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European Judicial Supervision of the Rule of Law: The Protection of the Independence of National Judges by the CJEU and the ECtHR

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Abstract

While an independent judiciary is considered an indispensable component of the rule of law, attacks of the domestic political power on the independence of the judicial branch are observed today in several European States. The European judges (CJUE, ECtHR) appear to be the “last soldier standing” in the defense of judicial independence and they have in no case remained indifferent. This contribution contains an analysis of the dynamic approaches that the CJEU and the ECtHR have adopted in order to reinforce the guarantees of independence that domestic judges enjoy under European Law (EU and ECHR law). An emphasis is put on the international judicial function of these Courts as protective and promoting judicial independence at the national level, arguing that both Courts assumed their role as guarantors of the common European value of the rule of law through a proactive stance, without going, however, to the extremes. Furthermore, the paper provides an examination on the fact that the European Courts have adopted measures in order to assure the effectiveness of the European guarantees of judicial independence. A particular focus is put on the protection through interim measures as a means of assuring an effective protection of the independence of national judges. Considering a comparative analysis, the issue of the ECtHR’s potential in this regard is hereby tackled, notably after the recent evolution in the case-law of the CJEU.

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Notes

  1. Burgorgue-Larsen L (2019).

  2. Sicilianos L-A (2020).

  3. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) (2017b).

  4. Note that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has voted to open a monitoring procedure for Poland over the functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law, declaring in a resolution that recent reforms “severely damage the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law”: PACE (2020). Poland is the first EU Member State to enter into such a procedure.

  5. On the Hungarian case, see European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) (2011, 2012a, 2012b); on the Polish case, see European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) (2016, 2017a),UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers (2018); and for concerns regarding those countries, see also European Commission (2020b).

  6. Kochenov D, Bard P (2019).

  7. Besselink L (2017).

  8. Pech L, Scheppele KL (2017).

  9. Leaving the issue of the independence of the European Courts themselves outside its scope, as an analysis of this subject would exceed the limits of the present contribution.

  10. By the European Commission under Article 258 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).

  11. The first concerns the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court and that of the National Council of the Judiciary ((CJEU, Commission v Poland (Régime disciplinaire des juges), C-791/19), and the second one criticizes most recent “Muzzle Law”, providing –notably- for repercussions for national judges referring to the CJEU ((European Commission (2020a)).

  12. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court) [GC], 24 June 2019, C-619/18.

  13. CJEU, Commission v Poland(Independence of the ordinary courts)[GC], 5 Nov. 2019, C-192/18.

  14. In 6 November 2012, the CJEU had adjudicated on the Hungarian judicial reforms in the case of Commission v Hungary [GC] (C-286/12), but criticized them only on technical grounds, as a violation of the Directive on the prohibition of discrimination.

  15. CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas [GC], 27 February 2018, C‑64/16.

  16. CJEU, ASJP, paras. 32 and 36.

  17. Id, para. 41.

  18. Id, para. 35.

  19. Id, para. 29.

  20. Id, para. 37.

  21. Id, para. 40.

  22. Guaranteeing the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial.

  23. Such an exceptional case was the ASJP case itself, where the measures affecting the organization of the Portuguese judiciary were guided by the EU austerity program. However, even in this exceptional case, the A.G. only reluctantly proposed that Art. 47 CRFEU was applicable, expressing “serious doubts” in this regard (Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in ASJP, C-64/16, paras. 43–53). Such a concrete EU norm was most likely inexistent in the cases of Poland: the applicability of Article 47 was not even advocated by the Commission and thus A.G. Tanchev deemed it inapplicable (Opinion of A.G. Tanchev in Commission v Poland (Ordinary courts), C-192/18, paras. 67–68; Opinion of A.G. Tanchev in Commission v Poland (Supreme Court), C-619/18, paras. 65–67).

  24. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court), paras. 98–107; Commission v Poland (Ordinary courts), paras. 42–59.

  25. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court), paras. 96–97, 118 and 123–124; Commission v Poland (Ordinary courts), paras. 125 and 135. In the case of the Polish ordinary courts, the Court also found an infringement of Article 157 TFEU on the prohibition of discrimination (para. 84), which will not be our focus.

  26. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court), para. 79; Commission v Poland (Ordinary courts) para. 115.

