Abstract
Do humans have cognitive adaptations for detecting violations of rules in multiple moral domains? Previous research using the Wason Selection Task has provided evidence for domain-specific mechanisms for detecting violations of social exchange and hazard precaution rules. The present study investigates whether similar evidence can be found for mechanisms for detecting violations of rules relating to soliciting aid, maintaining coalitions, and navigating hierarchies. Participants (n = 887) completed one of seven Wason Selection Tasks—five sociomoral tasks (exchange, hazard, aid, coalition, and submission) and two controls (descriptive and general deontic). Participants also completed the short form Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) as a self-report measure of five corresponding sets of moral values. The study found that, as predicted, performance on all five sociomoral tasks was significantly better than performance on the two control tasks. However, there was no relationship between task performance and corresponding moral values. These results provide initial evidence for cognitive adaptations for detecting violations of rules relating to providing aid, maintaining coalitions, and submitting to authority. We outline how future research might provide additional tests of this theory, and thereby further extend our understanding of the foundations of human sociomoral reasoning.
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Notes
Other lines of evidence are consistent with cheater-detection being an evolved component of human psychology include: social contract content effects have been demonstrated early in development (Harris et al. 2001) and across cultures (Sugiyama et al. 2002); and a neurological case-study with an individual with focal frontal-lobe brain injury suggests that this ability may be subtended by specific cognitive-neural processes in particular brain areas (Stone et al. 2002).
The questionnaire includes four items from each of the five domains, plus two dummy items that serve as attention checks.
There are 16 possible responses to a Wason Selection Task: (1) no cards; (2) P; (3) nP; (4) Q; (5) nQ; (6) P and nP; (7) P and Q; (8) P and nQ (the correct answer); (9) nP and Q; (10) nP and nQ; (11) Q and nQ; (12) P, nP and Q; (13) P, nP, and nQ; (14) P, Q, and nQ; (15) nP, Q, and nQ; (16) all cards. Hence, the probability of giving the right answer by chance is 1/16 = 6.25%.
A reviewer asked whether there are sex differences in Wason task performance. For example, given a coalitional context, men might exhibit a higher correct response rate compared to women, given that men faced greater selection pressures to form and maintain coalitions during intergroup conflict (Wrangham and Peterson 1996) and given that men which generally display greater ingroup favoritism are more discriminating and hostile towards outgroup members (Navarrete et al. 2010) and display greater repugnance and hostility towards ingroup defectors (Boyd et al. 2003). After conducting a moderation analysis for sex differences, we found a significant sex moderation effect of the coalition vs submission conditions, but in the opposite direction. Specifically, women were more adept at detecting violations of the coalition rule, whereas men were more adept at detecting violations of the submission rule. Because the moderation effect was in the opposite direction of what was argued and because the fit of the sex-moderated model was worse than that of model 2 (see Table 4, model 4), we proceeded with the hypothesized analyses.
The details and syntax of our power analysis simulation study are available in the supplemental materials.
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Acknowledgements
This research was supported by Kellogg College, University of Oxford. Thanks to Leda Cosmides, Larry Fiddick, Clark Barrett, Joe Manson, Dan Fessler, Kotrina Kajokaite, Rob Kurzban, Gary L. Brase, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful discussions.
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Appendix A: Full text of Wason Selection Tasks
Appendix A: Full text of Wason Selection Tasks
Exchange
The Rangers are a local basketball team that has been winning a lot lately. The coach and the executive staff care about the team a great deal and try their best to help the players, and most players seem to be enjoying playing for the team this season. As the team belongs to the local sports center, there is a rule: If someone plays for the Rangers, then they must pay a membership fee. Some of the players have been avoiding paying for a membership, thinking that they could keep playing and that it could go unnoticed. You are a member of the team staff, so you are interested to see which of the players are following the rule. The cards below represent four people. Each card represents one person. One side of a card gives reliable information about whether or not the person plays for the Rangers. The other side of the same card tells you if that person paid or did not pay for a membership fee. You can use the information the cards provide to discover information about the player. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these players have broken this rule: If someone plays for the Rangers, then they must pay a membership fee.
