Abstract
Previous research finds that agency workers are less satisfied with their job than regular workers. This paper analyzes whether this difference can be explained by the duration of the working contract agency workers are employed on. The analysis leads to three results. First, agency workers’ contract type does not explain their lower job satisfaction. Second, agency workers on permanent contracts are significantly less satisfied with their job than regular workers on the same contract. Third, agency workers on fixed-term contracts do not differ in job satisfaction from regular workers on both fixed-term and permanent contracts. The difference in job satisfaction between permanently employed agency and regular workers can partly be explained by changes in the reference point. Overall, the results, however, lend support to the conclusion that agency workers on fixed-term contracts regard their employment as stepping stone while those on permanent contracts appear to be trapped in this type of employment.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Similar results are found for other Western countries in 2015, such as the United Kingdom (3.8%), the Netherlands (3.0%), France (2.1%), the United States (2.2%), or Japan (2.0%) (CIETT 2017).
Such a “standard” employee–employer relationship is henceforth referred to as “regular”.
Note, however, that evidence on agency contracts as a stepping stone into permanent employment is mixed. Autor and Houseman (2008), for example, find that agency work does not have such a function.
One exception is Green and Heywood (2011) who find no difference in job satisfaction between agency workers and regular workers on permanent contracts.
Starting on April 1, 2017, the maximum period of assignment has been again restricted to 18 months.
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984–2016, version 33.1, SOEP, 2018, https://doi.org/10.5684/soep.v33.1. Further details on the SOEP are provided in Wagner et al. (2007).
Jahn (2015) shows that this argument applies to female agency workers in Germany as well.
Note that the same qualitative statements can be drawn if the subsequent analysis is based on the female subsample. The results are available on request.
Originally there are five subjective health categories in the SOEP questionnaire. However, due to small numbers in some categories, I follow Jahn (2015) and collapse “very good” and “good” into the category “good” and “not good” and “bad” into the category “bad”. The third category is “satisfactory”.
Note that with regard to agency workers a shortcoming of the SOEP coding is that it is not clear whether tenure refers to tenure at the agency or the user firm.
In the 2016 SOEP questionnaire, for example, job change is assessed by: “Have you changed jobs or started a new one since December 31, 2014?” The question includes employer change as well as internal job move such as a promotion. With regard to agency workers, the question is also answered in the affirmative when agency workers moved to another user firm.
To assess whether the following estimates are not the result of a selected sample, I replicate all estimations not differentiating agency workers according to their contract type. With regard to sign and significance, the results derived are comparable to previous studies on this issue, such as Green and Heywood (2011) or Jahn (2015). But since Green and Heywood (2011) employ an ordered probit model, the magnitude of the fixed effects coefficients can be compared to Jahn (2015) only; my estimates are about the same as the coefficients reported in Jahn (2015). The results are available on request.
Note that these results do not alter when the 1-digit industry fixed effects are neither controlled for.
Apart from (extra) wages, work autonomy, and other job characteristics, health status might be another endogenous covariate, because agency work might determine agency workers’ health status after becoming an agency worker. However, dropping workers’ health status in each regression of Table 2 does not alter the results.
The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term.
This result has been obtained by testing whether the sum of fixed-term effect and agency main effect is significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% level in column (5) and at the 5% level in column (6) using the F statistic.
This procedure has been applied inter alia in Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) who calculate the relative increase in income that is needed to compensate an individual for the drop in life satisfaction resulting from unemployment.
Given that monthly net income of agency workers on permanent contracts is on average around 1400 Euro, it follows that income needs to be raised by 630 Euro per month to make up for the lost job satisfaction resulting from being an agency worker on a permanent contract rather than a regular worker on such a contract.
Unfortunately, with the data at hand it is neither possible to test empirically the claim that regular employees might enjoy more (non-monetary) benefits nor that they might have higher exchange with peers and colleagues.
Sample statistics for the full sample are available on request.
More precisely, I construct a binary indicator that equals one if the respondent participated in the next SOEP wave.