  27. Opinion of A.G. Tanchev in Commission v Poland (Supreme Court), C-619/18, para. 71.

  28. Id, para. 72.

  29. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court), para. 82; Commission v Poland (Ordinary courts), para. 127.

  30. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court), para. 86.

  31. Id, paras. 84 and 91.

  32. Id, paras. 85 and 113, 114–117; Commission v Poland (Ordinary courts), paras. 116, 122, 128.

  33. This approach was founded by the CJEU in A.K. v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa and others [GC], 19 November 2019, C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18) and was met with mixed criticism: see Krajewski M, Ziólkowski M (2020) and, a contrario, Platon S (2021)).

  34. CJEU, A.B. and Others (Nomination des juges à la Cour suprême – Recours) [GC], 2 March 2021, C-824/18.

  35. Found that it is “devoid of any real effectiveness and thus offers only the appearance of a judicial remedy.” (para. 157), as (i) judicial review was possible only if all judges involved in the appointment procedure appealed against it, (ii) the excluded judges would not become again candidates for nomination even if the resolution was annulled and (iii) the appeal did not allow for an examination of an eventual wrongful application of the legislative criteria on appointments (paras. 156–167) by the NJC.

  36. CJEU, A.B. and Others, paras. 90–107.

  37. Id, para. 96.

  38. Id, para. 129.

  39. Id, para. 130.

  40. Id, para. 136.

  41. Id, para. 150.

  42. The Court highlighted important elements both on the independence of the NJC and on the systemic issues with the rule of law in Poland (paras. 99–105 and 130–135), taking the clear stance that the polish legislator “acted with the specific intention of preventing any possibility of exercising judicial review of the appointments made on the basis of those resolutions [of the NJC]” (para.138).

  43. Id, para. 140.

  44. Scholars, including AG Tanchev in his series of Opinions delivered in the cases of the Polish judicial reforms, expressed doubts as to whether Article 19 TEU had “direct effect”, in the sense that it could not be invoked before national courts, but be used only in the context of infringement proceedings, its application being reserved for cases concerning systemic, structural threats to judicial independence ((for a presentation, see Rodriguez P M (2020), pp 339–343)). This argument was relied, inter alia, upon the fact that, in A.K., the Court explicitly conferred direct effect only to Article 47 CFREU, avoiding the application of Article 19 (C-585/18, para. 162).

  45. Id, para. 146. Note that AG Tanchev, in his Opinion delivered in this case (C-824/18, paras. 85–95), had also abandoned his previous position and argued in favor of the “direct effect” of Article 19.

  46. Id, paras. 148–150 and 156.

  47. This expression was used for the first time by the ECtHR in Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], 28 May 2002, no. 46295/99, para. 78.

  48. ECtHR, Harabin v. Slovakia (dec.), 29 June 2004, no. 62584/00.

  49. ECtHR, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 6 November 2018, nos. 55391/13, 57,728/13 and 74,041/13, paras. 195–196.

  50. ECtHR, Harabin v. Slovakia, 20 November 2012, no. 58688/11, para. 132.

  51. ECtHR, Baka v. Hungary [GC], 23 June 2016, no. 20261/12.

  52. ECtHR, Kövesi v. Romania, 5 May 2020, no. 3594/19.

  53. Other such guarantees can be, by way of pure indication: Article 5 (Baş v. Turkey, 3 March 2020, no. 66448/17, concerning pre-trial detention of judges on suspicion of membership in a terrorist organization; and Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 16 April 2019, no. 12778/17); or Article 11 (Maestri v. Italy [GC], 17 February 2004, no. 39748/98, concerning disciplinary sanction of a judge on account of his membership of the Freemasons).

  54. ECtHR, Vilho Eskelinen And Others v. Finland [GC], 19 April 2007, no. 63235/00.

  55. ECtHR, Baka v. Hungary, paras. 103–104.

  56. Id.

  57. Id, para. 115.

  58. Id, para. 117.

  59. Id.

  60. Id, para. 116.

  61. Id.

  62. Id, paras. 120–122.

  63. ECtHR, Kövesi v. Romania, paras. 121–123.

  64. Id, para. 124.

  65. Id, para. 153.

  66. ECtHR Mitrinovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 30 April 2015, no. 6899/12.

  67. On the Court’s case law on disciplinary proceedings against judges, see also Aquilina K (2019).

  68. ECtHR Wille v. Lichtenstein, 28th October 1999, no. 283696.

  69. ECtHR, Baka v. Hungary, paras. 155–157.

  70. ECtHR, Kövesi v. Romania, paras. 81–82,88–89, 196–197.

  71. The Court had found violations of Article 10 in cases concerning judges’ freedom of expression, without highlighting however this dimension of judicial independence: Albayrak v. Turkey, 31 January 2008, no. 38406/97; and Kudeshkina v. Russia, 26 February 2009, no. 29492/05.