Hazard
The Rangers are a local basketball team. As players should stay clean after games, the coach and the executive staff made some rules in order to promote cleanliness. There is a rule in the team: If a player has a dirty jersey, then that player must wash it. Some of the players often neglect cleanliness and have not been washing their jerseys. You are a member of the team staff, so you are interested to see which of the players are following the rule. The cards below represent four players. Each card represents one person. One side of the card gives reliable information as to whether that player had a dirty jersey. The other side of the same card tells you whether that player has washed his jersey. You can use the information the cards provide to discover information about the player. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these players have broken this rule: If a player has a dirty jersey, then that player must wash it.
Aid
The Rangers are a local basketball team that provides a supportive social environment for its players. In order to encourage players to care for their fellow teammates, the coach and executive staff have made several rules in order to promote helping behavior. One of the rules is: If a player sees a teammate get injured, then that player must help the injured teammate. However, some of the players have been deliberately avoiding helping their fellow teammates. You are a member of the team staff, and you are interested in whether any of the players have violated this rule. The cards below represent four people. Each card represents one person. One side of the card gives reliable information about whether or not the person has seen an injured teammate. The other side of the same card tells you if that person helped or did not help his fellow teammate. You can use the information that the cards provide to discover information about that player. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these players have broken this rule: If a player sees a teammate get injured, then that player must help the injured teammate.
Coalition
The Rangers are a local basketball team that has been losing a lot lately. Despite the fact that the coach and the executive staff, care about the team a great deal and try their best to help the players, some players are thinking of quitting the team in the middle of the season. There is a rule in the team: If someone plays for the Rangers, then they must wear a green jersey. As an act of rebellion, some of the players have recently been showing up to practice wearing a wrong colored jersey. You are a member of the team staff. As the jersey represents group loyalty, you are interested to see which of the players are following the rule. The cards below represent four players. Each card represents one player. One side of a card gives reliable information about whether that player plays for the Rangers or for a different team. The other side of the same card tells you the color of the jersey the player is wearing. You can use the information the cards provide to discover information about the player. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these players have broken this rule: If someone plays for the Rangers, then they must wear a green jersey.
Submission
The Rangers are a local basketball team. The coach and the executive staff care about the team a great deal and try their best to help the players. Since basketball players should respect the authority of the team staff, there is a rule in the team: If a player sees the coach entering the court, then that player must respectfully stand up. Sometimes players choose to be disrespectful to the coach and do not follow the rule. You are a member of the team staff, so you are interested to see which of the players are following the rule. The cards below represent four players. Each card represents one person. One side of the card gives reliable information as to whether that player witnessed the coach entering the court. The other side of the same card tells you whether that player stood up respectfully after the coach entered the court. You can use the information the cards provide to discover information about the player. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these players have broken this rule: If a player sees the coach entering the court, then that player must respectfully stand up.
Descriptive
The Rangers are a local basketball team. You are starting a job as a local sports journalist interested in different local teams and you heard from one of your colleagues that: If someone plays for the Rangers, then they wear a green jersey. As you are writing about the different sports teams in the area, you are interested to see if this rule applies for people playing for the Rangers. The cards below represent four players. Each card represents one player. One side of a card gives reliable information about whether or not the player plays for the Rangers. The other side of the same card tells you the color of the jersey the player is wearing. You can use the information the cards provide to discover information about the player. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these players violate this rule: If someone plays for the Rangers, then they wear a green jersey.
Deontic
The Rangers are a local basketball team that has distinct rules regarding the uniforms they wear for their games. The team has a rule regarding the dress code for shoes: If a player wears white socks, then he must wear white shoes. Some players don’t feel like following the rule and have been showing up to practice wearing shoe and sock combinations that are not in accordance with the rule. You are a member of the team staff, so you are interested to see which of the players are following this rule. The cards below represent four people who are members of the Rangers, which showed up for practice this week. Each card represents one player. One side of a card gives reliable information about whether or not a player wore white socks for practice. The other side of the same card tells you the shoe color that the player wore with his socks. You can use the information the cards provide to discover information about the player. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these players have broken this rule: If a player wears white socks, then he must wear white shoes.
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Sivan, J., Curry, O.S. & Van Lissa, C.J. Excavating the Foundations: Cognitive Adaptations for Multiple Moral Domains. Evolutionary Psychological Science 4, 408–419 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40806-018-0154-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40806-018-0154-8