Perceived job security is captured by “How concerned are you about the following issues: Your job security (if employed). Respondents can either check “very concerned”, “somewhat concerned”, or “not concerned at all”. Following Jahn (2015), I consider respondents to perceive their job as insecure if they check “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned”. Instead of collapsing job insecurity into a binary variable, I also treated it as categorical. Yet this neither had an impact on the estimates presented in Table 2.
About 70% of the increase in unemployment in Germany during the financial crisis was due to the mass layoffs in the agency sector (Jahn 2015).
Moreover, compared to the reference year 2003, the time fixed effects are negative in each of the previous regressions and mostly insignificant. Not controlling for time fixed effects or including a dummy for the financial crisis (2007–2009), as well as an interaction between agency status and the crisis dummy, neither change the results.
References
Addison JT, Surfield C (2006) The use of alternative work arrangements by the jobless: evidence from the CAEAS/CPS. J Lab Res 27(2):149–162
Antoni M, Jahn E (2009) Do changes in regulation affect employment duration in temporary help agencies? Ind Labor Relat Rev 62(2):226–251
Arulampalam W, Booth A (1998) Training and labour market flexibility: is there a trade-off? J Ind Relat 36(4):521–536
Autor DH, Houseman SN (2008) Temporary agency employment: a way out of poverty? In: Blank R, Danziger S, Schoeni R (eds) Working and poor: how economic and policy changes are affecting low-wage workers, chapter 11. Russell Sage Foundation, New York, pp 312–338
Autor DH, Houseman SN (2010) Do temporary-help jobs improve labor market outcomes for low-skilled workers? Evidence from "Work First". American Econ J Appl Econ 2(3):96–128
Baetschmann G, Staub KE, Winkelmann R (2015) Consistent estimation of the fixed effects ordered logit model. J R Stat Soci Ser A 178(3):685–703
Böheim R, Cardoso AR (2009) Temporary help services employment in Portugal. 1995–2000. In: Autor DH (ed) Studies in labor market intermediation. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 309–334
Booth A, Francesconi M, Frank J (2002) Temporary jobs: stepping stones or dead ends? Econ J 112(480):189–213
Buddelmeyer H, McVicar D, Wooden M (2015) Non-standard ‘contingent’ employment and job satisfaction: a panel data analysis. Ind Relat J Econ Soc 54(2):256–275
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA), Arbeitsmarktberichterstattung (2018) Der Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland—Zeitarbeit—Aktuelle Entwicklungen, Februar 2018, Nürnberg
Burda M, Kvasnicka M (2006) Zeitarbeit in Deutschland: trends und Perspektiven. Perspektiven der Wirtschafspolitik 7(2):195–225
Busk H, Dauth C, Jahn E (2017) Do changes in regulation affect temporary agency workers’ job satisfaction? Ind Relat 56(3):514–544
Chadi A, Hetschko C (2016) Flexibilization without hesitation? temporary contracts and job satisfaction. Oxf Econ Pap 68(1):217–237
CIETT (2017) Economic report 2017. Brussels. http://www.weceurope.org/fileadmin/templates/ciett/docs/Stats/WEC_ER2016_web-1.pdf. Accessed 28 March 2018
Clark AE (1997) Job satisfaction: why are women so happy at work? Lab Econ 4(4):341–372
Clark AE (2001) What really matters in a job? hedonic measurement using quit data. Lab Econ 8(2):223–242
Clark AE, Oswald AJ (1994) Unhappiness and unemployment. Econ J 104(424):648–659
D’Addio AC, Rosholm M (2005) Exits from temporary jobs in Europe: a competing risk analysis. Lab Econ 12(4):449–468
D’Addio AC, Eriksson T, Frijters P (2007) An analysis of the determinants of job satisfaction when individuals’ baseline satisfaction levels may differ. Appl Econ 39(19–21):2413–2423
De Cuyper N, de Jong J, de Witte H, Isaksson K, Rigotti T, Schalk R (2008) Literature review of theory and research on the psychological impact of temporary employment: towards a conceptual model. Int J Manag Rev 10(1):25–51
