Abstract
In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an important feature of what is important in survival—having the property of personhood. I offer a theory that can account for this, and I explain how it avoids the implausible consequences of standard psychological continuity theory, as well as having certain other advantages over that theory.
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Notes
For this succinct characterization, see Lewis (1983).
For more discussion of the details of Parfit’s arguments, along with issues about interpretation, see Johansson (2010) and Schechtman (1996) who develops the objection that this cannot be a criterion on having what matters since it does not allow us to distinguish self-interested from other-interested concern. Williams (1970) also offers an objection based on similar concerns. It should be noted that Parfit is not consistent in his use of the term “survival.” “Survival” sometimes stands for persistence (1984), while at other times, he drives a wedge between the two concepts (1971). I will follow the more natural (1984) use.
The reason for both forward- and backward-looking requirements for having what matters in survival should now be clear for at least one reason: the transplant is successful only if there in fact exists a later being who retroactively “owns” their successor’s past. For more arguments for both criteria, see Schechtman (2001a, 2001b).
The fact that the situation portrayed in “The Matrix” is at all disturbing is proof that many people have negative reactions to virtual immersion.
That believing based on evidence enhances autonomy was emphasized by Kant (1785), and which is also part of the reason for why he believed lying to be wrong.
Of course, a person’s life trajectory is not entirely self-directed; luck intervenes more than many of us would like.
Marya Schechtman has recently developed a similar idea (2014) emphasizing the importance of unity with respect to practical concerns, which she terms having a “person life.” Her view, however, counts as a narrative social constitution view; my own is very different from that kind of view.
Psychological continuity and life trajectory continuity then are symbiotic. But even if this is not sufficiently convincing, the claim that what matters in survival is the continuation of some extrinsic q-properties is not supported on the grounds of our direct intuitions anyway. It is a consequence that follows from other intuitions we do have, like the intuition that being a person matters in survival, which I claim requires a certain kind of connection to an external context. To account for this intuition, it was then conjectured, not deduced, that part of what matters in our survival is the continuation of our life trajectory, which is analyzed in terms of the continuity of certain extrinsic properties over time.
Given the controversy about whether the future is open or determined, I believe this is reasonable.
See Korsgaard, 1989; Schechtman, 1996; Rovane, 1998; Unger, 1990; Whiting, 2002; among others. For Whiting (2002), for instance, having what matters in survival requires that we consider ourselves as a single continuous being over time, stemming from Locke’s observation that personal identity consists in the fact that a thinking being “can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places….” (L-N 2.27.9). Her theory requires accepting only unity not identity, which in fact, she rejects.
See Belzer (2005) who introduces the difference between what he calls the “identity” reaction and the “unity” reaction.
See also Perry (1972) for discussion of this distinction.
For a non-identity theorist like myself to fully endorse psychological continuity as what matters, an intuitive position even if its current formulation is flawed, I would also need to interpret the life trajectory theory as a theory of theory of psychological continuity, which would be an externalist account of that concept. Although I do not provide such details here, I do believe that such an interpretation is possible.
One potential objection to this criterion is that it begs the question. The issue can be understood in the following way: in assuming that there are permanent extrinsic properties that only one being can have at a time, have not I guaranteed that fission cannot preserve what matters in survival? Well, yes, but the argument I have offered for the life trajectory theory did not begin with the premise that properties that only one being at time can have matter in survival. This followed from other assumptions for which there is independent motivation.
Even if condition (1) is relaxed in certain ways so that a successor of A need not be completely indistinguishable with respect to certain permanent extrinsic properties of A’s, nevertheless, because they are extrinsic properties, certain environmental conditions would still be required to hold that would rule out the possibility of two beings having the q-counterpart of a property like being a sole author. And even supposing the global condition of satisfying condition (1) is relaxed, it is relatively unlikely that all of the permanent extrinsic properties a psychological subject has that entail unity over time could be ruled out, at least not without begging the question.
This is where Schechtman (2014) would have strong disagreements, whereas, she argues that practical concerns are metaphysical concerns. I am committed to the idea that at least being a member of a metaphysical kind is still importantly different from being a member of let us say, a purely normative kind, or socially constructed kind.
See Wilson (2005) for arguments that agency should not be included in an account of personhood.
In fact, it is not clear that conscious states do not presuppose self-awareness.
According to Lycan (2001), this would entail that dogs have higher-order states of consciousness, but I am not sure this would be a happy result for what are known as “HOT” theorists, if offering an “HOT” theory as a way of distinguishing persons from other types of cognitive beings. Rosenthal’s (1986) theory has much the same problem.
Carruthers’s dispositionalist account (1996) improves upon these ideas since the states must be about oneself, but in terms of being used to address a theory of what matters, it would either beg the question, or count The Borg as a single person.
Suppose that we have an entire world that fission. Would each fission product then count as having what matters? The answer I think would depend upon whether the q-counterparts of extrinsic properties are themselves individuated internally or externally mirroring the debate about whether water or even mental states must be so individuated. Thanks to Eric Schwitzgebel for bringing this possibility to my attention.
See Martin (1995) for reasons for thinking it truly is a case of fission.
The position explored shares similarities with other view but is still distinct. In particular, the externalist aspect of the life trajectory hypothesis is not new, and neither is the Parfitian view of identity. However, the emphasis on the importance of personhood for having what matters and their specific way in which externalism and Parfitian views about identity are combined is novel. For comparison, Whiting’s (2002) work supports Parfitian singularism, but is driven by internalist considerations. In contrast, Lindemann’s (2014) work on personal identity is externalist, but hers is one focused on social relations, rather than all external relations.
Thanks to my husband Shaun Brock, John G. Bennett, Peter Carruthers, Ted Everett, Dan Giberman, John Horty, Peter Ludlow, Duncan MacIntosh, Raymond Martin, Eric Olson, Derek Parfit, John Perry, Paul Pietroski, Georges Rey, and Allen Stairs for comments on drafts in progress. Thanks also to Derek Parfit for sharing his work in progress on the topic. More thanks are due also to various anonymous reviewers, audiences at the 2010 “Personal Identity, their Embodiments and Environments” Workshop, the 2004 Canadian Philosophical Association meeting, the Dalhousie Philosophy Colloquium Series, and the UC Riverside Workshop Series.
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Savage, H.E. What Matters in Survival: Self-Determination and the Continuity of Life Trajectories. Acta Anal 39, 37–56 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-023-00567-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-023-00567-y