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Reply to Macpherson: Further illustrations of the cognitive penetrability of perception

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The Original Article was published on 09 May 2015

Abstract

My reply to Macpherson begins by addressing whether it is effects of cognition on early vision or perceptual performance that I am interested in. I proceed to address Macpherson’s comments on evidence from cross-modal effects, interpretations of linguistic effects on image detection, evidence from illusions, and the usefulness of predictive coding for understanding cognitive penetration. By stressing the interactive and distributed nature of neural processing, I am committing to a collapse between perception and cognition. Following such a collapse, the very question of whether cognition affects perception becomes ill-posed, but this may be for the best.

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Correspondence to Gary Lupyan.

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Lupyan, G. Reply to Macpherson: Further illustrations of the cognitive penetrability of perception. Rev.Phil.Psych. 6, 585–589 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0255-2

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