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Financial Torts and Investor Protection: Is the Europeanisation of Third State Cases a Viable Solution?

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Abstract

Due to the growing globalisation of financial markets, non-EU market operators which act outside the EU are increasingly causing direct harm to European investors. This issue, and its relevant impact on investor protection, has already been considered by the European legislature at the substantive level. This article seeks to demonstrate that, at the private international law level, the Europeanisation of third state cases would increase both the degree of investor protection and investors’ equal access to justice. Focusing exclusively on financial torts, the advantages arising from the application of Brussels I bis heads of jurisdiction to non-EU defendants are assessed with regard to insider trading and Credit Rating Agency liability cases. The paper also examines the main critical elements related to such an extension of the Brussels I bis regime, especially from a systematic perspective, and suggests possible future approaches to this issue.

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Notes

  1. Although this phenomenon also creates problems with regard to market stability, the present paper exclusively deals with issues related to investor protection.

  2. See Scott (2014a), p. 87; Scott (2014b), p. 1343. The extraterritorial application (or territorial extension) of EU substantive regulations can be traced, inter alia, in the Credit Rating Agencies Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, [2009] OJ 2009, L302/1); Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014, [2014] OJ L173/1); Market in Financial Instruments Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014, [2014] OJ L173/84) and Alternative Investment Funds Directive (Directive 2011/61/EU, [2011] OJ L174/1).

  3. Prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction is commonly defined as the power of the national legislature to promulgate laws that are applicable in some specific circumstances: see Buxbaum (2009), p. 631; Staker (2014), p. 309.

  4. Unless otherwise specified, the term ‘investor’ is used here in a very broad sense, referring to subjects who buy and/or sell financial instruments on the market (either primary or secondary); see infra Sect. 4.

  5. Strictly speaking, adjudicatory jurisdiction concerns the power of domestic courts to claim their jurisdiction over a specific case, i.e. to hear a case irrespective of the law applicable to it: see e.g. Graveson (1963), p. 114; Maier (1982), p. 280; Ryngaert (2008), pp. 11–14.

  6. Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2012] OJ L351/1.

  7. Brussels I bis envisages a few exceptions to this general rule, infra Sects. 2 and 3.

  8. Gargantini (2016), p. 31.

  9. Commission Special Eurobarometer 230: Public Opinion in Europe on Financial Services (2005), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/financial_services/reference_studies_documents/docs/report_eurobarometer63-2_en.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2016.

  10. Commission Special Eurobarometer 373: Retail Financial Services (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/policy/eb_special_373-report_en.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2016.

  11. See e.g. Carty (2010); Ryder (2011).

  12. Among the several ‘types’ of financial torts, it is possible to mention the cases of prospectus liability, insider trading liability and CRAs’ liability. On the commission of wrongs in the law of finance see Hudson (2013), pp. 79, 711.

  13. 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [1972] OJ L299/32.

  14. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L12/1.

  15. On the twofold function of the defendant’s domicile see e.g. Gaudemet-Tallon (2010), pp. 86–90; Stone (2014), pp. 53–72; Van Lith (2015), p. 113. On the other hand, the place of the plaintiff’s domicile is of no relevance in this respect: see e.g. Case C-412/98 Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v. Universal General Insurance Company (UGIC) ECLI:EU:C:2000:399.

  16. Arts. 23 and 24 of the Brussels I Regulation.

  17. Art. 32; see Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, [1979] OJ C59/1, p. 21 (‘Report Jenard’); Kaye (1987).

  18. In Ferrexpo AG v. Gilson Investment Ltd [2012] EWHC 721 (Comm), however, the High Court of England and Wales held a rather different position by endorsing the doctrine of reflexive effects in respect of Arts. 27 and 28 of Brussels I; on this case see e.g. Smith et al. (2012), p. 389. According to Carbone and Tuo (2015), p. 16, the doctrine of reflexive effects should be considered as being incompatible with the new Brussels I bis regime; see also Takahashi (2012), p. 1.

  19. Case C-281/02 Andrew Owusu v. Jackson and Others [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:120; on this case see, inter alia, Fentiman (2006), p. 705.

  20. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, COM(2010) 748 final, p. 8; see Fentiman (2011), p. 65; Hess (2012a), p. 1075; Nielsen (2012), p. 586; Weber (2011), p. 619.

  21. Art. 4 of Brussels I referred to the application of domestic jurisdiction rules, including the exorbitant heads of jurisdiction listed in Annex I; see Hess (2012a), p. 1105.

