Are People Implicitly Moral Objectivists?

Abstract

In this paper I argue that there are at least two ways in which people can be moral objectivists, namely implicitly and explicitly. It is possible to explicitly deny being a moral objectivist while being implicitly committed to it. (Enoch, Shafer and Landau (eds), The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, 192–205, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014) presents three thought experiments to convince his reader that they are moral objectivists even if they explicitly think otherwise. As it happens, Enoch’s tests, which he uses as intuition pumps, provide excellent measures of implicit metaethical commitments. In this paper I use each of them as material for survey experiments to test whether people are implicit moral objectivists. Overall, results provide support for the idea that people are moral objectivists.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Results of the first survey experiment.

N = 94.

1. “To what extent do you think the above story can be regarded as a joke?”.

Taste version: 60%

Factual version: 28%

Moral version: 12%

2. “To what extent do you think the above story if funny (0–100)?”.

Median score taste version: 28.

Median score factual version: 14.

Median score moral version: 6

3. “What does a moral disagreement feel like?”.

Feels like global warming: 72%

Feels like chocolate: 28%

4. “Had our beliefs and practices been different gender-discrimination…”.

Would still be wrong: 69%

Would not be wrong: 31%

Appendix 2

In this part of the study, we will consider what it feels like for you to engage in a disagreement.

Now, think of some serious moral disagreement. For example, about the moral status of abortion. Suppose that you are engaged in such a disagreement. Imagine this, as it were, from the inside. You are in this disagreement yourself. Perhaps you think that there is nothing wrong with abortion, and you are arguing with someone who thinks that abortion is morally wrong. Or, perhaps you think that abortion is morally wrong and you are arguing with someone who thinks that there is nothing wrong with it.

Please explain how it feels for you to engage in this kind of disagreement. Please note that there is no correct answer to this question: We would simply like to know how it feels for you to engage in moral disagreements. In particular, please tell us whether it feels more like disagreeing over which chocolate is better, or like disagreeing over objective facts like whether human actions contribute to global warming or not?

[1] It feels more like disagreeing over which chocolate tastes better.

[2] It feels more like disagreeing over whether human actions contribute to global warming.

Other.

Appendix 3

As a result of years of scientific research we now know that smoking causes cancer. Now, had our relevant beliefs and practices regarding smoking been different—had we been ok with it, had we not banned it, had we thought smoking was actually quite harmless—would it still have been true that smoking causes cancer? It is probably uncontroversial that the answer is "Yes". The effects of smoking on our health do not depend on our beliefs and practices. Rather, it is an objective matter of fact.

The question that we therefore ask here is "Had our beliefs and practices been very different, would it still have been true that so-and-so?".

Let us apply this question to morality. For example, some people believe that gender-based discrimination is wrong. Maybe you also believe that it is morally wrong or maybe you do not. If you do not, imagine something else that you think is morally wrong. Would it still have been wrong had our relevant beliefs and practices been different?

[1] No, had our relevant beliefs and practices been different than it would not be wrong.

[2] Yes, had our relevant beliefs and practices been different than it would still be wrong.

Appendix 4: Study details and materials for the alternative versions of the phenomenology of disagreement test

370 participants living in the United States were recruited via the online service Mechanical Turk and received $0.35 for their time. Participants who did not complete the survey or failed to answer correctly a multiple-choice question that assessed whether they understood the phenomenology of disagreement test appropriately (N = 50) were excluded from statistical analyses⁵. Analyses were conducted on the remaining 320 participants (99 female; Mage = 35). The check followed after the questions about how moral disagreements feel. In the final part, participants answered three demographics questions (age, gender, nationality).

After filling out a “Yes” to the informed consent form, participants were assigned to one of the three versions of the phenomenology of disagreement test. Participants read a very short story based on Enoch’s explanation about the difference between disagreements about taste and disagreements about factual matters (Enoch, 2014, p. 195–196). In each version, participants were subsequently asked to think about a moral disagreement about abortion or a disagreement about a different moral issue they felt strongly about. In version 1, participants were then presented with the question of whether the moral disagreement they have in mind feels more like a disagreement about bitter chocolate versus milk chocolate or more like a disagreement about the time it takes to fly from New York to Los Angeles. In version 2, the comparison made was between a disagreement about the taste of organic food versus non-organic food and whether or not global warming is caused by human behavior. In version 3, the was between a disagreement about the taste of organic food versus non-organic food and the flight time between New York and Los Angeles.

Version 1.

People engage in all sorts of disagreements. For example, we may engage in a disagreement about whether bitter chocolate tastes better than milk chocolate. We can also disagree about how long it takes to fly from New York to Los Angeles. These two disagreements are, however, different. In the chocolate case, it feels like stating one's own preference, and perhaps trying to influence the listener into getting his own preferences in line. In the flight case, though, it feels like trying to get at an objective truth, one that is there anyway, independently of our beliefs and preferences.

In this part of the study, we will consider what it feels like for you to engage in a.

disagreement.

Now, think of some serious moral disagreement. For example, about the moral status of.

abortion. Suppose that you are engaged in such a disagreement. Imagine this, as it were,

from the inside. You are in this disagreement yourself. Perhaps you think that there is.

nothing wrong with abortion, and you are arguing with someone who thinks that abortion.

is morally wrong. Or, perhaps you think that abortion is morally wrong and you are.

arguing with someone who thinks that there is nothing wrong with it.

Please explain how it feels for you to engage in this kind of disagreement. Please note.

that there is no correct answer to this question: We would simply like to know how it.

feels for you to engage in moral disagreements. In particular, please tell us whether it.

feels more like disagreeing over which chocolate is better, or like disagreeing over.

objective facts like the time it takes to fly from New York to Los Angeles?

