Abstract
This paper proposes a theoretical framework for decision making when the firm needs to make marketing and production/order decisions simultaneously before demand uncertainty is resolved. We discuss the theoretical properties of the framework for single and multi-product firms; in addition, we show that the framework can be extended to allow for competitive reaction in a duopoly setting. We propose an empirical method to operationalize the model and compare the results to those from extant methods. The empirical results for both single and multi-product firms show that the proposed method outperforms decision making using standard econometric methods. In particular, depending on customer lifetime value (CLV) and other error costs and price elasticities, the loss in potential profits by using the standard regression-based methodology or quantile regression can be considerable.
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29 May 2020
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Acknowledgements
The authors thank the Editor-in-Chief and Matt Schneider, Drexel University, for their comments
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Proofs of Propositions
1.1 Proof of Proposition 3 (Multi-Product Model)
First, we need the following Lemma:
Suppose Z = f(x1, x2) is a twice differentiable continuous function. Let \( \frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_1=0} \) and \( \frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_1=0} \), respectively, denote the loci of all (x1, x2) pairs satisfying the first-order conditions. Then, \( \frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_1=0}-\frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_2=0}>0 \) if f12 > 0 and \( \frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_1=0}-\frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_2=0}<0 \) if f12 < 0.
Proof:
The first-order conditions are \( \frac{\partial Z}{\partial {x}_1}={f}_1\left({x}_1,{x}_2\right)=0 \) and \( \frac{\partial Z}{\partial {x}_2}={f}_2\left({x}_1,{x}_2\right)=0 \). By taking total differentials, f11dx1 + f12dx2 ≡ 0. Hence, \( \frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_1=0}=\frac{-{f}_{11}}{f_{12}} \) >0 if f12 > 0 and < 0 if f12 < 0.
Similarly, f21dx1 + f22dx2 ≡ 0. Hence, \( \frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_2=0}=\frac{-{f}_{21}}{f_{22}} \) >0 if f12 > 0 and < 0 if f12 < 0.
Subtracting, we get, \( \frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_1=0}-\frac{d{x}_2}{d{x}_1}{\vert}_{f_2=0}=\frac{-{f}_{11}}{f_{12}}+\frac{f_{21}}{f_{22}}=\frac{-\left({f}_{11}{f}_{22}-{f}_{12}^2\right)}{f_{12}{f}_{22}} \) > 0 if f12 > 0 and < 0 if f12 < 0. Q.E.D.
1.1.1 Comparison of Accounting and Economic Profit Models
We distinguish two cases based on the signs of \( \frac{\partial^2A}{\partial {p}_1\partial {p}_2} \) and \( \frac{\partial^2E\left(\pi \right)}{\partial {p}_1\partial {p}_2} \) where A denotes accounting profit and π denotes economic profit. In our model, \( \frac{\partial^2A}{\partial {p}_1\partial {p}_2}=\frac{\partial^2E\left(\pi \right)}{\partial {p}_1\partial {p}_2}=\frac{\partial {f}_1}{\partial {p}_2}+\frac{\partial^2{f}_1}{\partial {p}_1\partial {p}_2}\left({p}_1-{c}_1\right)+\frac{\partial^2{f}_2}{\partial {p}_1\partial {p}_2}\left({p}_2-{c}_2\right)+\frac{\partial {f}_2}{\partial {p}_1} \).
Suppose f1and f2 are additively separable in p1and p2. Then, \( \frac{\partial^2A}{\partial {p}_1\partial {p}_2}>0 \) and \( \frac{\partial^2E\left(\pi \right)}{\partial {p}_1\partial {p}_2}>0 \) if the products are substitutes and \( \frac{\partial^2A}{\partial {p}_1\partial {p}_2}<0 \) if the products are complements.
