Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose an exploratory artefactual theory of fictional objects based on Evnine’s amorphism, with the goal of reconciling the inconsistent intuitions surrounding these entities. While not presenting a fully developed and comprehensive theory, I aim to explore the possibilities of amorphism and to offer a preliminary investigation into the nature of fictional objects and the challenges posed by our basic intuitions regarding their non-existence, creation, and property attribution. I formulate a two-level criterion of identity-based on creative acts and utilize the notion of internal predication to account for how fictional objects possess the properties attributed to them in relevant stories. Additionally, I propose considering a subset of essential properties to fix the identity of ficta across stories. Lastly, I address the challenge of negative existential statements by equating non-existence with unreality, asserting that fictional objects are constituted by the properties attributed to them but do not fully exemplify them.
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Notes
Herbert West is the main character from the horror tale Herbert West – Reanimator by H.P. Lovecraft.
On the inconsistency of our intuitions about fictional objects see Berto (2011, p. 314).
Actually, (1) and (2) are not logically inconsistent, but I think they are metaphysically inconsistent since being a doctor can plausibly be considered an existence entailing property. As for (2) and (3), it seems very plausible to me that in order to be literally a doctor, someone must exist and not just exist as a character in a story. In any case, even though (1) and (2) or (2) and (3) were not inconsistent, the set (1)-(3) would still be and that because a subset of it is inconsistent.
Such a stance can be found in Berto (2011).
An alternative would be that of dealing with the inconsistency resorting to the notion of ambiguity (see Glavaničová (2020)).
Such descriptivist account of fictional names is found, e.g., in Rorty (1982).Well known arguments against descriptivism in general can be found in Donnellan (1970), Kripke (1980). It should be noted that certain authors, including Currie (1990) and Glavaničová (2018), have contended that fictional names do not qualify as genuine proper names. Therefore, choosing descriptivism for fictional names does not necessarily entail adopting descriptivism for genuine proper names.
An anti-realist way out would be to adopt the fictionalist paraphrase “According to the realist hypothesis, Herbert West is a fictional character created by H.P. Lovecraft”. On this see Brock (2002).
Today there are various neo-Meinongian accounts: there are meinongians who hold that non-existing characters literally and actually instantiate the properties ascribed to them in the relevant fictions such as Parsons (1980), Routley (1980) and Jaquette (1996); meinongians who introduce a different kind of predication such as Zalta (1983) and Rapaport (1978); modal versions of meinongianism in which the possession of properties is relativized to im/possible worlds such as Priest (2005) and Berto (2011).
On the so called selection problem see Sainsbury (2010, 57–63).
Not all those who identify fictional characters with abstract objects are artefactualists. Authors such as Wolterstorff (1980), Lamarque and Olsen (1994), Currie (1990) and Glavaničová (2020) identify ficta with uncreated abstract roles. Role realists can deal with the three main intuitions I have considered, but since they share some features with antirealism, Meinongianism and abstract artifactualism, it is not easy to catalogue them under any of these position. Due to space limitations, I will not deal with hybrid approaches such as role realism and Voltolini’s syncretistic account (2006).
Consider for instance Borges’ Menard-case reported by Voltolini (2003) in which Pierre Menard writes a work word by word identical to Cervantes’ Don Quixote without having any knowledge of the original work. In such a case, Menard creates an original work and his characters would then be distinct from those of Cervantes.
Here I focus on characters created by an author for the sake of telling a story, I don’t consider mythical figures or characters from folk tales. Myths, I believe, are more similar to false scientific theories, they were thought originally to be descriptions of reality. As for folk tales, here we have a case in which it is not clear who created a certain character (see Lamarque (2010)), there is no specific author. Generally though, I don’t think it is impossible for a character to be the result of a collective act of creation, like in a story written by two distinct authors.
See: Fine (1994).
For a critique of the notion of bare particular see Bailey (2012).
The table-shaped piece of wood could become an actual table if someone picked it up and started using it like a table. In this case, it would be like a ready-made object. The act of creation would consist in the selection of the table-shaped peace of wood with the intention to use it as a table.
David Oderberg (2014, pp. 164–6) provides some examples of how hylomorphism can be fruitfully applied outside the domain of concrete substances in various ways.
Indeed it is not necessary that one identifies a changeable part, one could just distinguish a structural and a “material” component like in the case of sentences and inference patterns. One can see one and the same inference pattern realized through different sets of sentences.
Of course properties are abstract entities and hence cannot literally be considered the matter out of which a character was made. A character is not a material being and cannot be constituted of material parts. Here the amorphic doctrine is extended by analogy to fictional characters.
One could also propose a one-level criterion of identity for ficta such as ∀x∀y(((F(x) & F(y)) → (x = y ↔ ∃z(C(z) & x = R(z) & y = R(z)))). Here F(x) is a predicate that stands for ‘x is a fictum’. This criterion says that two ficta are identical if and only if they are the result of the same creative act. I think that what is metaphysically relevant is not the form of the criterion of identity, but rather the fact that a given fictum is essentially the result of a certain creative act and this allows us to define the identity conditions of a fictional object in terms of the act that brought it into existence.
Here R(x) can be seen as a function from creative acts to artifacts.
The stories might have different authors. In this case it is essential that after the creation of c, the other authors intend to preserve it, namely to maintain the original creative intuition.
Actually it is not necessarily the case that, in a series of stories, the set of properties that constitute a fictum in a given episode n is a proper subset of the sets that constitute it in the sequels n + m. A given character could actually be a smoker in a story and quit smoking in the next one (thanks to an anonymous referee for this observation). A solution might be that of considering the properties that constitute a fictum as incorporating a temporal index. This way a fictum f that is a smoker at the fictional time t in the story S, would still be constituted by the property of being a smoker at t in a story that take place at t + 1.
For a completely different perspective see Lamarque (2010, 191–8).
See Kripke (2013).
The quantifier here ranges over all objects, both concrete and abstract. This solution would apply to fictional abstract objects as well.
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Dozzi, M. Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities. Acta Anal (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-023-00580-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-023-00580-1