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Challenges to an Efficient European Centralised Banking Supervision (SSM): Single Rulebook, Joint Supervisory Teams and Split Supervisory Tasks

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Abstract

The establishment of centralized supervision by means of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) had to ensure the quality and impartiality of banking supervision, as well as the establishment of a supervisory system more properly aligned with the characteristics of the banking sector. The far-reaching mixed administration of the European Central Bank (ECB) and national competent authorities (NCAs) must also ensure strong and consistent supervision across the participating member states while using the NCAs’ local and specific know-how. All elements indicate that a more effective banking supervision was necessary for the Eurozone. This may be challenging given the conflict between the required centralisation of supervision, on the one hand, and the far-reaching mixed administration and composite legal order in place on the other. The first years of experience with the SSM provide a multi-faceted picture of the effectiveness of centralised supervision. This paper discusses the effectiveness of centralised supervision within the context of a far-reaching mixed administration and legal order on the basis of three different elements. Firstly, the basis of supervision is discussed, i.e. the applicable substantive laws for which compliance must be ensured by the ECB, and which concerns the so-called Single Rulebook. Secondly, the organisation of supervision, in practice, is discussed on the basis of one of its most important features: the Joint Supervisory Teams. Lastly, the delineation of supervisory tasks is discussed, as well as its impact on the ECB and, based on the Dutch example, its impact on national supervisory models. These elements illustrate the many steps that have been taken to improve the effectiveness of centralised supervision. They also show how many obstacles are still left to overcome.

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Notes

  1. Cf. Jans et al. (2015), p. 7.

  2. Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union.

  3. Euro area summit statement, Brussels, 29 June 2012, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/euro-summit/documents-2010-2013/ (accessed 25 April 2017); Memo ‘Commission proposes a package for banking supervision in the Eurozone—frequently asked questions’, Brussels/Strasbourg, 12 September 2012, p. 2. The European Council took account of the Euro area summit statement in its conclusions of 28/29 June 2012, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-76-2012-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 25 April 2017). For a discussion about the vicious circle between the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis, including the establishment of a nexus between banks and the sovereigns, see: C. Scheinert, ‘Vicious circles: The interplay between Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crises’, briefing European Parliament Think Tank, 6 June 2016, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)583806 (accessed 25 April 2017); Box 1 of European Commission Memo, Updated version of first memo published on 15 April 2014, Banking Union: Restoring Financial Stability in the Eurozone, Brussels, 9 March 2015.

  4. Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 511 final. The Commission published a Roadmap towards a Banking Union (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 510 final) and a proposal for amending the EBA Regulation (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards its interaction with Council Regulation (EU) No…/… conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 512 final), available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/banking-union/single-supervisory-mechanism/index_en.htm (accessed 26 April 2017).

  5. Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (hereinafter: SSM Regulation).

  6. Art. 2(9) SSM Regulation.

  7. Cf. Art. 4(1) in conjunction with Art. 6(4) SSM Regulation. The so-called Common Procedures are excluded from the division of responsibilities. This means that the ECB is competent to grant or withdraw authorisations and to assess notifications of the acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings in credit institutions (cf. Art. 6(4) in conjunction with Art. 4(1)(a) and (c) SSM Regulation).

  8. Art. 6(1) of the SSM Regulation.

  9. Art. 6(3) of the SSM Regulation.

  10. Cf. Jans et al. (2015), pp. 7 and 31–35, who refer to this process of co-operative implementation of Union law as shared administration. See also about mixed administrations and the legal questions arising from such complicated systems, inter alia: Della Cananea (2004); Eliantonio (2014), pp. 65–102; Hofmann (2009).

  11. ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, Report by President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, Brussels, 26 June 2012, EUCO 120/12, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-120-2012-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 26 April 2017).

  12. ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, Report by President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, Brussels, 26 June 2012, EUCO 120/12, p. 3, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-120-2012-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 26 April 2017).

  13. Cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 510 final, p. 9. The third element of the first building block, i.e. a European deposit insurance scheme, is still work in progress (cf. para. 8(d) of the Council conclusions on a roadmap to complete the Banking Union, Press Release 353/16, 17 June 2016, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/6/47244642837_en.pdf (accessed 26 April 2017)).

  14. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Brussels, 10 July 2013, COM(2013) 520 final.

  15. Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 (hereinafter: SRM Regulation).

