Abstract
This paper talks about a small open economy comprising of three sectors: two formal sectors and one informal sector. One of these formal sectors uses a specific factor which is specially trained labor. “Special training” can easily encompass the issues such as vocational training, technical training, computer literacy, software knowledge etc. Unskilled workers have the option of being trained to get a job in high wage skilled sector or to be employed in the informal sector. In such situation, an inflow of educational capital leads to a change in informal wage while formal wage and rental will remain unchanged. Under reasonable condition informal wage may even go up. Though we have mixed effect in formal sector, informal sector must shrink. An extended version of the model with the incorporation of the effect of trade liberalization policy predicts just the opposite results with regard to informal output and formal wage.
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Notes
Fixed proportion technology for education in the production of skilled labor is very important in our model. This helps us to understand as to how an inflow of E can directly lead to an increase in S 1 and also L 1. If the technology is not assumed to be fixed there could have been factor substitution between L and E owing to change in \(\frac{W}{R}\) which happens in our model. This may again lead to some changes in sectoral composition. We want to avoid such situation in order to focus only on the endowment effect. We are thankful to the referee for clarifying this argument.
\(\overline{W}\) = Wage of formal unskilled labor, \({W_{S}}_{s}\) = Wage of skilled labor, W = Informal wage, R = return to Educational capital, r = return to physical capital, X = Output of formal sector using skilled labor, Y = Output of formal sector using unskilled labor, Z = Output of informal sector, \(P_{X}\), \(P_{Y}\) = Exogenous commodity prices, E, L, K = Total supply of educational capital, labor and physical capital respectively, S = original endowment of skilled labor in the economy, \(L_{1} = S_{1}\) is the amount of unskilled labor upgraded to skilled labor, \(a_{ij}\) = Input coefficients, \(\theta_{ij}\) = Relative share of ith input in the total value of the jth commodity where i = S,L,K and j = X,Y,Z, ‘^’ represents percentage changes for particular variables.
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We are thankful to Soumyadip Chattopadhyay for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Constructive comments from Prasun Bhattacharjee, Saswati Chaudhuri are also gratefully acknowledged. This paper is based on a chapter of the Ph.D dissertation of the second author. We are also thankful to the anonymous referee and the editor of this journal for their insightful comments that helped us to improve the exposition of this paper. However, the usual disclaimer applies.
Appendices
Appendix A
Differentiating Eq. (2) and using zero-profit and envelope condition we get
Similarly Eqs. (1) and (3) yield
Differentiating Eq. (7) gives \(\hat{{S_{1} }} = \hat{E}\) (15) as educational capital has no other alternative use except for training the informal workers.
Differentiating Eq. (4), (5) and (6) and then manipulating them we derive at the following sets of equations
Rearranging Eqs. (16) and (17) in a matrix form we solve for
Substituting the values of \(\hat{Y}\) and \(\hat{Y}\) in Eq. (9) and manipulating it we derive the expression for
where \(\nu_{X} = \frac{{\beta P_{X} X}}{{\left( {1 - \beta } \right)P_{z} Z}}\), \(\nu_{Y} = \frac{{\beta P_{Y} Y}}{{\left( {1 - \beta } \right)P_{Z} Z}}.\)
\(P_{z}\) would increase if \(\frac{{\lambda_{{S_{1} T}} }}{{\lambda_{{S_{1} L}} }}\lambda_{KX} < \frac{{\nu_{Y} \lambda_{KZ} + \lambda_{KY} }}{{\nu_{Y} \lambda_{LZ} + \lambda_{LY} }}\).
From (14) again \(\hat{W} = \frac{{\hat{{P_{Z} }}}}{{\theta_{LZ} }}\). Thus \(\hat{W} > 0\) if \(\hat{{P_{Z} }} > 0\).
Differentiating Eq. (8) we have
Note \(S_{T} = S + S_{1}\)
\(\left| \lambda \right| = \lambda_{LY} \lambda_{KZ} - \lambda_{LZ} \lambda_{KY}\) < 0 as Z is a labor intensive sector and Y is capital intensive sector.
Appendix B
Differentiating Eq. (10) and solving for \(\hat{r}\) we get
Since \(\hat{W}\) and \(P_{Y}\) do not change, and using the envelope condition [\(a_{LY} \theta_{LY} + a_{KY} \theta_{KY} = 0\)].
The above expression yields:
\(\hat{r}\theta_{KY} = \alpha \hat{t}\), where \(\alpha = \frac{t}{(1 + t)}\) and, the \(\theta_{KY} = \frac{{a_{KY} r}}{{P_{Y} (1 + t)}}\)e income share of physical capital in sector Y.
Thus
Now differentiating Eq. (1) and substituting the expression for \(\hat{r}\) we get
Again, differentiating Eq. (3) and substituting \(\hat{r}\) we get
If E does not change and \(S_{1}\), \(L_{1}\) and K remains constant then no endowment effect (or Rybczzynski) is observed. However, there could be a possibility of factor substitution in X first and then in other commodities.
Equation (4) yields:
Using the expression for elasticity of substitution between S and K in X we have
Using the envelope condition Eq. (26) and (27) are modified as
Again substituting these values in Eq. (26) we obtain
From Eq. (27) we have
Substituting the above expression in Eq. (31) we have
Using Eq. (25) we obtain
Differentiating Eqs. (5) and (6) and substituting the expression for elasticity of substitution we arrange them in matrix form to yield the following sets of equations
Similarly,
Substituting the values of \(\hat{Y}\) and \(\hat{Z}\) in Eq. (11) and manipulating it we derive the expression for \(\widehat{{P_{Z} }} = \nu_{X} \hat{X} + \nu_{Y} \left( {\hat{Y} + t\hat{Y} + t\hat{t}} \right) - \hat{Z}\)
Now,
From Eq. (24), \(\hat{W} > 0\).
The expression for the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled labor (or formal and informal labor) is given by
Using this result and Eq. (8) we obtain \(\hat{R}\) > 0.
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Mandal, B., Roy, S. Inflow of educational capital, trade liberalization, skill formation and informal sector. Eurasian Econ Rev 8, 115–129 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-017-0083-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-017-0083-z