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The Constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Law in the EU and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, but Still Some Way to Go!

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Abstract

In the first part of the new millennium, the rise of the use of fundamental rights in shaping and using intellectual property norms has led one of the authors of this article to predict that this movement will be “constitutionalizing” intellectual property law. More than a decade and a half later, the influence of fundamental rights on the scope and limitations of intellectual property has never been more important, as illustrated by three seminal copyright decisions (in the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online cases) delivered in July 2019 by the Court of Justice of the European Union. These decisions, dealing with the relationship between copyright and freedom of expression (including freedom of the media, information, and freedom of artistic creativity), stand out in the European judicial practice on copyright and fundamental rights for a number of reasons. First, freedom of expression and its balancing factors play a crucial role in shaping the contours of the exclusive rights, starting from the definition of copyright law’s subject-matter and extending to the right of reproduction, as well as – most importantly – to copyright limitations and exceptions. In essence, the CJEU takes a quite liberal position towards the national courts’ interpretation of existing copyright norms in the light of the freedom of expression requirements. The CJEU goes even as far as to term the Art. 5 InfoSoc exceptions not as “exceptions” as such but as self-sufficient rights of users of copyright-protected subject-matter. It is also notable that, in applying freedom of expression to EU copyright, the CJEU has largely relied on the case law of yet another supranational European court – the European Court of Human Rights – manifesting eagerness to engage in a “dialogue” with the principal human rights tribunal in Europe in order to establish guiding principles for EU copyright law informed by freedom of expression. Such a liberal, “freedom-of-expression-driven” approach of the CJEU to the interpretation of EU copyright appears quite analogue in results that could be reached by applying an external and/or open-ended copyright exception. Nevertheless, the Luxembourg Court indicates in Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online that an externally introduced flexibility (by means of complementing that already existing in the EU list of exceptions) could be harmful to copyright harmonization and legal certainty. Therefore, despite having taken a more favourable position on the possibility of shaping EU copyright by fundamental rights norms, the CJEU does not go all the way, since it considers in quite categorical terms that an external freedom of expression exception beyond the exhaustive list of limitations of Art. 5 InfoSoc is clearly inacceptable. According to the Court, copyright’s own internal mechanisms present sufficient safety valves for balancing with freedom of expression. Such a position of the CJEU that relies on the fact that the legislature has anticipated all the potential conflicts between copyright and higher ranking norms such as fundamental rights might be incompatible with the EU legal order. Thus, despite visible progress in flexibilizing copyright norms via their interpretation “in the light of” fundamental rights, some further steps will still need to be taken in the future to make the “constitutionalization” of IP law a complete reality in the EU.

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Notes

  1. Geiger (2006), (2008a), p 101, (2012), p 223.

  2. CJEU, judgment in Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-469/17, 29 July 2019, EU:C:2019:623 (hereafter “judgment in Funke Medien”); CJEU, judgment in Pelham GmbH and Others v. Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, C-476/17, 29 July 2019, EU:C:2019:624 (hereafter “judgment in Pelham”); and CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online GmbH v. Volker Beck, C-516/17, 29 July 2019, EU:C:2019:625 (hereafter “judgment in Spiegel Online”). For a commentary on these important decisions, see Sganga (2019); Snijders and Deursen (2019); Jütte and Quintais (2019a); and Jütte (2019). See also Griffiths (2019); Geiger and Izyumenko (2019a); Jongsma (2019); and Jütte and Quintais (2019b).

  3. CJEU, judgment in Funke Medien.

  4. CJEU, judgment in Pelham.

  5. German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the First Senate, Metall auf Metall, 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016, DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513. More generally on this issue, see Geiger (2018), (2007a).

  6. CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online.

  7. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (InfoSoc), OJ L 167 of 22 June 2001, p. 10.

  8. CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, C-469/17, 25 October 2018, EU:C:2018:870 (hereafter “Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Funke Medien”).

  9. CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Funke Medien, at paras. 38–41 and 70–71.

  10. CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Pelham GmbH and Others v. Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, C-476/17, 12 December 2018, EU:C:2018:1002 (hereafter “Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Pelham”); and CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Spiegel Online GmbH v. Volker Beck, C-516/17, 10 January 2019, EU:C:2019:16 (hereafter “Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Spiegel Online”).

  11. CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Pelham, at paras. 54, 77 and 98.

  12. CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Spiegel Online, at para. 63. For a commentary on the Opinions of Advocate General Szpunar on Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online cases, see Geiger and Izyumenko (2019a).