1.1.2 Case 1: Products Are Substitutes (ϕ1 > 0, ϕ2 > 0)
In Fig. 1, let AB and CD respectively denote the loci of all (p1, p2) pairs satisfying \( \frac{\partial A}{\partial {p}_1}=0 \) and \( \frac{\partial A}{\partial {p}_2}=0 \). Then, both AB and CD are upward sloping and AB is steeper than CD (see Lemma and Proof).
Similarly, let A′B′ and C′D ′, respectively, denote the loci of all (p1, p2) pairs satisfying \( \frac{\partial E\left(\pi \right)}{\partial {p}_1}=0 \) and \( \frac{\partial E\left(\pi \right)}{\partial {p}_2}=0 \). Then, both A′B′ and C′D ′ are upward sloping and A′B′ is steeper than C′D ′ (see Lemma and Proof).
Let \( \widehat{p_1} \) and \( \widehat{p_2} \) denote any pair that satisfies \( \frac{\partial A}{\partial {p}_1}=0 \). At this point, \( \frac{\partial E\left(\pi \right)}{\partial {p}_1}=\frac{\partial A}{\partial {p}_1}-E\left({u}_1>0\right)+E\left({u}_1<0\right) \). Hence, by concavity, holding p2 constant, p1 must be reduced so that \( \frac{\partial E\left(\pi \right)}{\partial {p}_1}=0 \). This implies that A′B′ is always to the left of AB.
Similarly, we can show that C′D ′ is always below CD.
Hence, the economic profit model always leads to lower prices for both products than the accounting profit model if the demand functions are additively separable and the products are substitutes (Proposition 3).
Case 2: Products are Complements (ϕ1 < 0, ϕ2 < 0)
Proceeding as in Case 1, we can show that both AB and CD are downward sloping and AB is steeper than CD (see Fig. 2). Similarly, both A′B′ and C′D ′ are downward sloping and A′B′ is steeper than C′D ′. Hence, we can only exclude the case that both products are priced higher in the economic profit model than in the accounting profit model.
1.2 Proof of Proposition 4 (Duopoly Model)
- Let \( {\overline{\uppi}}^{(1)} \):
-
: expected profit for Firm 1
- \( {\overline{\uppi}}^{(2)} \) :
-
: expected profit for Firm 2
- \( {\overline{\pi}}_1^{(1)} \) :
-
: first derivative for Firm 1 w.r.t own price p1
- \( {\overline{\uppi}}_2^{(2)} \) :
-
: first derivative for Firm 2 w.r.t own price p2
- \( {\overline{\uppi}}_{12}^{(1)} \) :
-
: cross partial for Firm 1 w.r.t prices p1 and p2
- \( {\overline{\uppi}}_{21}^{(2)} \) :
-
: cross partial for Firm 2 w.r.t prices p1 and p2
- \( {\overline{\uppi}}_{11}^{(1)} \) :
-
: second derivative for Firm 1 w.r.t price p1
- \( {\overline{\pi}}_{22}^{(2)} \) :
-
: second derivative for Firm 2 w.r.t price p2
Suppose the demand function is additively separable in its arguments. Thus,
Then, \( {\overline{\uppi}}_{12}^{(1)}={\phi}_1>0 \) and \( {\overline{\uppi}}_{21}^{(2)}={\phi}_2>0 \), where ϕ1 ≠ ϕ2 in general.
At \( {\overline{\uppi}}_1^{(1)}=0 \) the total differential is \( {\overline{\uppi}}_{11}^{(1)}d{p}_1+{\overline{\uppi}}_{12}^{(1)}{p}_2\equiv 0 \).
Thus, \( {\left.\frac{d{p}_2}{d{p}_1}\right|}_{{\overline{\uppi}}_1^{(1)}}=\frac{-{\overline{\uppi}}_{11}^{(1)}}{{\overline{\uppi}}_{12}^{(1)}}>0 \) and similarly, \( {\left.\frac{d{p}_2}{d{p}_1}\right|}_{{\overline{\uppi}}_2^{(2)}}=\frac{-{\overline{\uppi}}_{21}^{(2)}}{{\overline{\uppi}}_{22}^{(2)}}>0 \).
