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Difference and Robustness in the Patterns of Philosophical Intuition Across Demographic Groups

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Abstract

In a recent paper, I argued that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly robust both across demographic groups and across development. Machery and Stich reply by reviewing a series of studies that do show significant differences in philosophical intuition between different demographic groups. This is a helpful point, which gets at precisely the issues that are most relevant here. However, even when one looks at those very studies, one finds truly surprising robustness. In other words, despite the presence of statistically significant differences between demographic groups, a core finding coming out of those studies is that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly robust across demographic groups.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Edouard Machery and Stephen Stich for sharing an earlier draft of their reply and for helpful discussions of these issues. Thanks also to Ivar Hannikainen and Vilius Dranseika, who kindly provided detailed information on the methods and results of their studies.

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  1. Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

    Joshua Knobe

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  1. Joshua Knobe
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Correspondence to Joshua Knobe.

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Knobe, J. Difference and Robustness in the Patterns of Philosophical Intuition Across Demographic Groups. Rev.Phil.Psych. 14, 435–455 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00683-z

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