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The emergence and maintenance of cooperation in the public goods game under stochastic strategy updating rule with preference

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Abstract

This paper introduces a stochastic strategy updating rule with preference in the public goods game. Besides, we also consider the carrying capacity of individual reproductive abilities and two different types of population sizes, the fluctuating and fixed sizes. Through systematic analyses, this paper explores the impact of the preference heterogeneity in the stochastic strategy update rule on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. The results show that in both types of populations, the strategy updating rule can facilitate the evolution of cooperation by increasing the preference for cooperation, thereby alleviating the public goods dilemma. In addition, in a fixed-size population, when cooperation is a successful evolutionary strategy, increasing the preference for cooperation is beneficial to enhancing the maintenance of the cooperation. However, in a fluctuating-size finite population, reducing the preference for cooperation is beneficial to enhancing the stability of the cooperative evolutionary dynamics.

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Data availability

The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

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Funding

This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72031009, 72371193) and Chinese National Funding of Social Sciences (No. 20&ZD058).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, 430070, China

    Wenman Chen & Ji Quan

  2. Research Institute of Digital Governance and Management Decision Innovation, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, 430070, China

    Wenman Chen & Ji Quan

  3. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan, 430072, China

    Xianjia Wang

Authors
  1. Wenman Chen
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  2. Ji Quan
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  3. Xianjia Wang
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Contributions

WC and JQ analyzed the results and wrote the manuscript. XW developed the model.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ji Quan.

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The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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Chen, W., Quan, J. & Wang, X. The emergence and maintenance of cooperation in the public goods game under stochastic strategy updating rule with preference. Dyn Games Appl (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00548-1

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