  22. See Basedow (2000), p. 687; cf. Remien (2001), p. 76. In this respect, the Groupe européen de droit international privé (GEDIP) suggested the inclusion of the recognition and enforcement of third state judgments in the recast of Brussels I, but this proposal was not followed by the Commission; see Borràs (2012), p. 57.

  23. Opinion 1/03 [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:81; see Pocar (2007).

  24. Opinion 1/03, supra n. 23, p. 148.

  25. See Gillies (2012), p. 493.

  26. On the ‘primacy’ of the rule of the defendant’s domicile see, among others, Case 189/87 Athanasios Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Shröder and Others [1988] ECLI:EU:C:1988:459.

  27. See COM (2010) 748 final, supra n. 20, p. 8; Luzzatto (2012), p. 111.

  28. Art. 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), [2007] OJ L199/40; see Gillies (2012), p. 505.

  29. See Fiorini (2008), p. 969.

  30. See COM (2010) 748 final, supra n. 20, p. 8. These protective rules were (are) contained in Sections 3–5 of Brussels I (bis).

  31. Impact Assessment—Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, SEC (2010) 1547 final, p. 26.

  32. See e.g. Carbone and Tuo (2016); Hay (2013), p. 1; Nielsen (2013), p. 503; Nuyts (2013), p. 1.

  33. Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters (recast), 28 June 2011, 2010/0383(COD), p. 47, where the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs defined the proposed extension of the Brussels I regime as premature.

  34. Recital 14 of Brussels I bis. On the protection of the weaker parties in Brussels I bis see e.g. Lazić (2014), p. 100; Rühl (2014), p. 335.

  35. SEC (2010) 1547 final, supra n. 31, p. 21.

  36. In the same sense, Recital 8 of Brussels I.

  37. See COM (2010) 748 final, supra n. 20, p. 3; SEC (2010) 1547 final, supra n. 31, p. 20. See also Weber (2011), p. 624.

  38. See, among others, Green Paper on Retail Financial Services in the Single Market, COM (2007) 226 final; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank—Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, COM (2010) 301 final; Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63 final; Green Paper on Retail Financial Services—Better Products, More Choice and Greater Opportunities for Consumer and Businesses, COM (2015) 630 final.

  39. See COM (2015) 630 final, supra n. 38, p. 5.

  40. On the use of private international law rules as a governance tool in the field of financial regulation see Van der Eem (2014), p. 293.

  41. On the linkage which exists between investor protection and an integrated financial market see also Tridimas (2011), pp. 783–784.

  42. See Scott (2014b), pp. 1355–1364.

  43. Regulation (EU) 596/2014, [2014] OJ L173/1; for an overview of the substantive regulation see Moloney (2014), pp. 699–762.

  44. Although the issues related to the proper regulation of insider trading fall outside the scope of the present article, it should be noted that some authors disagree with the application of civil liability remedies to insider trading cases; see e.g. Hellgardt (2014), p. 157.

  45. See Art. 5(3) of the 1968 Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation. The expression ‘may occur’ makes clear that Art. 7(2) applies also in case of preventive actions; see Case C-167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Karl Heinz Henkel [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:555.

  46. Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij Bier BV v. Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA [1976] ECLI:EU:C:1976:166; see also Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:61; Case C-18/02 DFDS Torline A/S v. SEKO Sjöfolk Facket för Service och Kommunikation [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:74.

  47. This place is normally closer to the plaintiff’s domicile: see Ivaldi (1996), pp. 184–186.

  48. Case C-200/88 Dumez France v. Hessische Landesbank (Helaba) and Others [1990] ECLI:EU:C:1990:8; Case C-364/93 Antonio Marinari v. Lloyds Bank plc and Others [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:289; Case C-51/97 Réunion européenne SA v. Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:509. In this respect, the opposite solution would violate the well-established principle actor sequitur forum rei; see Briggs and Rees (2005), p. 191.

  49. Case C-168/02 Rudolf Kronhofer v. Marianne Maier and Others [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:364. The term ‘pure economic loss’ is used when a monetary/financial loss occurs without any physical damage to properties; see Bussani and Palmer (2003).

  50. Many countries, indeed, have opted for a dematerialised system, where financial instruments exist exclusively in dematerialised form as computer records and are registered in securities account. However, the same difficulties—from a private international law perspective—exist when the financial instruments are immobilised and held indirectly through intermediaries. For a comparative approach see Gardella (2007). See also Ooi (2003); Peach (2012), p. 1; Schwarcz (2001), p. 283.

