theta < - b/2 \) and \( \beta < b/2 \)
- (5)
\( X_{RN} > X_{NA} \) if \( \theta < - b/2 \) and \( \beta < b/2 \)
- (6)
\( X_{RA} > X_{RN} \) if \( \theta > b/2 \)
- (7)
\( X_{NA} > X_{NN} \) if \( \theta > b/2 \)
- (8)
\( X_{RN} > X_{NN} \) if \( \beta > b/2 \)
- (9)
\( X_{RN} > X_{NA} \) if \( \theta < \beta \)
- (10)
\( X_{NA} > X_{RA} \) if \( \theta < b/2 \) and \( \beta < b/2 \)
- (11)
\( X_{NN} > X_{RA} \) if \( \theta < b/2 \) and \( \beta < b/2 \)
- (12)
\( \pi_{RA} > \pi_{NA} > \pi_{RN} > \pi_{NN} \) if \( \beta \ne 0 \).
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Pourkarimi, P., Atallah, G. The Impact of Cooperative R&D and Advertising on Innovation and Welfare. J. Quant. Econ. 18, 143–167 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40953-019-00176-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40953-019-00176-w