Abstract
Starting from the publication of the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (Paris, 1687)—the first Latin translation of Chinese philosophical texts—European scholars, such as Leibniz, Malebranche, and Bayle, became interested in learning about Chinese culture. However, the pivotal stage of this reception was partial and strongly influenced by contemporary religious and political goals, which are well represented by the Jesuit mission in China. Weighing the merits of early understandings of Neo-Confucianism against their limitations, I present a case study regarding the notion of li 理 in the sense of the brothers Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) and argue for the importance played by context and difference in intercultural understanding. First, early European receptions of the Neo-Confucian li are assessed in terms of their merits and limitations and with reference to the practice of translation. I argue that the Eurocentric character of early receptions of Confucianism is not only due to the underlying aims by which such understanding was vehiculated but also, and more specifically, to a lack of nuanced understanding resulting from an unbalanced focus on similarities across traditions. Formal indication is introduced as a tool to stem the issues of underdetermination and limitation posed by translation. It is applied to an overview of the various ways in which the Cheng brothers explain li by specifying it through the conjunction with other notions such as dao, tian, xin, ming, and xing. I conclude that understanding li as a formal indication can help us to appreciate the role of context and difference in understanding Chinese philosophical texts, an endeavor here taken as but one example of cross-cultural and intercultural understanding.
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Notes
The full title is Confucius Sinarum Philosophus sive Scientia Sinensis Latine exposita, studio et opera Properi Introcetta, Christiani Herdtrich, Francisci Rougemont, Philippi Couplet, Patrum Societatis Jesu.
From the chapter “Confucius, Socrates de la Chine.”
I say “mainstream,” because this view was not shared unanimously by all Jesuits. According to a smaller group, in which we find Jesuits such as François Noël (1651–1729) and Joseph de Prémare (1666–1736), among others, argued for Neo-Confucianism as being inherently compatible with Christianity, based on concepts such as li 理 and taiji 太極. On this topic, see Mungello (1976) and Meynard (2018).
As Lundbaek notes, the Jesuits understood a crucial issue of Neo-Confucian philosophical discourse, namely, that Song and Ming thinkers held li to be responsible for social roles and interactions in general (ratio, in fact, denotes both “relations” as well as the property of relatedness, besides “reason” as cause), as well as individuals’ body (1983, p. 24).
Elsewhere, I have discussed a possible interpretation regarding the link(s) between the two terms in their respective traditions (Simionato 2023).
The Rites Controversy offers a good example of such irreconcilable differences. On this subject, see Mungello (1994).
“The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. But this commonality is constantly being formed in our relation to tradition. Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves” (Gadamer 2004, p. 293).
While recognizing the flaws of the Jesuits’ representation of China, the four authors also admit that, “[o]f course, the merits of those Jesuit missionaries in pioneering the West–East cultural interflow are enormous” (Tang et al. 1960, p. 5).
Another example of more historical nature is found in the translation of logos as ratio; the latter, in fact, did not express the sense of “discourse,” “language,” and “speech” embodied by logos, even though the two did share the sense of “calculating” (Cassin et al. 2014, p. 586).
Heidegger explains formal indication by differentiating it from generalization: “Generalization means generalizing according to genus. For example, red is colour, colour is sensuous quality. Or joy is an affect, affect is experience. One can, so it seems, drive this further: qualities as such, things as such are essences. Red, colour, sensual quality, experience, genus, species, essence, are things. But the question arises: is the generalizing transition from ‘red’ to ‘colour’ and from ‘colour’ to ‘sensuous quality’ the same as that from ‘sensuous quality’ to ‘essence’ and from ‘essence’ to ‘thing’? Evidently not! There is a break here: the transition from ‘red’ to ‘colour’ and from ‘colour’ to ‘sensuous quality’ is a generalization; that from ‘sensuous quality’ to ‘essence’ is a formalization” (Heidegger 2004, p. 40).