  13. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 64; Pelham, at para. 65; and Spiegel Online, at para. 49.

  14. See Geiger (2006).

  15. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 58; Pelham, at para. 60; and Spiegel Online, at para. 43.

  16. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 70; and Spiegel Online, at para. 54.

  17. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at paras. 60 and 73; and Spiegel Online, at paras. 45 and 57, with further references to CJEU, judgment in Painer, C-145/10, 1 December 2011, EU:C:2011:798 (hereafter “judgment in Painer”), at para. 135. See also CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online, at para. 72 (with further references to CJEU, judgment in Painer, at para. 113) stating that the purpose of the news reporting exception is “to contribute to the exercise of the freedom of information and the freedom of the media, enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter”.

  18. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at paras. 58, 70; Pelham, at para. 60; and Spiegel Online, at paras. 43, 54. For a similar argument in the US context, pursuant to which the US fair use and idea/expression dichotomy already sufficiently balance FoE and copyright internally, see US Supreme Court, Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprise, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright. Whether verbatim copying from a public figure’s manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must be judged according to the traditional equities of fair use.”). Note, however, that the US fair use, unlike the EU list of copyright exceptions enshrined in InfoSoc, is an open-ended provision susceptible of a flexible interpretation by the courts. Furthermore, in its subsequent pronouncements on the relationship between copyright and the First Amendment, the US Supreme Court has held that copyright is only “generally” immune to free speech (US Supreme Court, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003)). It has been held, further, that where “Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection [i.e. the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defence], further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary” – the statement implying that, when the traditional contours of copyright protection are indeed affected, First Amendment scrutiny is necessary: see US Supreme Court, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221, 264 (2003); and US Supreme Court, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–891 (2012).

  19. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at paras. 62, 63; Pelham, at paras. 63, 64; and Spiegel Online, at paras. 47, 48.

  20. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 64; Pelham, at para. 65; and Spiegel Online, at para. 49.

  21. See, notably, CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 76; and Spiegel Online, at para. 59.

  22. This is not the first time that the CJEU emphasized the need to interpret EU copyright law in the light of fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and information: see e.g. CJEU, judgments in Painer, at para. 135; Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, 24 November 2011, EU:C:2011:771, at para. 54; SABAM v. Netlog, C-360/10, 16 February 2012, EU:C:2012:85, at para. 52; UPC Telekabel, C-314/12, 27 March 2014, EU:C:2014:192 (hereafter “judgment in Telekabel”), at para. 47; Deckmyn, C-201/13, 3 September 2014, EU:C:2014:2132 (hereafter “judgment in Deckmyn”), at para. 27; GS Media, C-160/15, 8 September 2016, EU:C:2016:644 (hereafter “judgment in GS Media”), at para. 45; McFadden, C-484/14, 15 September 2016, EU:C:2016:689, at para. 90; and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Dirk Renckhoff, C-161/17, 7 August 2018, EU:C:2018:634 (hereafter “judgment in Renckhoff”), at para. 41. See on this new flexibilizing role of the CJEU through the application of fundamental rights in copyright law, Geiger (2016a), p 435.

  23. CJEU, judgment in Funke Medien, at para. 24.

  24. Id., at paras. 71, 73–76.

  25. Id., at para. 24, with further references to CJEU, judgments in Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, C-393/09, 22 December 2010, EU:C:2010:816, at paras. 48–50; and SAS Institute, C-406/10, 2 May 2012, EU:C:2012:259, at para. 67.

  26. CJEU, judgment in Funke Medien, at para. 24.

  27. Id., at para. 71.

  28. CJEU, judgment in Pelham, at paras. 31, 37, 39.

  29. Further on a dialogical nature of the relationships regulated by copyright law, see the work of A. Drassinower and, in particular, Drassinower (2015). Drassinower builds, in turn, on the Kantian idea of a work of authorship as a speech to the public (Kant (1785), p. 23).

  30. CJEU, judgment in Pelham, at paras. 71, 72.

  31. German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the First Senate, Metall auf Metall, 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016, DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513.

  32. European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02, 26 October 2012, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b70.html (accessed August 2019). Further, on the intellectual property clause of EU Charter, see Geiger (2009a), (2010a). See also Griffiths and McDonagh (2013), p 75; and Husovec (2019).

