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Equilibrium Arrivals to Preemptive Queueing System with Fixed and Random Population Size

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Abstract

A single-server queueing system with preemptive access is considered. Each customer has one attempt to enter the system at its working interval [0, T]. As soon as the customer request enters the system, the server immediately starts the service. But when the next request arrives in the system, the previous one leaves the system even he has not finished his service yet. We study a non-cooperative game in which the customers wish to maximize their probability of obtaining service within a certain period of time. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and the price of anarchy, which is defined as the ratio between the optimal and equilibrium social utility. Two models are considered. In the first model the number of players is fixed, while in the second it is random and obeys the Poisson distribution. We demonstrate that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium for both models. Finally, we calculate the price of anarchy for both models and show that the price of anarchy is not monotone with respect to the number of customers.

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Author notes

    Authors and Affiliations

    1. Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Centre of RAS, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia

      Julia Chirkova & Vladimir Mazalov

    2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266071, Shandong, China

      Vladimir Mazalov

    Authors
    1. Julia Chirkova
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    2. Vladimir Mazalov
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    Contributions

    The authors contributed equally to this work. Conceptualization, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; methodology, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; software, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; validation, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; formal analysis, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; investigation, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; resources, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; data curation, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; writing original draft preparation, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; writing review and editing, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; visualization, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov; supervision, J. Chirkova, V. Mazalov. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

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    Correspondence to Julia Chirkova.

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    The authors declare no conflict of interest.

    Additional information

    This research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (No. 22-11-20015, https://rscf.ru/project/22-11-20015/), jointly with support of the authorities of the Republic of Karelia with funding from the Venture Investment Foundation of the Republic of Karelia. Also the research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72171126).

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    Chirkova, J., Mazalov, V. Equilibrium Arrivals to Preemptive Queueing System with Fixed and Random Population Size. J. Oper. Res. Soc. China 12, 77–92 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-023-00461-9

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    • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-023-00461-9

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