  51. This approach has been suggested with specific regard to prospectus liability and CRAs’ liability cases: see Audit (2011), p. 581.

  52. See Benedettelli (2012), p. 483; and, in relation to choice of law issues, Garcimartín (2011), p. 449.

  53. See Lehmann (2011), p. 527.

  54. Case C-375/13 Harald Kolassa v. Barclays Bank plc [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:37. It should be noted that in this judgment the Court used the expression ‘bank account’ rather than ‘securities account’. On this basis some authors conclude that a reference to the money account used to purchase the securities was made: see D’Avout (2015), p. 770; Lehmann (2016b), p. 318. Yet, we prefer the interpretation of other authors who underline how, despite the terminological inaccuracy, the Court’s aim was to take into consideration the securities account: see Arons (2015), p. 377; see also Gargantini (2016), pp. 11–19. This approach also seems to be more consistent with the previous case law of the ECJ: see Case C-228/11 Melzer v. MF Global UK Ltd [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:305.

  55. The PRIMA is referred to, for instance, in Art. 9(2) of the Settlement Finality Directive (Directive (EC) 26/98, [1998] OJ L166/45); Art. 24 of the Winding-Up Directive (Directive (EC) 24/01, [2001] OJ L125/15); and Art. 9(1) of the Financial Collateral Directive (Directive (EC) 47/02, [2002] OJ L168/43). According to the Commission, in case of multi-branch entities (i.e. intermediaries) attention should be alternatively given to: a) the branch of the place where the account was opened; b) the branch that handles the commercial relationship with the account holder; or c) the branch that administers payments or corporate actions in relation to the securities: see Legislation on legal certainty of securities holding and dispositions, DG Markt G2 MET/OT/acg D(2010) 768690, p. 24.

  56. Of course, provided that the damage occurred within the EU.

  57. Recital 16 of Brussels I bis: see Case C-189/08 Zuid-Chemie BV v. Philippo’s Mineralenfabriek NV/SA [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:475; infra Sect. 4.

  58. 23 Member States, indeed, do have special grounds of jurisdiction for tort-related matters. The lack of any specific rule is only registered in Finland, Greece and Poland, whereas Latvia and Lithuania give the plaintiff the possibility to sue the tortfeasor in the place of his residence: see Nuyts (2007), pp. 32–34.

  59. See Bewaji (2012), p. 73. Conversely, in the United States (US) the 1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (‘ITSFEA’) modified the 1934 Exchange Act by introducing Section 20A that provides investors with a new cause of action in insider trading liability cases: see e.g. McVea (1988), p. 239. As anticipated above, some authors are convinced that a civil liability regime for insider trading is inadequate. This article does not cover these substantive law topics.

  60. Corte di cassazione, Sezione III, 3 July 2014, 15224, on this judgment see Giudici (2014), p. 1384.

  61. See, among others, Art. 46(1) and (2) of the New Code of Civil Procedure in France; §§ 12, 13 and 32 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO); and Art. 3(2) of the Law on the Reform of the Italian System of Private International Law.

  62. On the private international law issues related to insider trading see, inter alia, De la Rosa (2014), p. 135; Kronke (2000), pp. 334–340.

  63. In this case the insider’s liability should be qualified as non-contractual, since there is not any obligation ‘freely assumed by one party towards the other’, see Case C-51/97, supra n. 48, para. 17. This solution seems compatible with the impersonal structure of modern financial markets, where it is impossible for market participants to know the identity of the subject with whom they are trading. For this reason the aforementioned ITSFEA (supra n. 59) has provided a private cause of action for investors who contemporaneously trade with the insider.

  64. Corte di cassazione, Sezioni Unite, 22 March 2012, 8076; Bundesgerichtshof, III ZR 282/11, 13 December 2012.

  65. Despite the fact that Art. 3(2) of Law No. 218/1995 refers to Sections 2 to 4 of the ‘old’ 1968 Brussels Convention, the majority of Italian legal scholars agree that this reference should now encompass the ‘new’ Brussels I(bis) Regulation(s): see e.g. Cuniberti (2009); Franzina (2010), p. 817.