  33. Section 29.21 of the Canadian Copyright Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42).

  34. The Advocate General considered, notably, that (unlicensed) music sampling should be regarded as a violation of the exclusive rights of phonogram producers and, consequently, as not covered by the “essence” of the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the arts. (CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Pelham, at para. 98.) Further on this, see Geiger and Izyumenko (2019a).

  35. For examples of such cases, see Geiger (2019). The CJEU’s position in Pelham, including the need to balance artistic freedom with the protection of property of rightholders under Art. 17(2) of the EU Charter (underlined in para. 32 of the CJEU’s judgment in Pelham), leaves, however, room for the limitations-based remuneration solutions for commercial creative uses that can secure significant revenues for creators and can thus be considered as important features of the copyright balances in author-centred legislative frameworks. For a further detailed discussion of such legislative solutions, see Geiger (2017), p 305, (2010b).

  36. According to the CJEU, “neither the wording of Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 nor the concept of ‘quotation’ […] require that the quoted work be inextricably integrated, by way of insertions or reproductions in footnotes for example, into the subject matter citing it, so that a quotation may thus be made by including a hyperlink to the quoted work”. (CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online, at para. 80.)

  37. CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online, at para. 81, with further references to CJEU, judgments in GS Media, at para. 45; and Renckhoff, at para. 40.

  38. CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online, at para. 82, with further references to CJEU, judgment in Painer, at paras. 120 and 134.

  39. CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online, at para. 63. In this connection, the Court has emphasized, in particular, the need to ensure a rapid dissemination of information on current events: “When a current event occurs, it is necessary, as a general rule, particularly in the information society, for the information relating to that event to be diffused rapidly, which is difficult to reconcile with a requirement for the author’s prior consent, which would be likely to make it excessively difficult for relevant information to be provided to the public in a timely fashion, and might even prevent it altogether.” (CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online, at para. 71.)

  40. CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online, at para. 74.

  41. Further on the tendency to “constitutionalize” EU copyright law by the application of fundamental rights, see Geiger (2004a), (2006), (2009b), p. 27; Griffiths (2013), (2018), p. 144; Mylly (2015); and Schovsbo (2015).

  42. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 38; and Pelham, at paras. 84–86.

  43. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at paras. 42–43; and Spiegel Online, at paras. 27–28. This has been criticized by several scholars: see e.g., with further references, Geiger and Schönherr (2012), p. 133, Geiger et al. (2014), p. 395.

  44. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 43; and Spiegel Online, at para. 28.

  45. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at paras. 67–68; and Spiegel Online, at paras. 51–52, with further references to CJEU, judgments in Promusicae, C-275/06, 29 January 2008, EU:C:2008:54, at para. 70; Telekabel, at para. 46; and Coty Germany, C-580/13, 16 July 2015, EU:C:2015:485, at para. 34.

  46. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 51; and Spiegel Online, at para. 36.

  47. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 76; and Spiegel Online, at para. 59.

  48. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 74; and Spiegel Online, at para. 58.

  49. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 74; and Spiegel Online, at para. 58, citing ECtHR, Ashby Donald and Others v. France, No. 36769/08, 10 January 2013, CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908 (hereafter “judgment in Ashby Donald”), at para. 39.

  50. CJEU, judgment in Funke Medien, at para. 75.

  51. Id.

  52. CJEU, judgment in Spiegel Online, at paras. 58, 59.

  53. CJEU, judgment in Pelham, at paras. 34, 35.

  54. Id., at para. 34.

  55. Such an interpretation is consistent with the Strasbourg Court’s approach to artistic expression. Although, unlike the EU Charter, the European Convention on Human Rights does not envisage a separate provision on the freedom of arts, Art. 10 (freedom of expression) ECHR has been interpreted by the ECtHR over the years to include artistic expression, as well as to accord to such expression an elevated level of protection. (See e.g. ECtHR, Müller and Others v. Switzerland, No. 10737/84, 24 May 1988, CE:ECHR:1988:0524JUD001073784, at para. 27 (hereafter “judgment in Müller”); and Alınak v. Turkey, No. 40287/98, 29 March 2005, CE:ECHR:2005:0329JUD004028798, at para. 42.) The CJEU’s approach to artistic expression as forming part of freedom of expression in general is consistent with the norms of international law, and notably with Art. 19 (freedom of expression) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 999, p. 171) that specifically includes information and ideas “in the form of art” within the scope of this provision. Certain national Constitutions, including those of Germany and Sweden, likewise incorporate explicit references to freedom of artistic expression/artistic creativity within the right to freedom of expression: see Art. 5 (freedom of expression, arts and sciences) of the German Basic Law and Chapter 1, Art. 1 of the Swedish Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (one of the four laws making up the Swedish Constitution).