  72. ECtHR, Baka, para. 172 in fine.

  73. ECtHR, Baka., para. 173; Kövesi, para. 205.

  74. ECtHR Baka., para. 173; Kövesi, para. 209.

  75. ECtHR Baka, para. 172.

  76. ECtHR Baka., para. 168; Kövesi, para. 208.

  77. ECtHR, Baka, para. 172 in fine; Kövesi para. 208.

  78. ECtHR, Baka, paras. 72–83 and; Kövesi paras. 80–93.

  79. ECtHR, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 1 December 2020, no. 26374/18, paras. 226–227.

  80. Id, paras. 226 and 233–234.

  81. Id, para. 245: the Court will, however, also pursue its examination also in cases where a judicial appointment procedure is “seemingly in compliance with the relevant domestic rules” but “nevertheless produces results that are incompatible with the object and purpose of that Convention right”.

  82. Id, paras. 243–252.

  83. Id, paras. 282–283. Note that in paragraphs 253–272, the Court had already found that the flagrant, as confirmed by the Supreme Court, breach of domestic law concerned fundamental rules of appointment of judges, recently reformed so as to diminish the influence of political actors in this process and thus reinforce judicial independence.

  84. Id, paras. 139 and 239.

  85. ROEBEN V (2019) pp 38–40.

  86. This was advocated by scholars such as A. Jakab, e.g. Jakab A (2017).

  87. See the Opinion of A.G. Tanchev in Commission v Poland (Supreme Court), C-619/18, para. 58.

  88. Opinion of A.G. Tanchev in Commission v Poland (Ordinary Courts), C-192/18, para. 72.

  89. See the Concurring Opinion of Judges Pinto de Albuquerque and Dedov in ECtHR, Baka v Hungary, paras. 1 and 17–22.

  90. See the Concurring Opinion of Judge Sicilianos in ECtHR, Baka v. Hungary, paras. 13–15.

  91. ECtHR, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Ireland [GC], paras. 207 and 243.

  92. CJEU, A.K. v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, paras. 59 and 130; A.B. and others, para. 129.

  93. CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) [GC], 25 July 2018, C-216/18 PPU.

  94. Bonelli M (2021), p 474.

  95. CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), paras. 70–72.

  96. Id, para. 73.

  97. Krajewski M (2018).

  98. Bonelli M (2021) p 470.

  99. Biernat S, Filipek P (2021), pp 420–425.

  100. CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice), paras. 76–78.

  101. Biernat S, Filipek P (2021), pp 426–427; Bonelli (2021) pp 470–471.

  102. CJEU, Openbaar Ministerie (Indépendance de l’autorité judiciaire d’émission) [GC], 12 November 2020, C‑354/20 PPU and C‑412/20 PPU.

  103. Id, paras. 42–44.

  104. CJEU, Miasto Łowicz [GC], 26 March 2020, C-558/18 and C-563/18.

  105. Id, p 53.

  106. The CJEU substantiated this assessment in paragraphs 49–51: the disputes in the main proceedings were not substantively connected to Article 19(1) TEU, in the sense that the referring courts were not required to apply it “in order to determine the substantive solution to be given to those disputes” (para. 49), nor did it require the interpretation of procedural provisions of EU law which the referring court was required to apply (para. 50), nor would the interpretation solicited by the CJEU allow the referring courts to resolve procedural questions of national law before being able to rule on the substance of the disputes before them (para. 51).

  107. Id, para. 58.

  108. Platon (2021), pp 16 and 22.

  109. CJEU, Miasto Łowicz, para. 47.

  110. See previously analyzed ASJP (par. 20–25, concerning cases brought by judges against measures implementing cuts in their remuneration, raising an issue of the compatibility of these cuts with the independence of judges), and A.B. (concerning cases brought by judges against the omission of the Polish National Judicial Council to propose them to the President of the Republic for appointment to the Supreme Court), but also the A.K. case, cited in fn 33 (paras. 99–101 and 112, concerning cases brought by judges against the decisions to dismiss them through premature retirement, raising the question of whether the transfer of pending cases relating to judicial careers to the competence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court was compatible with EU law, in view doubts on the independence of this body).