De Graaf-Zijl M (2012) Job satisfaction and contingent employment. De Economist 160(2):197–218
Green CP, Heywood JS (2011) Flexible Contracts and Subjective Well-being. Econ Inq 49(3):716–729
Green CP, Leeves G (2004) Casual employment and internal labour markets. Manch Sch 72(5):658–676
Hamermesh DS (2001) The changing distribution of job satisfaction. J Hum Resour 36(1):1–30
Hamersma S, Heinrich C, Mueser P (2014) Temporary help work: compensating differentials and multiple job-holding. Ind Relat 53(1):72–100
Hopp C, Minten A, Toporova N (2016) Signaling, selection and transition: empirical evidence on stepping-stones and vicious cycles in temporary agency work. Int J Hum Resour Manag 27(5):527–547
ILO (1997) Convention concerning Private Employment Agencies, C181—Private Employment Agencies Convention, No. 181, Article 1.1.b. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:55:0::NO::P55_TYPE,P55_LANG,P55_DOCUMENT,P55_NODE:CON,en,C181,%2FDocument. Accessed 9 Feb 2016
Jahn E (2010) Reassessing the pay gap for temps in Germany. J Econ Stat 230(2):208–233
Jahn E (2015) Don’t worry, be flexible?—job satisfaction among flexible workers. Aust J Lab Econ 18(2):147–168
Kassenboehmer SC, Haisken-DeNew JP (2009) You’re fired! The causal negative effect of entry unemployment on life satisfaction. Econ J 119(536):448–462
Matusik SF, Hill CWL (1998) The utilization of contingent work, knowledge creation, and competitive advantage. Acad Manag Rev 23(4):680–697
Morris MD, Vekker A (2001) An alternative look at temporary workers, their choices and the growth of temporary employment. J Lab Res 22(2):1061–1077
Nienhüser W, Matiaske W (2006) Effects of the ‘principle of non-discrimination’ on temporary agency work: compensation and working conditions of temporary agency workers in 15 european countries. Industrial Relations Journal 37(1):64–77
Origo F, Pagani L (2009) Flexicurity and job satisfaction in Europe: the importance of perceived and actual job stability for well-being at work. Labour Economics 16(5):547–555
Rosen S (1974) Hedonic prices and implicit markets: product differentiation in pure competition. J Polit Econ 82(1):34–55
Schäfer H (2012) Temporary agency work in the SOEP: Coping with data quality problems. SOEP papers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 454, The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin
Souza-Poza A, Sousa-Poza AA (2003) Gender differences in job satisfaction in Great-Britain, 1991–2000: permanent or transitory? Appl Econ Lett 10(11):691–694
Wagner GG, Frick JR, Schupp J (2007) The German socio-economic panel study (SOEP)—scope, evaluation and enhancements. J Appl Soc Sci Stud 127(1):139–169
Wilkin CL (2013) I can’t get no job satisfaction: meta-analysis comparing permanent and contingent workers. J Org Behav 34(1):47–64
Winkelmann L, Winkelmann R (1998) Why are the unemployed so unhappy? Evidence from panel data. Economica 65(257):1–15
Wooden M, Warren D (2004) Non-standard employment and job satisfaction: evidence from the HILDA survey. J Ind Relat 46(3):275–297
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank two anonymous referees, Andrew E. Clark, Caterina Giannetti, Anthony Lepinteur, Christoph Metzger, as well as participants of the Workshop on Subjective Survey Data in Labour Market Research (IAAEU Trier), the 13th Workshop on Social Economy for Young Economists (University of Bologna), the Doctoral Seminar in Public Finance and the Walter Eucken Seminar of Empirical Economics (both at University of Freiburg) for review, discussions, and excellent input that improved the paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Petilliot, R. How important is the type of working contract for job satisfaction of agency workers?. Int Rev Econ 65, 359–379 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-018-0300-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-018-0300-4