Abstract
In the connected vehicles, connecting interfaces bring threats to the vehicles and they can be hacked to impact the vehicles and drivers. Compared with traditional vehicles, connected vehicles require more information transfer. Sensor signals and critical data must be protected to ensure the cyber security of connected vehicles. The communications among ECUs, sensors, and gateways are connected by in-vehicle networks. This paper discussed the state-of-art techniques about secure communication for in-vehicle networks. First, the related concepts in automotive secure communication have been provided. Then we have compared and contrasted existing approaches for secure communication. We have analyzed the advantages/disadvantages of MAC and digital signatures for message authentication and compared the performance and limitations of different cryptographic algorithms. Firewall and intrusion detection system are introduced to protect the networks. The constraints and features of different intrusion detection approaches are presented. After that, the technical requirements for cryptographic mechanism and intrusion detection policy are concluded. Based on the review of current researches, the future development directions of the automotive network security have been discussed. The purpose of this paper is to review current techniques on automotive secure communication and suggest suitable secure approaches to implement on the in-vehicle networks.
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Hu, Q., Luo, F. Review of Secure Communication Approaches for In-Vehicle Network. Int.J Automot. Technol. 19, 879–894 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12239-018-0085-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12239-018-0085-1