  111. Spotting the same systemic deficiencies that it had denounced five years earlier in Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (ECtHR, Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 9 January 2013, no. 21722/11).

  112. E.g. the dismissal of a judge because of aspects of her private life, such as close private relationships, the clothes and make-up she wore and the fact that she lived separately from her mother (ECtHR, Özpınar v. Turkey, 19 October 2010, no. 20999/04, paras. 43 and 47).

  113. As was the case in Volkov, where the applicant judge was removed from office for professional reasons, this measure having nonetheless severe consequences vis-à-vis his economic situation, but also his reputation (ECtHR, Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, para. 166).

  114. ECtHR, Denisov v Ukraine [GC], 25 September 2018, no. 76639/11, paras. 107, 109, 110–114 and 115.

  115. ECtHR, Denisov v Ukraine, para. 126.

  116. Id, paras. 123–124.

  117. Id, paras. 125–126.

  118. Id, para. 127.

  119. ECtHR, Erményi v Hungary, 22 November 2016, no. 22254/14 paras. 31 and 34–37.

  120. See also a similarly strict application of the Denisov approach on Article 8 in ECtHR, J.B. and Others v. Hungary and 2 other applications (dec.), 27 November 2018, nos. 45434/12 a.o., paras. 135–136.

  121. ECtHR, Xhoxhaj v. Albania, 9 February 2021, no. 15227/19.

  122. Id, para. 363.

  123. Id, paras. 297, 303,391–393,

  124. Id, paras. 403–404.

  125. While it criticized the vetting authorities’ findings on the applicant’s professional competence as overly strict (para. 410), Strasbourg considered that the findings made in respect with the applicant’s assets were sufficient to justify the applicant’s dismissal from office (paras. 407–409. See, however, the dissenting Opinion of Judge Dedov).

  126. Id, para. 413.

  127. Id, paras. 299 and 412.

  128. The Court dismissed all of the applicant’s complaints under Article 6. In particular, underlining the Venice Commission’s findings for the independence of the vetting authorities (para. 303), the Court dismissed all complaints raised in that regard: (a) the fact that the vetting committee was composed exclusively by members appointed by the Parliament was not found to be problematic, as once appointed, these judges enjoyed sufficient guarantees of irremovability (para. 295); (b) nor was the 5-year term of their tenure in itself problematic, in view of the extraordinary nature of the vetting process (para. 296); the Court also considered that the fact that the judges of the vetting committee did not come from amongst serving professional judges was consistent with the spirit and goal of the vetting process, namely to avoid any individual conflicts of interest and ensure public confidence in the process. The Court further referred “to the strict eligibility requirements that members of the IQC were expected to satisfy”, noting “that those members were elected by Parliament in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law” and that their status was the same as that of Supreme Court judges (para. 298).

  129. Committee of Ministers (2020b).

  130. Committee of Ministers (2019).

  131. Committee of Ministers (2020b).

  132. European Commission (2020b), Country Chapter Hungary, p 6.

  133. CJEU, Commission v Hungary, 6 November 2012, C-286/12.

  134. Bárd P, Śledzińska-Simon A (2019), p 9.

  135. Szente Z (2017), p 470.

  136. Committee of Ministers (2019).

  137. In this respect, see the reflections of Judge de Albuquerque concerning the possibility of reinforcing the execution mechanism of ECtHR’s judgments: Albuquerque de PP (2016).

  138. For a summary of this situation, see paras. 14–21 of CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court, order) [GC], 17 December 2018, C-619/18 R.

  139. CJEU, Commission v. Poland (order, expedite proceedings), 15 November 2018, C-619/18 R.

  140. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court, order), 19 October 2018, C-619/18 R.

  141. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court, order) [GC], 17 December 2018, C-619/18 R.

  142. See the operative part of CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court, order); and of Commission v Poland (Supreme Court, order) [GC].

  143. See the recapitulative table proposed in Materne T (2012), at 270–272.

  144. Prete L, Smulders B (2010), p 40.

  145. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Supreme Court, order) [GC], para. 68.