[1] It feels more like disagreeing over which chocolate tastes better.

[2] It feels more like disagreeing over the time it takes to fly from New York to Los Angeles.

Version 2.

People engage in all sorts of disagreements. For example, we may engage in a disagreement about whether organic food tastes better than non-organic food. We can also disagree about whether human actions influence global warming. These two disagreements are, however, different. In the (non)organic food case, it feels like stating one's own preference, and perhaps trying to influence the listener into getting his own preferences in line. In the global warming case, though, it feels like trying to get at an objective truth, one that is there anyway, independently of our beliefs and preferences. That is, either human actions contribute to global warming, or they do not. In this part of the study, we will consider what it feels like for you to engage in a disagreement.

Now, think of some serious moral disagreement. For example, about the moral status of abortion. Suppose that you are engaged in such a disagreement. Imagine this, as it were, from the inside. You are in this disagreement yourself. Perhaps you think that there is nothing wrong with abortion, and you are arguing with someone who thinks that abortion is morally wrong. Or, perhaps you think that abortion is morally wrong and you are arguing with someone who thinks that there is nothing wrong with it.

Please explain how it feels for you to engage in this kind of disagreement. Please note that there is no correct answer to this question: We would simply like to know how it feels for you to engage in moral disagreements. In particular, please tell us whether it feels more like disagreeing over whether or not organic food tastes better than non-organic food, or like disagreeing over objective facts like whether human actions contribute to global warming or not?

[1] It feels more like disagreeing over whether organic food tastes better than non-organic food.

[2] It feels more like disagreeing over whether human actions contribute to global warming.

Version 3.

People engage in all sorts of disagreements. For example, we may engage in a disagreement about whether organic food tastes better than non-organic food. We can also disagree about how long it takes to fly from New York to Los Angeles. These two disagreements are, however, different. In the organic food case, it feels like stating one's own preference, and perhaps trying to influence the listener into getting his own preferences in line. In the flight case, though, it feels like trying to get at an objective truth, one that is there anyway, independently of our beliefs and preferences. In this part of the study, we will consider what it feels like for you to engage in a disagreement.

Now, think of some serious moral disagreement. For example, about the moral status of abortion. Suppose that you are engaged in such a disagreement. Imagine this, as it were, from the inside. You are in this disagreement yourself. Perhaps you think that there is nothing wrong with abortion, and you are arguing with someone who thinks that abortion is morally wrong. Or, perhaps you think that abortion is morally wrong and you are arguing with someone who thinks that there is nothing wrong with it.

Please explain how it feels for you to engage in this kind of disagreement. Please note that there is no correct answer to this question: We would simply like to know how it feels for you to engage in moral disagreements. In particular, please tell us whether it feels more like disagreeing over whether or not organic food tastes better than non-organic food, or like disagreeing over objective facts like over the time it takes to fly from New York to Los Angeles.

[1] It feels more like disagreeing over whether organic food tastes better than non-organic food.

[2] It feels more like disagreeing over the time it takes to fly from New York to Los Angeles.

Appendix 5: Study details and materials for the concrete counterfactual test

300 participants living in the United States were recruited via the online service Mechanical Turk and received $0.35 for their time. Participants who did not complete the survey or failed to answer correctly a multiple-choice question that assessed whether they understood the test appropriately (N = 48) were excluded from statistical analyses. Analyses were conducted on the remaining 252 participants (76 female; Mage = 34). The check followed after the question whether or not something is still morally wrong had our beliefs and practices been different. In the final part, participants answered three demographics questions (age, gender, nationality).

Participants read a short story based on Enoch’s explanation about the counterfactual of “Had our beliefs and practices been very different, would it still have been true that so-and-so?” applied to the example of how smoking causes cancer even if we would believe otherwise and had we not banned it (Enoch, 2014, p. 196–197). They were then presented with one of the three alternative versions of the counterfactual test, namely either to a concrete version of the gender-discrimination example (version 1, see Appendix 5), to a version about public corporal punishment (version 2), or to a version about dueling (version 3). They were subsequently again introduced with a counterfactual of the form “Had our beliefs and practices been very different, would it still have been true that so-and-so?” and asked whether the particular moral issue (or a different moral issue they feel strongly about) would still be wrong had our relevant beliefs and practices been different.

As a result of years of scientific research we now know that smoking causes cancer. Now, had our relevant beliefs and practices regarding smoking been different—had we been ok with it, had we not banned it, had we thought smoking was actually quite harmless—would it still have been true that smoking causes cancer? It is probably uncontroversial that the answer is "Yes". The effects of smoking on our health do not depend on our beliefs and practices. Rather, it is an objective matter of fact.

The question that we therefore ask here is "Had our beliefs and practices been very different, would it still have been true that so-and-so?".

Let us apply this question to morality. For example, some people believe that gender-based discrimination is wrong. Maybe you also believe that it is morally wrong or maybe you do not. If you do not, imagine something else that you think is morally wrong. There has been a time in which people in societies made strong distinctions on the basis of gender, in which women were expected to take responsibility for children and perform household chores while men where out to work, and in which there were different clothing restrictions for men and women. Now, had our relevant practices and beliefs regarding differences in gender been different—had we been ok with making distinctions on the basis of gender—had we been ok with a society in which women and men were expected to fulfil different social roles—would it still have been morally wrong?

[1] No, had our relevant beliefs and practices been different than it would not be wrong.

[2] Yes, had our relevant beliefs and practices been different than it would still be wrong.