  16. Art. 99 of the SRM Regulation. Cf. Press release of the European Commission, ‘Single Resolution Mechanism to come into effect for the Banking Union’, Brussels 31 December 2015, IP/14/2784.

  17. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 510 final, p. 3.

  18. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 510 final, p. 7.

  19. Cf. Principle 1 of the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, September 2012, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf (accessed 26 April 2017).

  20. Art. 1 SSM Regulation.

  21. Ottow (2006), pp. 76–77 (an English summary is available at pp. 385–396). Ottow identifies inter alia these elements in the context of her research of the influence of European and Dutch administrative (procedural) law on telecommunications supervision. In more recent work, she identifies principles of good agency behaviour, which includes the effectiveness principle. In this context, the effectiveness principle focusses on ‘enforcement with its tools and instruments’, which in turn covers the sub-values of ‘speed, efficiency, flexibility, and prioritization’ [Ottow (2015), p. 87].

  22. For more information about the Single Rulebook, see inter alia: http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-rulebook; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/banking-union/single-rulebook/ (accessed 26 April 2017). The Single Rulebook is a term used to indicate the entire set of rules for the financial sector, with the emphasis on harmonisation of these rules. It is more a political concept, and not clearly defined. (Cf. Lefterov (2015), pp. 7–11).

  23. ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, Report by President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, Brussels, 26 June 2012, EUCO 120/12, p. 4, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-120-2012-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 26 April 2017); Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 510 final, p. 4. The importance of the role of the Single Rulebook has repeatedly been stressed by the European legislator when setting up the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The SSM Regulation was accompanied by an amendment of the EBA Regulation in order to avoid fragmentation of the internal market due to the establishment of the SSM. The EBA’s role to further develop the Single Rulebook needed to be preserved. Besides, the EBA was given an additional task to develop a Single Handbook accompanying the Single Rulebook to ensure further convergence of supervisory practices throughout the Union (see: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards its interaction with Council Regulation (EU) No…/… conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 512 final, p. 3).

  24. Keynote speech by Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the Workshop of the European Banking Institute (EBI) hosted by the ECB, Frankfurt, 27 January 2016.

  25. Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012.

  26. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directive 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC.

  27. Cf. Arts. 10 and 15 of the Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (‘EBA Regulation’).

  28. Cf. Lefterov (2015), p. 17; Ferrarini and Recine (2015), p. 118.

  29. Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm. For a discussion about the origins of the CRD IV package, see: Theissen (2013), pp. 27–70.

  30. Art. 4(3) SSM Regulation.

  31. Art. 91 CRD IV. With respect to the fit and proper assessments, the ECB has published principles, i.e. five essential criteria, which apply to all candidates, despite the differences in national law. This harmonised interpretation of suitability leaves without saying that the ECB still has to deal with varying procedures, e.g. different points at which the assessment procedure is started in each country. Sometimes banks have to apply to or notify their NCA once candidates have taken up their new roles, and sometimes prior approval is required before candidates can start. The ECB pointed out that this complicates it works considerably and that it would like to see this topic to be part of the CRD IV revision in order to get a harmonised framework. (ECB website, Supervision explained, ‘what is fit and proper supervision?’, https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/ssmexplained/html/fap.en.html (accessed 1 May 2017)).

  32. Cf. Keynote speech by Sabine Lautenschläger, supra n. 25. She refers to the examples that supervisors of some member states have to assess both members of management bodies and key function holders, whereas the CRD IV only refers to the first group, and the different method used by supervisors in order to assess such candidates (e.g. whether they use questionnaires only or also face-to-face interviews) and that some Member States have applicable time lines, whereas others do not have any time lines.

  33. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, Brussels, 12 September 2012, COM(2012) 510 final, pp. 4-5; Council conclusions on a roadmap to complete the Banking Union, Press Release 353/16, 17 June 2016, para. 7(c), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/6/47244642837_en.pdf (accessed 27 April 2017).

  34. The rules laid down in the CRR relate to prudential requirements for inter alia banks and are considered to be important for the smooth functioning of the internal market (Recital 7 CRR. Cf. Recital 2 CRD IV). Accordingly, the regulation is based on Art. 114 TFEU, since no other legal basis is provided for by the Treaty. (For a brief explanation about Art. 114 TFEU being a residual provision, see: Craig and de Búrca (2011), p. 590).

  35. Measures, as referred to in Art. 114 TFEU, include inter alia regulations. Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2011), p. 590.