  56. CJEU, judgment in Pelham, at para. 34, with further references to ECtHR, judgments in Müller, at para. 27; and Karataş v. Turkey [GC], No. 23168/94, 8 July 1999, CE:ECHR:1999:0708JUD002316894, at para. 49.

  57. CJEU, judgment in Pelham, at para. 35.

  58. Id., at para. 31.

  59. Id., at para. 37.

  60. Id., at para. 38.

  61. Id.

  62. German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), Metall auf Metall, No. 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513, at para. 86 (emphasis added), translation from German by the authors. Analogously, in another decision from Germany, Germania 3, which concerned the refusal of the heirs of Bertolt Brecht to allow the use of passages from his play for insertion in a new one, the German Constitutional Court took into account that such use would involve only a minimal financial loss for the rightholders – a factor that tilted, according to the Court, in favour of allowing a derivative use. (German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), Germania 3, 1 BvR 825/98, 29 June 2000, GRUR Int. 149 (2001), at para. 22.)

  63. For a detailed exploration of the FoE balancing factors in their application to copyright law in Europe, as well as for a comparative analysis of such FoE factors with the US fair use factors, see Geiger and Izyumenko (2019b). See also Geiger and Izyumenko (2014).

  64. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html (accessed August 2019).

  65. CJEU, judgment in Funke Medien, at para. 73 (internal quotations omitted).

  66. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 74; Pelham, at para. 34; and Spiegel Online, at para. 58.

  67. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 74; and Spiegel Online, at para. 58, quoting ECtHR, judgment in Ashby Donald, at para. 39. For a detailed analysis of the Ashby Donald judgment, including the different FoE factors that the ECtHR applied to the copyright regulation in that case, see Geiger and Izyumenko (2014). See also Strowel (2014); Voorhoof (2015). More generally on copyright and FoE before the ECtHR, see Izyumenko (2016); and Geiger and Izyumenko (2018), p. 9.

  68. See Geiger (2006); Griffiths (2013); Mylly (2015).

  69. For the first comprehensive overview of the ECtHR case law on intellectual property, see Geiger and Izyumenko (2018). For the role of the judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, in general, in shaping intellectual property laws, see Geiger et al. (2018c). For a comparative overview of the approaches of the ECtHR and the CJEU towards balancing copyright and FoE, see Izyumenko (2016); and Strowel (2014).

  70. CJEU, judgments in Telekabel, at para. 57; and Ulmer, at para. 43.

  71. CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 70; and Spiegel Online, at para. 54 (emphasis added), with further references to CJEU, judgment in Ulmer, at para. 43.

  72. See, notably, Vaver (2000), at 169–227. For a similar reflection in the context of copyright in the EU, see Geiger (2004b), p 882.

  73. Canadian Supreme Court, CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339, at para. 12 (emphasis added). See also para. 48 of the CCH Canadian decision, holding, with reference to Vaver, as follows: “Any act falling within the fair dealing exception will not be an infringement of copyright. The fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In order to maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively.” The statement of Vaver referenced by the Canadian Supreme Court concerned an observation to the effect that “[u]ser rights are not just loopholes” and “[b]oth owner rights and user rights should therefore be given the fair and balanced reading that befits remedial legislation” (Vaver (2000)). For other Canadian Supreme Court decisions interpreting copyright exceptions liberally, see e.g. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 SCR 336; SOCAN v. Bell Canada, [2012] 2 SCR 326; and Alberta (Minister of Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), [2012] 2 SCR 345.

  74. CJEU, judgment in Telekabel. For a commentary on this case as well as on the European practice of website blocking for copyright enforcement in general, see Geiger and Izyumenko (2016); and, more recently, Geiger and Izyumenko (2019c).