  66. See Risso (2013), p. 849.

  67. For a comparison between the two cases see Stella (2013), p. 95.

  68. Art. 8(1) of Brussels I bis has the same content as the ‘old’ Art. 6(1) of Brussels I.

  69. See Hess (2012b), p. 91.

  70. According to Art. 4(1) of the CRA I Regulation (Regulation (EC) 1060/2009, [2009] OJ L302/1, as subsequently amended by Regulations 513/2011 and 462/2013), credit institutions, investment firms, insurance undertakings, assurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and institutions for occupational retirement provision can use ratings for regulatory purposes exclusively if they are issued by CRAs established in the EU and registered in accordance with the regulation itself: see e.g. Chiu (2014), p. 269.

  71. The complete list of EU-registered CRAs can be found at https://www.esma.europa.eu/supervision/credit-rating-agencies/risk. Accessed 13 June 2016.

  72. As explained earlier, indeed, the EU-registered subsidiaries have their statutory seat within the EU, since that is a fundamental requirement for the registration; on the private international law aspects of the registration see Risso (2015), pp. 706, 719.

  73. See Lehmann (2016a), p. 60.

  74. Art. 4(4) of the CRA I Regulation states that a rating endorsed in accordance with Art. 4(3) shall be considered as a rating issued by a CRA established within the EU.

  75. Art. 8(1) applies only when the anchor defendant is sued in the court of its domicile, whereas it cannot be used when other grounds of jurisdiction (including the one set out for tort-related matters) come into play: see Fentiman (2015), pp. 349–353; Gaudemet-Tallon (2010), pp. 254–259.

  76. It is not strictly necessary, however, for the two causes of action to have the same legal basis: see Case C-98/06 Freeport plc v. Olle Arnoldsson [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:595; Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH and Others [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:798.

  77. Despite the rigid formulation of Art. 8(1), which mentions the risk of ‘irreconcilable judgements’, the ECJ stated that a sufficient connection exists when there is a risk of contradictory decisions, even though they are not mutually exclusive: see Case C-406/92 The owners of the cargo lately laden on board the ship ‘Tatry’ v. The owners of the ship ‘Maciej Rataj’ [1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:400; Muir Watt (2016), p. 371.

  78. See Case C-645/11 Land Berlin v. Ellen Mirjam Sapir and Others [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:228.

  79. See Muir Watt (2010), p. 111.

  80. See Hess (2010), p. 116.

  81. On Art. 35 bis see, inter alia: Haar (2014), p. 315.

  82. More specifically, it is possible to distinguish between states (like Cyprus, the UK and Ireland) that focus on the co-defendant, requiring him to be a proper party to the action, and states (like France and Hungary) that focus on the cause of action, requiring an objective connection between specific elements of the claims. Moreover, even those Member States (like Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) that adopt a similar approach to the one in Art. 8(1) of Brussels I bis interpret differently the requirement of a close connection. In Italy, for instance, there must be a concrete risk of irreconcilable—not simply conflicting—judgments to use the forum connexitatis: see Nuyts (2007), pp. 51–53.

  83. See Von Mehren and Trautmann (1966), p. 1153.

  84. 1999 Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2016. Its Art. 14(1) on co-defendants’ derivative jurisdiction was intended to apply even when the co-defendant was not domiciled in a Contracting State: see Audit and Bermann (2005), p. 55.

  85. AG Opinion, Case C-12/15 Universal Music International Holding BV v. Michael Tétreault Schilling and Others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:161, paras. 44–45. See also the judgment of the ECJ: Case C-12/15 Universal Music International Holding BV v. Michael Tétreault Schilling and Others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:449.

  86. In 1998, Universal Music International and B&M (a company established in the Czech Republic) concluded a share-option agreement according to which Universal Music would have immediately acquired 70 % of the shares of B&M and the remaining 30 % at a fixed price in 2003. The agreement was drafted by the Czech law firm Burns Schwartz International. Due to a mistake by an employee of the firm, the final version of the contract did not include an amendment concerning the determination of the share price proposed by the legal department of Universal Music. As a result, the share price turned out to be five times higher than expected and Universal Music brought an action for non-contractual liability against the law firm. More specifically, the company contended that, according to Art. 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, the court having jurisdiction was in the Netherlands, since the bank account from which Universal Music paid the shares was located there. Conversely, the ECJ ruled that, in case of pure economic losses, the place of the bank account where the damage materialises cannot be considered ex se as a sufficiently strong connecting factor when all the other elements of the tort are located elsewhere.