Unless otherwise noted, all English translations of Er Cheng Ji in this paper are from Huang (2014). The formula “one li with many manifestations” appears in Cheng Yi’s comment on Zhang Zai’s Western inscription (Ximing 西銘), where he is questioned by one of his disciples who wanted to know whether Zhang Zai was referring to the same universal love argued by the Mohists. Cheng Yi here responds that since each one’s due is different (fen 分), people should necessarily be treated with discernment (Er Cheng Ji, pp. 1202–1203). It should be noted that scholars do not always agree about the English rendering of the formula. Here I chose, following Wing-tsit Chan, to interpret fen shu as “many manifestations” with the specific meaning of “the universal embodied in the particular partially or completely,” as Chan justifies this translation (Chan 1964, p. 106). At the same time, unlike Liu (2019), I do not take issue in also rendering the passage as “one li with many differentiations,” because in order for li to be many it also has to be necessarily differentiated. I thus hold that fen can be correctly rendered as both “manifestation” and “differentiation.”.
Other characters that the Cheng brothers identify with li include li 禮 (“propriety,” Er Cheng Ji 11; 25), sheng 生 (“life-giving activity” as rendered by Huang 2014, p. 210, Yishu 2a; 33), and shen 神 (“divinity” or “god,” Er Cheng Ji 9; 597).
This is argued by Cheng Hao in Er Cheng Ji, p. 30.
This is Liu’s translation in the context of the following passage: “wanwu zhi li jie zhizu 萬物之理皆至足”; “the li of all things are already self-sufficient” (Liu 2019, p. 276).
The verb for “apprehending” is moshi 默識, meaning “to recognize” or “to understand.”
Ming, in Anglophone texts, is sometimes rendered as “destiny.” With regard to classical Confucianism, it is often found in the compound tianming 天命 to express that which cannot be altered and is naturally so. In the context of the Chengs’ thought, where li is elevated to foundational principle, ming expresses what is naturally so as described or traced (‘decreed’) by li. Ming, in this sense, is thus another of the various specifications of li.
According to the Chengs, acquiring knowledge of li leads to the ability to unite “internal” (the self) and “external” (the others, nature), where both dimensions are relevant to the virtuous self. The following dialogue well-exemplifies this point: “ ‘Q. In examining things and searching the self, should one look back into oneself to seek what one has already seen in things?’ ‘A. There is no need to put it in that way. There is a single li in things and in me; as soon as ‘that’ is understood, ‘this’ becomes clear. This is the way to unite external and internal. The scholar should understand everything, at one extreme the height of heaven and thickness of earth, at the other why a single thing is as it is.’ ‘Q. In extending knowledge, what do you say to first seeking li in the ‘four beginnings’?’ ‘A. To seek them in the nature and the passions is certainly the most direct course; but a single grass and a single tree both have li which must be investigated’” (Er Cheng Ji quoted in Graham 1958, p. 75).
The compound gewu is no novelty to the history of Chinese thought; in fact, it is already found in the Daxue 《大學》: “The people of old who wished to make bright virtue plain to the world first put their countries in order, for which they had first to regulate their families, and for that to improve themselves as individuals, and for that to correct their hearts, and for that to give integrity to their actions, and for that to extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge [zhizhi 致知] lies in the investigation of things [gewu 格物]” (Daxue quoted in Graham 1958, p. 64).
See Daodejing, p. 41, James Legge’s translation.
See Sunzi Bingfa, Xushi, p. 7, Lionel Giles’ translation.
See Gaozi II, p. 26.
See Huainanzi, p. 2.
Huang reports that Hou Wailu 候外蘆, for example, interprets the Cheng brothers as holding that “outside the material world, there is an eternal tianli that exists independent of this material world as its root and foundation” (Huang 2014, p. 206).
According to Feng, li was considered as “independently subsisting apart from actual things” (Feng 1983, p. 507).
Wei also means “obscure” or “profound.” In this context, it designates li as that which is difficult to understand or grasp.
In this context, xiang designates what has shape, is individuated, and thus can be grasped.
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Simionato, A. Context and difference in intercultural understanding: a case-study from the Neo-Confucian tradition. Int. Commun. Chin. Cult 11, 61–76 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40636-024-00285-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40636-024-00285-z