Abstract
In this paper, we discuss the following four alternative ways of understanding the outcomes of resurrection biology (also known as de-extinction). Implications of each of the ways are discussed with respect to concepts of species and extinction. (1) Replication: animals created by resurrection biology do not belong to the original species but are copies of it. The view is compatible with finality of extinction as well as with certain biological and ecological species concepts. (2) Re-creation: animals created are members of the original species but, despite their existence, the species remains extinct. The view is incompatible with all species concepts presented. (3) Non-extinction: animals produced belong to the original species which actually never went extinct. The view may be consistent with phenetic and phylogenetic species concepts as well as with finality of extinction. (4) According to literal resurrection, resurrection biology is successful in reversing extinction through the creation of new members of species that once went extinct. This view presupposes non-finality of extinction and it is compatible with phenetic species concepts. It is notable that no species or extinction concept is consistent with all possible views of resurrection biology nor is any view of resurrection biology consistent with all species or extinction concepts. Thus, one’s views regarding species and extinction determine which views one can adopt regarding resurrection biology and vice versa.
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Notes
The reproduction of non-avian dinosaur traits differs from the resurrection of the passenger pigeon in one important respect: the latter would be the result of replicating an organism’s entire genome whereas the former would be the result of replicating an organism’s gene sequences. Nevertheless, this is a difference of degree rather than of kind; certainly, if a sufficient number of non-avian dinosaur traits were to be replicated then the entirety of a non-avian dinosaur phenotype would follow. Whether or not scientists can know when they have succeeded in replicating a dinosaur phenotype is a separate epistemological question.
Biological species concepts may be operational, i.e. testable in practice, or theoretical (Mayden 1997). Ernst Mayr, the most vocal proponent of biological concepts, distinguished between these senses of his biological species concept by reference either to actual interbreeding between organisms (in the operational sense) or to potential interbreeding between organisms (in the theoretical sense) (Stamos 2003). In order to recognize organisms’ potential to interbreed, a concept must specify some salient trait similarity between those organisms, such as Paterson’s specific mate recognition system (1985) or overall genetic similarity (see Mayden 1997). In this sense, the theoretical sense of biological species concepts is functionally indistinguishable from phenetic species concepts. When we refer to biological concepts, then, we mean specifically the operational sense of those concepts.
One might argue that Celia bore traits that demonstrated her reproductive compatibility with other members of the sub-species, and that we could therefore recognize her as a member of that taxon; but doing so would entail rejecting an operational view of the biological species concept (see note 2). Given Celia’s separation in time from members of the taxon C. pyrenaica pyrenaica, she could not actually interbreed with any organism in that taxon; it is for this reason that Simpson (1961) and Mayr argue that the biological species concept is not operational across the temporal dimension (see Stamos 2003).
The projects also seem to concern charismatic animals and animals that have gone extinct because of human activities.
The case of Celia and Delia concerns extinction and de-extinction of a sub-species. Yet, in the paper, the interest is in the extinction of species and in the species concept. For the sake of the argument and in order to include a real life case of Celia and Delia, we presuppose that extinction of sub-species is an instance of real extinction. As a result, we also presuppose that questions presented about de-extinction in this paper can and should be answered similarly regarding species and sub-species. These presuppositions, however, are not detrimental to our general argument regarding species concept and species extinction.
Proponents of biological species concepts often deny that their concepts are operational across the temporal dimension (see supra note 3). It is for this reason that Simpson (1961) argued for supplementing biological species concepts with his “successional species concept” for the purposes of phylogenetic reconstruction. One may argue that Celia and Delia have traits that give them the potential to interact within the same reproductively isolated population; however, Hull argues that “unrealized potentialities don’t count” in diagnosing species membership by biological standards (1965). Even laboratory tests performed using Celia’s preserved genetic information would therefore be insufficient to demonstrate the conspecificity of Celia with clones: if two organisms do not actually bear the appropriate relation prescribed by biological concepts then they are in fact not members of the same species. Whether this should be considered a virtue or a vice of biological concepts is left to the reader to decide.
The inconsistency of literal resurrection with biological species concepts rests on the assumption that biological concepts are operational rather than theoretical (see footnote 2). If a biological concept is taken to be theoretical—that is, if it defines species in terms of counterfactual relations in addition to real ones—then Delia might be a member of C. pyrenaica pyrenaica. However, this possibility can only be accepted by reference to phenetic similarity, and so the relevant species concept underwriting the argument would be phenetic rather than biological.
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We thank two anonymous referees for their useful comments on the earlier version of the paper.
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Siipi, H., Finkelman, L. The Extinction and De-Extinction of Species. Philos. Technol. 30, 427–441 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0244-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0244-0