  36. The CRD IV’s main objective and subject/matter is ‘to coordinate national provisions regarding access to the activity of credit institutions and investment firms, the modalities for their governance and their supervisory framework’ (Recital 2 CRD IV. Cf. Recital 6 CRR).

  37. Cf. Recital 2 CRD IV.

  38. For an explanation of the move of the legal basis of the banking rules during the crisis, see: Theissen (2013), pp. 107–109.

  39. It is not always clear why certain rules are included in either the CRR or CRD IV. For example, governance rules are laid down in the CRD IV as well. They are part of the authorisation requirements—and thus relevant for market access indeed— but are not only related to market access. However, due to the dependence of the cultural specificities, governance rules seem to be more difficult to fully harmonise. The implementation of governance rules may require a more tailor-made implementation for each Member State. Possibly, these rules have thus been included in the directive in order to facilitate the different political wishes in this field and to allow for national implementation in the context of their cultural specificities.

  40. Cf. Public consultation on the draft Regulation and Guide of the European Central Bank on the exercise of options and discretions in Union law, Questions and answers, Question 6, available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/reporting/pub_con_options_discretions_qa.en.pdf?82fb798092138f9e4a00719a06ee26c1 (accessed 27 April 2017).

  41. Art. 4(3) SSM Regulation.

  42. Regulation (EU) 2016/445 of the European Central Bank of 14 March 2016 on the exercise of options and discretions available in Union law (ECB/2016/4), available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/oj_jol_2016_078_r_0011_en_txt.pdf (accessed 27 April 2017).

  43. ECB Guide on options and discretions available in union law, March 2016, available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ecb_guide_options_discretions.en.pdf?62da619681f6f78cccd466076978160b (accessed 27 April 2017).

  44. Cf. Public consultation on the draft Regulation and Guide of the European Central Bank on the exercise of options and discretions in Union law, Questions and answers, Question 1, available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/reporting/pub_con_options_discretions_qa.en.pdf?82fb798092138f9e4a00719a06ee26c1 (accessed 27 April 2017).

  45. Cf. Public consultation on the draft Regulation and Guide of the European Central Bank on the exercise of options and discretions in Union law, Questions and answers, Question 2, available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/reporting/pub_con_options_discretions_qa.en.pdf?82fb798092138f9e4a00719a06ee26c1 (accessed 27 April 2017).

  46. Cf. Babis (2014). Babis concludes that the CRR/CRD IV packages are just the beginning of the single rulebook (p. 38). Also: Andrea Enria’s speech at the University of Padova, ‘The Single Rulebook in banking: is it “single” enough?’, 28 September 2015.

  47. Cf. Recital 34 and Art. 4(3) of the SSM Regulation.

  48. Note that NCAs still have to apply their national laws themselves with regard to less significant institutions.

  49. For more about legal certainty and legitimate expectations, see: Tridimas (2006), pp. 242–297.

  50. See, for example, Recital 9 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/445 of the European Central Bank of 14 March 2016 on the exercise of options and discretions available in Union law (ECB/2016/4).

  51. Cf. Lefterov (2015), pp. 42–43; Ter Kuile et al. (2015), pp. 181–183.

  52. Lefterov (2015), p. 37.

  53. For a discussion about the current institutional set-up in which EU banking regulation is separated from prudential supervision and the implication of this set-up for the SSM, see: Ferrarini and Recine (2015), pp. 118–154.

  54. Arts. 127(4) and 282(5) TFEU.

  55. Art. 1(2) of Council Decision of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (98/415/EC).

  56. Holtring et al. (2014), p. 457.

  57. Cf. Lefterov (2015), p. 37. Lefterov discusses the possibility that the Court of Justice of the EU will alter its case law on reverse vertical direct effect and accommodate the administration to impose obligations on banks laid down in a directive. According to Lefterov, this would not per definition be in conflict with the underlying rationale of the doctrine (i.e. that Member States should not be able to benefit from their own failures to comply with the duty to implement Union law) (p. 37). It, however, goes without saying that this would be detrimental to the principle of legal certainty and seems, as such, also undesirable.