Subtracting, \( {\left.\frac{d{p}_2}{d{p}_1}\right|}_{{\overline{\uppi}}_1^{(1)}}-{\left.\frac{d{p}_2}{d{p}_1}\right|}_{{\overline{\uppi}}_2^{(2)}}=\frac{-{\overline{\uppi}}_{11}^{(1)}}{{\overline{\uppi}}_{12}^{(1)}}+\frac{{\overline{\uppi}}_{21}^{(2)}}{{\overline{\uppi}}_{22}^{(2)}}=-\frac{{\overline{\uppi}}_{11}^{(1)}{\overline{\uppi}}_{22}^{(2)}-{\overline{\uppi}}_{12}^{(1)}{\overline{\uppi}}_{21}^{(2)}}{{\overline{\uppi}}_{12}^{(1)}{\overline{\uppi}}_{22}^{(2)}}>0 \) by the second-order conditions.
Proposition 4 follows immediately following the same method as in the multi-product case for substitutes. Hence, the economic profit model leads to lower prices than the accounting profit model if demand is additively separable.
Appendix 2. Optimal Price Derivation
1.1 Optimal Price for Proposed Model
Suppose based on our proposed method, the quantity estimate for a price point p is \( \widehat{\mu}=\alpha +\upbeta p \), and the difference between realized demand y and \( \widehat{\mu} \) is \( u=y-\widehat{\mu} \). Furthermore, assume that the demand function is linear: y = α0 + β0p + ε, and ε~N(0, σ2). Then, the demand function can be estimated by ordinary least squares. At each point p, y follows a normal distribution with density function f(y) and cumulative distribution function F(y).
At price point p, the expected profit is as follows:
Taking the derivative with respect to p, we have
The optimal price p* is then the value that makes the derivative equal to 0.
1.2 Optimal Price for OLS and Quantile Regression
For both OLS and quantile regression, Eu < 0(u) and Eu ≥ 0(u) are, by definition, independent of p. Therefore, the derivation of the optimal price is much simpler than for the proposed method.
At the optimal price point p, the expected profit is as follows:
In order to maximize expected profit, we take the derivative of the expected profit function and set it to 0:
Then, the optimal price\( {p}^{\ast }=\frac{\alpha }{2\upbeta}+\frac{c}{2}+\frac{1}{2\upbeta}{E}_{u<0}(u)-\frac{\upvarphi}{2\upbeta}{E}_{u\ge 0}(u) \)
For both OLS and quantile regression:
Appendix 3. Algorithm for Estimation
We used a recently proposed Normalized Adaptive Gradient Descent (NAG) algorithm for model training[16]. The algorithm scales gradients automatically in each step in order to reach the minimum fast while keeping the estimates stable. The detailed model training steps are as follows:
First, set values for the learning rate α. We set α = 2 for our model training, as suggested by the authors of NAG. Set the initial parameter value βi = 0. We also need to set the initial values for the tuning parameters: si = 0, Gi = 0, N = 0.
For each step t, we randomly pick a sample (x, y)
Appendix 4. Additional Simulation Results
1.1 One-Product Case
Table 4 shows the prices, quantities, and expected economic profits for different estimators for different cost-price ratios (i.e., 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7) and CLV parameters (i.e., 1 and 2). These results support the conclusion in the text that, in general, the proposed model leads to higher prices and quantities than OLS and quantile regression. Furthermore, regardless of parameter values, the proposed model leads to higher expected economic profits than OLS or quantile regression.
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Jagpal, S., Xia, F. Coordinating Marketing and Production with Asymmetric Costs: Theory and Estimation. Cust. Need. and Solut. 6, 1–12 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40547-019-00094-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40547-019-00094-1