Abstract
Protocol analysis, in the form of concurrent verbal ‘thinking aloud’ reports, is a method of collecting and analyzing data about cognitive processes. This approach can help economists in evaluating competing theories of behavior and in categorizing heterogeneity of thinking patterns. As a proof of concept, I tested this method in the context of a guessing game. I found that concurrent think aloud protocols can inform us about individual’s thought processes without affecting decisions. The method allowed me to identify game theoretic thinking and heterogeneous approaches to unravelling the guessing game. The think aloud protocol is inexpensive and scalable, and it is a useful tool for identifying empirical regularities regarding decision processes.
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Notes
Confusion happens when the environment the researcher has setup to observe behaviors is not the same environment perceived by the subjects.
There are many important contributions on communication in experimental settings. Here I narrowed my attention to works that more explicitly used verbal reports to trace decision processes. See Brandts et al. (2019) for a review of the communication literature in experiments.
A criticism of TAP is that participants may feel watched and/or judged by the experimenter when expressing their thoughts. The additional incentive to elicit thought processes could have accentuated this problem. However, after having run pilot experiments, I realized that subjects at my university needed incentives to write. The instructions are included in the supplemental materials.
CRT − 16.161 (5.852); z_errWM 9.598 (4.550); z_Imotiv − 6.617(5.818). Robust SE in parentheses.
Disagreements had to do mostly with D > 2 and L > 2 classifications. That said, the method is not devoid of error, but I devised the majority voting rule to reduce error in classifying subjects.
This particular individual’s second round choice was 70!
See Penczynski (2018) for an exploration of the use of machine learning techniques for analyzing communication content from experiments.
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Capra, C.M. Understanding decision processes in guessing games: a protocol analysis approach. J Econ Sci Assoc 5, 123–135 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-019-00074-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-019-00074-0