  58. Andrea Enria, supra n. 47, p. 9.

  59. Art. 9(1), second paragraph, SSM Regulation.

  60. Cf. Keynote speech by Sabine Lautenschläger, supra n. 25.

  61. Art. 3:96(1) of the Dutch Act of Financial Supervision (Wet op het financieel toezicht).

  62. Art. 9(1), third paragraph, SSM Regulation.

  63. Cf. Keynote speech by Sabine Lautenschläger, supra n. 25.

  64. Art. 18(5) SSM Regulation.

  65. Cf. Art. 14 SSM Regulation.

  66. Arts. 1:102(3) and 1:103(2) of the Act on Financial Supervision (Wet op het financieel toezicht).

  67. Tweede Kamer 34 049, No. 3, under S through U, p. 17 (Explanation to amendment of law in light of the implementation of the SSM). The first proposal for an amendment of law included an extension of this period (Tweede Kamer 34 049, No. 3), but this has been amended during the legislative process (Tweede Kamer 34 0439, No. 14). The national legislator has again proposed to extend this period in an amendment of law for 2018 (Consultatiedocument Memorie van Toelichting Wijzigingswet Financiële Markten 2018, p. 16).

  68. The Research Network on EU Administrative Law (ReNEUAL) addresses the potential and the substantial need for simplification of EU administrative law. It drafted a set of model rules, which is available at www.reneual.eu.

  69. Ter Kuile et al. (2015), pp. 180-185.

  70. Cf. Andrea Enria, supra n. 47, p. 10. Enria states that there can be no significant progress in financial integration without progress in the harmonisation of the rules. He, furthermore, lists three possible ways to move towards greater harmonisation (p. 10).

  71. As Enria points out, drafting EU regulation is a ‘delicate legal and diplomatic exercise, which requires a balance between legal and policy considerations’ (Andrea Enria, supra n. 47, p. 4).

  72. Art. 3(1) SSM Framework Regulation.

  73. ECB Guide to banking supervision, November 2014, p. 17.

  74. ECB Guide to banking supervision, November 2014, p. 16.

  75. Recital 37 SSM Regulation.

  76. Recital 12 SSM Regulation.

  77. Keynote speech by Sabine Lautenschläger, supra n. 25.

  78. Speech by Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the SSM, at the Austrian Bankers’ Business Lunch, Frankfurt, 13 January 2016.

  79. It must, of course, be prevented in general—thus also for ECB staff—that supervisors are sensitive to regulatory capture.

  80. The Supervisory Board is composed of its chair, vice-chair, four representatives of the ECB and one representative of the NCA in each participating Member State, cf. Art. 26(1) SSM Regulation.

  81. Cf. Art. 91 SSM Framework Regulation.

  82. Art. 26(8) SSM Regulation.

  83. ECB Guide on banking supervision, November 2014, p. 17.

  84. Cf. Interview with Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, published on 24 January 2016, Süddeutsche Zeitung.

  85. Art. 4 SSM Framework Regulation.

  86. Art. 1 SSM Regulation.

  87. Art. 1, paras. 2 and 4(1) SSM Regulation.

  88. Recital 15 SSM Regulation and Art. 1, paras. 2 and 5 SSM Regulation.

  89. Recital 28 SSM Regulation.

  90. Jans et al. (2007), p. 40; Jans et al. (2011), pp. 35–36 and 254; Tridimas (2006), p. 420; Lenaerts (2007), p. 1645; Lenaerts et al. (2014), p. 108.

  91. Jans et al. (2015), p. 19.

  92. Hofmann et al. (2011), p. 12.

  93. Also: Barkhuysen (2006), p. 12; Jans et al. (2007), p. 42; Craig and De Búrca (2011), p. 220; Jans et al. (2011), pp. 37–43 and 254; Vermeulen (2001), pp. 89–92; Tridimas (2006), pp. 423–427; Fernandez Esteban (1999), p. 172; Lenaerts (2007), pp. 1645; Van den Broek (2015), p. 35; Lenaerts et al. (2014), pp. 118–119; Schermers and Waelbroeck (2001), pp. 200–203. Tridimas points out that it is difficult to pin down the scope of the principle of autonomy and that it more easily can be defined negatively; the procedural autonomy is the discretion left to national courts after the obligation to apply the dual safeguards of equivalence and effectiveness (Tridimas (2006), p. 424).

  94. Hofmann et al. (2011), p. 12 and the case law mentioned.

  95. See also: Van Gelder and Teule (2014).

  96. Respectively Arts. 1:24 and 1:25 of the Act on Financial Supervision (Wet op het financieel toezicht).

  97. Prudential supervision has as an objective to contribute to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system (cf. Art. 1 SSM Regulation), whereas conduct of business supervision has as an objective to protect consumers and investors (e.g. Art. 1:25 of the Dutch Act on Financial Supervision states that conduct of business supervision shall focus, also in the interest of the stability of the financial system, on orderly and transparent financial market processes, integrity in relations between market parties and due care in the provision of services to clients).