  75. CJEU, judgment in Telekabel, at para. 57 (emphasis added). It has been submitted that such a cause of action may be provided to the users on the basis of their contractual relationship with the intermediary implementing an injunction (Husovec (2014a), at 633). This assumption was in effect further supported by the implementing decision of the Austrian Court which was of the opinion that “[the locus standi] requirement is already fulfilled in the Austrian law because the customers can sue their provider on the contractual basis in case they consider the blocking measures not lawful or excessive. Because the contract between the access provider and his consumers is to be, as a rule, interpreted meaning that all – but only those – website blocking injunctions are permitted, which correspond to requirements of the CJEU. Already this possibility suffices to guarantee the right of the customers to legal access to information, which was stressed by the CJEU. In order to reduce the risk of conflicting decisions, the provider will be in such a case able to announce the dispute to the right holder, who gave rise to such blocking” (Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), UPC-Telekabel II/kino.to, No. 4Ob71/14 s, 24 June 2014, translation from German by Husovec (2014b)).

  76. Notably, this procedural guarantee is consonant with one of the principal positions of the Office of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in that “[b]locking must be carried out with effective notice on the conclusion of due process, and interested parties should be given the opportunity to challenge the decision in public judicial proceedings”. (Korff and Brown (2012), emphasis added.)

  77. See in this regard Suthersanen (2008), at 184, observing that “[c]ourts need to grasp that when a defendant pleads ‘freedom of expression’, it is not a defence but a counter-claim”; Geiger (2016b), p. 73.

  78. Savola (2014), at para. 36, emphasis added. See also Husovec (2014a), at 633, arguing that “even the implementation of technology-specific and fixed website-blocking injunctions can lead to a problem of overblocking of the legitimate content, which might also have been a reason why the CJEU especially requires the need of locus standi for users. This would then lead to locus standi of users as a general requirement also in cases of all the specific website-blocking injunctions.”

  79. CJEU, judgment in Ulmer.

  80. Id., at para. 43 (emphasis added).

  81. Id., at para. 44.

  82. See e.g. CJEU, judgment in Painer, at paras. 134, 135 (stating that the quotation exception enshrined in Art. 5(3)(d) InfoSoc intended to strike a fair balance between the rights of users of protected subject-matter and the reproduction right conferred on authors, and that striking such a balance in this case implied favouring “the exercise of the users’ right to freedom of expression over the interest of the author in being able to prevent the reproduction of extracts from his work which has already been lawfully made available to the public” (emphasis added)); CJEU, judgment in Deckmyn, at para. 27 (framing the parody exception in the “rights-language”, from which it followed that the application of such an exception had to strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interests and rights of copyright holders, and, on the other, the rights of users of protected subject-matter to freedom of expression). See Geiger, Griffiths, Senftleben, Bently, and Xalabarder (2015).

  83. Such an optimistic prognosis can, however, be compromised by the other recurring trend in the CJEU case law that likewise manifests itself in Funke Medien and Spiegel Online – notably, the CJEU’s position that “any derogation from a general rule [of copyright protection] must, in principle, be interpreted strictly”. (See CJEU, judgments in Funke Medien, at para. 69; and Spiegel Online, at para. 53.) For the previous manifestations of this restrictive position of the CJEU towards copyright exceptions and limitations, see e.g. CJEU, judgments in Infopaq, C-5/08, 16 July 2009, EU:C:2009:465, at para. 56; Football Association Premier League and Others, C-403/08 and C-429/08, 4 October 2011, EU:C:2011:631, at para. 162; ACI Adam and Others, C-435/12, 10 April 2014, EU:C:2014:254, at para. 23; Public Relations Consultants Association, C-360/13, 5 June 2014, EU:C:2014:1195, at para 23; and Deckmyn, at para. 22.

  84. German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), Vorschaubilder, No. I ZR 69/08, 29 April 2010.

  85. Notably, quotation did not apply due to its construction in German law which subjects this exception to the requirements of criticism or review – the context is clearly absent in the case of an image search service.

  86. German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), Vorschaubilder, No. I ZR 69/08, 29 April 2010. For the subsequent findings that no copyright infringement results from the use of thumbnails by search engines, see the judgments of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) in Vorschaubilder II, No. I ZR 140/10, 19 October 2011; and Vorschaubilder III, No. I ZR 11-16, 21 September 2017.

  87. According to Westkamp (2012), at 61, the Court established through the consent doctrine a general escape clause, “an additional limitation outside the enumeration of acceptable limitations under Article 5 EUCD”. According to Westkamp, “this resonates with more expansive balancing approaches, such as the fair use rule under US copyright law that incorporates a public interest test, a general recognition of communication freedom a directly applicable defense” (id., at 62).

  88. See Leistner (2011); Guilbault (2010), at paras. 10–12; Senftleben (2010), at 536–538; Hugenholtz and Senftleben (2011), at 12.