  146. Id, para. 67.

  147. Id, para. 68.

  148. Id, para. 71.

  149. Id, para. 74.

  150. Id, para. 115.

  151. Id, paras. 100–103.

  152. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Régime disciplinaire des juges, order), 4 April 2020, C-791/19R, paras. 55–60: the Commission pointed (a) that the members of the Council of the judiciary, organ appointing the members of the disciplinary chamber, were in their vast majority (23/25) nominated either by the executive or by the legislative powers; (b) that the judges already exercising their duties at the Supreme Court were excluded from participating in the composition of the disciplinary chamber; and (c) that the disciplinary chamber was characterized by an increased autonomy inside the Supreme Court.

  153. Id, paras. 89–90.

  154. Id, paras. 91–93.

  155. Pech (2021), pp 8–10.

  156. Note that the CJEU has already given extensive guidelines on the standards of independence to which the Disciplinary Chamber should comply, in the occasion of the A.K. case (C‑585/18).

  157. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Régime disciplinaire des juges, order), para. 112.

  158. Bárd P, Śledzińska-Simon A (2019), p 17.

  159. CJEU, Commission v Poland (Białowieska, order) [GC], paras. 109–113.

  160. Id, paras. 100 and 104.

  161. Id, paras. 91 and 101.

  162. Id, paras. 97–99.

  163. Id, para. 102.

  164. Id, paras. 104–105.

  165. European Commission (2020a).

  166. Opinion of AG Tanchev in C-824/18, para. 78.

  167. Committee of Ministers (2019).

  168. ECtHR, Oleksandr Volkov v Ukraine, 9 January 2013, no. 21722/11.

  169. Id, para. 205.

  170. Id, para. 199.

  171. Id.

  172. Id, para. 205.

  173. UNHRC, Busyo and Others v. Democratic Republic of Congo ((2003), AHRLR 3 (HRC 2003)).

  174. Committee of Ministers (2015)

  175. Committee of Ministers (2020a).

  176. ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46,951/99: In this case, the Court affirmed the legally-binding nature of its interim injunctions and set forth the principles governing its practice vis-à-vis interim measures.

  177. Id, para. 108.

  178. Id, para. 104.

  179. ECtHR (2020).

  180. E.g. in Tuleya v. Poland (communicated, no. 21181/19). Although no press releases were effectuated, this is confirmed by official ECtHR sources known to the authors.

  181. Id, para. 101.

  182. ECtHR, Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, no. 19776/92; Stafford v. UK [GC], 28 May 2002, no. 46295/99.

  183. ECtHR, Oleksandr Volkov, paras. 199 and 205.

  184. ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, para. 124.

  185. See the international criticism summarized in footnotes 4–5.

  186. Sicilianos LA (2019).

  187. ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73 para. 24.

  188. While, in 2016, it took the Court four years to decide the Baka case, this time was reduced to only fifteen months in 2020, at the occasion of Kövesi v. Romania.

  189. Lawson R (2018) p 263.

  190. Lawson R. (2020) pp 11–12.

  191. ECtHR (2021) p 3.

  192. See communicated cases Grzęda v. Poland ( no. 43572/18) and Żurek v. Poland (no. 39650/18), concerning the dismissal of members of the Polish Council of the judiciary; Sobczyńska and Others v. Poland, (nos. 62765/14 a.o.), relating to the abstaining of the Polish President to appoint judges to vacant posts; Broda v. Poland (no. 39650/18); Bojara v. Poland (no. 27367/18), concerning the premature discontinuance of the office of the applicants judges as vice-presidents of a regional court; and Tuleya v. Poland (21,181/19), relating to the new Polish disciplinary regime for judges.

  193. Applying the Factorame case-law (CJEU, 19 June 1990, C-213/89); for an example from the Polish context, see the Polish Supreme Court Judgment of 2 August 2018, III UZP 4/18.

  194. See European Commission (2020b), Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary (p 4) and Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland (pp 6–8).

  195. Spano R (2020).

  196. Schukking J (2018) p 158.

  197. Spano R (2020).

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Acknowledgements

The authors express sincere gratitude for the CoE traineeship program, which gives to young professionals with a Law degree an outstanding professional opportunity to work with judges of the ECtHR for five months, setting the foundations for successful legal careers.

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  1. European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France

    Ivana Jelić

  2. Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France

    Dimitrios Kapetanakis

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Jelić, I., Kapetanakis, D. European Judicial Supervision of the Rule of Law: The Protection of the Independence of National Judges by the CJEU and the ECtHR. Hague J Rule Law 13, 45–77 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-021-00155-5

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