  98. Kremers and Schoenmaker (2010), p. 2. Cf. Kingdom of the Netherlands—Netherlands: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation—Technical Note on Financial Sector Supervision: The Twin Peaks Model, IMF Country Report No. 11/208, July 2011.

  99. Art. 3:1a Act on Financial Supervision.

  100. Art. 1:47(1) Act on Financial Supervision. The relevant measures are listed in para. 2 of this Article.

  101. Art. 1:47(4) in conjunction with Art. 1:104(5) Act on Financial Supervision. Cf. Art. 14 SSM Regulation for the ECB’s competences.

  102. Art. 1:48 Act on Financial Supervision. Cf. Art. 14 SSM Regulation.

  103. Art. 1:48(1) and (6) in conjunction with 2:13 Act on Financial Supervision.

  104. Art. 1:47a Act on Financial Supervision; Explanatory note to the amendment of the Act on Financial Supervision (Memorie van Toelichting op de Uitvoeringswet verordening bankentoezicht), Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014-2015, 34 049, No. 3, p. 13.

  105. Art. 1:47b Act of Financial Supervision. Cf. Art. 15 SSM Regulation.

  106. Cf. Speech by Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, at Goethe Universität in Frankfurt, 23 November 2015.

  107. Recital 14 and Art. 3(6) SSM Regulation.

  108. Cf. Recital 33 and Art. 3(1) SSM Regulation.

  109. Available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/ecblegal/framework/html/index.en.html (accessed 27 April 2017). The SSM Regulation states that the ECB must cooperate closely with resolution authorities, including in the preparation of resolution plans (Art. 3(4) SSM Regulation and Art. 30 SRM Regulation), and to carry out supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans, early intervention, and, only in the cases explicitly stipulated by relevant Union law for competent authorities, structural changes required from credit institutions to prevent financial stress or failure, excluding any resolution powers (Art. 4(1)(i) SSM Regulation). Angeloni emphasized that it is the supervisors’ challenge to provide support to the Single Resolution Board and to ensure that effective modalities of cooperation are in place (Speech by Ignazio Angeloni, Member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, ‘Challenges facing the Single Supervisory Mechanism’, De Nederlandsche Bank’s ‘Netherlands Day’, Amsterdam, 6 October 2016).

  110. The ESMA states at its website that ‘This template MoU provides for a common framework for cooperation and may be agreed and complemented bilaterally, on a voluntary basis for the performance, respectively, of the tasks under the SSM Regulation and those under MIFID’, available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-national-securities-regulators-and-ecb-exchange-information (accessed 27 April 2017).

  111. Art. 152 of the SSM Framework Regulation.

  112. Interview with T. Kockelkoren, ‘ECB Urged to Integrate with Financial-Conduct watchdogs’, Bloomberg, 24 June 2014, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-24/ecb-urged-to-integrate-with-financial-conduct-watchdogs (accessed 27 April 2017).

  113. Kremers and Schoenmaker (2010), p. 3.

  114. The only logical Union institutions would be the European Commission or the European Central Bank, both already allocated with competition and prudential supervisory tasks respectively.

  115. Art. 1(5)(b) of Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority).

  116. Art. 9 EBA Regulation.

  117. Art. 2 of Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 (EBA Regulation). The ESFS’s objective is ‘to ensure that the rules applicable to the financial sector are adequately implemented to preserve financial stability and to ensure confidence in the financial system as a whole and sufficient protection for the customers of financial services’ (Art. 2(1)).

  118. Art. 1 SSM Regulation.

  119. Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union.

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  1. Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank N.V.), Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Laura Wissink

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  1. Laura Wissink
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Correspondence to Laura Wissink.

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This article is based on a speech delivered at the European University Institute on 11 October 2016 on the occasion of the workshop on ‘The European Banking Union and Its Instruments—Experience from the First Years of an Interplay with National Banking Supervision and Resolution’. This article is written in a private capacity and does not represent the opinion of De Nederlandsche Bank N.V. The author wishes to thank Peter van Duijvenvoorde, Iris Palm-Steyerberg, Christy Ann Petit and Professor Stefan Grundmann for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Wissink, L. Challenges to an Efficient European Centralised Banking Supervision (SSM): Single Rulebook, Joint Supervisory Teams and Split Supervisory Tasks. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 18, 431–456 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-017-0078-y

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