  87. See supra Sect. 3.1.

  88. See DG Markt G2 MET/OT/acg D(2010) 768690, supra n. 55, p. 24.

  89. Kronke (2013), pp. 25–36. As already discussed (see supra Sect. 3.1.), in such cases, some legal scholars have proposed a market-based approach, which localise the place of the damage in the market where the financial instruments have been offered or traded. Moreover, in the area of the applicable law, a similar solution was envisaged by the Deutscher Rat für Internationales Privatrecht for a possible reform of the Rome II Regulation; see Lehmann (2012), p. 485. Without going into an in-depth analysis, it is possible to note that this solution has two major drawbacks: (a) it does not take into account the issues related to investor protection; (b) it is difficult to apply when the relevant financial instruments are traded on alternative trading systems, such as multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), organised trading facilities (OTFs), or over the counter.

  90. Case C-375/13, supra n. 54, para. 56.

  91. Supra Sect. 3.

  92. See Recital 18 of Brussels I bis. Protective measures in insurance contracts also refer to certain third parties, such as the insured, the beneficiary and the injured party.

  93. On the definition of a consumer in Brussels I bis, and the differences between this and Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), [2008] OJ L177/6, see Espiniella Menéndez (2014), p. 277.

  94. See Report Jenard, supra n. 17, p. 22; Case 12/76 Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG [1976] ECLI:EU:C:1976:133; Case C-386/05 Color Drack GmbH v. Lexx International Vertriebs GmbH [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:262; Case C-381/08 Car Trim GmbH v. KeySafety Systems Srl [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:90. See also Franzina (2006); Mankowski (2016), pp. 143–145.

  95. See Hill (2003), p. 39; Mann (1964), p. 9; Mann (1984), p. 19.

  96. On the terminological incoherence that still exists (also) at the substantive level see Moloney (2012), p. 169.

  97. Directive (EU) 65/2014, [2014] OJ L173/349, Art. 30 and Annex II. A detailed explanation of each category of investors falls outside the scope of the article, on this aspect see Moloney (2014), pp. 791–793.

  98. Central counterparties, which are listed in Art. 30(2) of the MiFID II Directive, are considered as a sub-category of professional investors.

  99. Art. 22, see Audit and Bermann (2005), p. 79; Pocar and Honorati (2005).

  100. On the positive effects of the forum non conveniens in transnational libel cases see Hartley (2010), p. 25.

  101. Case C-281/02, supra n. 19, para. 37.

  102. A similar solution was suggested with regard to the jurisdiction rules on the protection of so-called weaker parties: see Dickinson (2011), p. 13.

  103. In respect of financial services see Gargantini (2016), p. 41.

  104. See Risso (2015), pp. 711–714.

  105. The ex ante identification of these special grounds of jurisdiction is not easy, since they should be determined according to each type of financial torts so as to avoid a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Nevertheless, the principle of reasonableness would impose a focus on the different solutions that the Commission has already suggested with regard to the PRIMA, see DG Markt G2 MET/OT/acg D(2010) 768690, supra n. 55, p. 24. However, it is clear that the Brussels I bis Regulation would apply to all the procedural aspects that would remain unregulated, as happens in the cases referred to in Art. 71; see AG Opinion, Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v. AXA Versicherung AG [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:50, para. 39.

  106. Sections 3–5 of the Brussels I bis Regulation; see Hill (2003), pp. 52–53.

  107. In accordance with Art. 73 of Brussels I, the Commission engaged in several discussions with the stakeholders and commissioned empirical and legal studies on the functioning of the Regulation with the aim being to reveal the weaknesses of the Brussels I regime. As is well known, one of the major shortcomings was the unsatisfactory level of the access to justice in disputes involving third state defendants; see COM (2010) 748 final, supra n. 20, pp. 3–5; Borràs (2012), pp. 61–62.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Law, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy

    Giorgio Risso

  2. Trinity College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

    Giorgio Risso

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Correspondence to Giorgio Risso.

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The author holds a J.D. (Hons.) and a Ph.D. from the University of Genoa, Italy; he is currently a Research Fellow in International and EU Law at the Department of Law, University of Genoa, Italy, and an LL.M. candidate at Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the X International Seminar on Private International Law (Complutense University of Madrid, 14–15 April 2016). The author wishes to thank Professor Àngel Espiniella Menéndez, Professor Chiara Tuo and the anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments and suggestions on this article. The usual caveats apply.

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Risso, G. Financial Torts and Investor Protection: Is the Europeanisation of Third State Cases a Viable Solution?. Neth Int Law Rev 63, 313–334 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-016-0065-y

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