  89. See, for example, Lucas (2010), at 282.

  90. Vast numbers of scholars support more flexibility and criticize the closed list of EU copyright exceptions. See e.g. Geiger and Schönherr (2014); Geiger (2010c), at 8; Geiger (2008b); Senftleben (2011); Hugenholtz and Senftleben (2011).

  91. The Hague Court of Appeals, Church of Scientology v. XS4ALL, 4 September 2003, 6 AMI 222 (2003).

  92. Id.

  93. Id. On 16 December 2005, the Dutch Supreme Court dismissed Scientology’s appeal and made the previous ruling final, but without deciding on the merits of the case: see the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 16 December 2005, 1st Chamber, No. C04/020/HR (LJN AT2056).

  94. See more generally on this issue, Geiger (2007b), p 24.

  95. See e.g. ECtHR, judgment in Ashby Donald; and ECtHR, Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden [The Pirate Bay] (dec.), No. 40397/12, 19 February 2013, CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712. For a joint commentary on these cases that have manifested a breakthrough for the external-limitation approach, see Geiger and Izyumenko (2014).

  96. See Art. 6(2) TEU as amended by Art. 1(8) of the Treaty of Lisbon (“The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”); and Art. 59(2) ECHR as amended by Art. 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR (“The European Union may accede to this Convention.”). Although the CJEU rejected the latest draft agreement of EU accession to the ECHR (Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454), this only delayed the accession, which remains compulsory for the EU.

  97. For some examples of the gradual acknowledgement of the external FoE limitation on copyright by the national courts in Europe, see e.g. High Court of Paris (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris), Utrillo, 23 February 1999, 184 Revue internationale du droit d’auteur 374 (2000); Austrian Supreme Court, Medienprofessor, 12 June 2001, GRUR Int. 341 (2002); UK Court of Appeal, Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2001] EWCA Civ. 1142; Supreme Court of the Canton of Zurich, 9 September 2004, Medialex 231 (2004); French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), Société Plon SA and Others v. Pierre Hugo and Others, No. 125, 30 January 2007, 38(6) IIC 736 (2007); French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), Peter Klasen v. Alix Malka, No. 13-27391, 15 May 2015, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000030600576 (accessed August 2019); German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the First Senate, Metall auf Metall, 1 BvR 1585/13, 31 May 2016, DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513. On some of these cases, see Voorhoof (2015). In trademark law, such an external FoE limitation was also admitted by several courts, without it being as controversially discussed as in copyright law: see Geiger (2004c), p. 268, (2007c).

  98. See CJEU, judgment in Pelham, at paras. 63–65.

  99. CJEU, judgment in Funke Medien, at para. 63.

  100. Id., at para. 64.

  101. See e.g. CJEU, judgment in Deckmyn, at para. 15, declaring the parody exception an “autonomous concept of EU law” that should be “interpreted uniformly throughout the European Union”.

  102. Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, OJ L 130, p. 92. The new Directive introduces, notably, four mandatory exceptions for text and data mining (TDM) for research purposes (Art. 3); a general TDM exception for other purposes (Art. 4); an exception for teaching and educational purposes (Art. 5); and an exception for the preservation of cultural heritage (Art. 6). For further discussion, see Geiger et al. (2018a, b).

  103. CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Funke Medien, at para. 40.

  104. For a detailed exploration of how such an FoE-grounded “fair use” can be structured and further introduced in the EU copyright framework, see Geiger and Izyumenko (2019b).

  105. For an overview of the “constitutionalization” of EU copyright by applying the norms of the fundamental rights law, see Geiger (2006). See also Griffiths (2013); Mylly (2015); and Schovsbo (2015).

  106. Importantly, such an FoE-grounded European “fair use” does not always need to be use for free, as is the case with the American fair use provision. Further on this, see Geiger and Izyumenko (2019b).

  107. See in this sense Geiger (2013), p. 153, (2006), (2014), p. 661.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Professor of Law, Director of the Research Department of the Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI), University of Strasbourg; Affiliated Senior Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition and Spangenberg Fellow in Law & Technology at the Spangenberg Center for Law, Technology & the Arts, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Strasbourg, France

    Christophe Geiger

  2. Researcher, CEIPI, University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France

    Elena Izyumenko

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Geiger, C., Izyumenko, E. The Constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Law in the EU and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, but Still Some Way to Go!. IIC 51, 282–306 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-019-00901-1

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