Abstract
According to one tradition, the virtues and vices should be understood in terms of their relation to value. But inside this tradition, there are three distinct proposals: virtues are intrinsically valuable; virtues are instrumentally valuable; or a hybrid proposal on which virtues are either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. In this paper, I offer an alternative proposal inside this tradition. I propose that virtues and vices should be understood in terms of the degreed properties of being virtuous and being vicious, which I analyze in terms of the value and disvalue of actions and attitudes. I defend my proposal as the best inside this tradition by showing how it is immune from standard problems the other three proposals face.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Following standard procedure, I use “flourishing” as shorthand for eudemonia. However, Aristotle (n.d) sometimes uses divine language when describing eudemonia and so “blessed” may also be an appropriate shorthand (see, e.g., I.7 1098a; I.8 1099b; I.9 1099b-1100a; I.10: 1100a-1101a; IX.9 1169b-1170b; X.8 1178b). The fact that so many authors use quasi-naturalistic language like “flourishing” over divine language like “blessed” presumably reflects shifts in attitudes about religion. Lastly, for reasons of space, I focus on Western traditions over Eastern traditions.
In this paper, I assume non-primitivism and a value-based approach to analyzing virtue. In a companion piece to this paper, I criticize other approach that assume non-primitivism but do not accept a value-based approach, such as flourishing or deontic approaches. However, the results here are relevant to other traditions that want to partly, but not wholly, analyze virtue in terms of value (e.g., even a Neo-Aristotelian like Annas partly analyzes virtue in terms of value; see Annas (2011: chp. 7)).
I will use the term “intrinsic value” instead of “final value” in what follows as it is the more common one in the value tradition. I see this as mere terminological preference. However, I do not assume that intrinsic value supervenes on intrinsic properties.
One author who does not neatly fall into this tradition is Adams (2006). Adams understands capital “V” virtue—a holistic virtuous character—in terms of excellence in being for the good (or valuable) and claims it is of intrinsic value. But his account of the relationship between virtue and the virtues is complex in ways that would take me too far afield to address.
Actually, a better term for this proposal is disjunctive proposal; but it is too late for rebranding.
For instance, Ross (1930: 134ff.) claimed that virtuous attitudes and dispositions are intrinsically valuable. This means he still accepts intrinsic proposal, but his metaphysics of virtue differs from (e.g.) Hurka’s on which virtues and vices are attitudes.
The “situationalist” challenge to character traits urges that there are not any global character traits that reliably manifest across a wide range of stimulus conditions (see Doris (1998, 2002), Merritt (2000) for classic statements). I won’t discuss this challenge at length since there are several responses to this challenge and each of them are consistent with my claims here. For instance, one might maintain that there are no global traits, but merely more localized traits; or one might hold that there are global traits but only had to a weak degree; or that there are character traits but they are “mixed” (what I would call “imperfect traits”). Each of these responses is consistent with my proposals for virtues and vices.
My thinking on this topic has been helped by Case (2021). It may be better to think of Brown as having a cluster of character traits, instead of just one. This does not undermine the basic point I intend to make with this case, namely, that some character traits are not indifferent and not yet virtues or vices.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising these issues.
References
Adams, R. (2006). A theory of virtue. Clarendon Press.
Annas, J. (2011). Intelligent virtue. Oxford University Press.
Aristotle. (n.d). Nicomachean ethics. Many Editions.
Calder, T. (2007). Against consequentialist theories of virtue and vice. Utilitas, 19(2), 201–219.
Case, S. (2021). Moral extremism. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 38(4), 615–629. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12488
Doris, J. (1998). Persons, situations, and virtue ethics. Nous., 32(4), 504–530.
Doris, J. (2002). Lack of character. Cambridge University Press.
Driver, J. (2001). Uneasy virtue. Cambridge University Press.
Driver, J. (2012). Consequentialism. Routledge.
Hurka, T. (2001). Virtue, vice, and value. Oxford University Press.
Hurka, T. (2006). Virtuous act, virtuous dispositions. Analysis, 66(1), 69–76.
Hurka, T. (2014). British ethical theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press.
McElwee, B. (2015). The value of the virtues. Utilitas, 27(1), 61–81.
Merritt, M. (2000). Virtue ethics and situationist personality psychology. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice., 3(4), 365–383.
Mill, J. S. (1843). System of logic. London: John W. Parker.
Mill, J. S. (1861). Utilitarianism. London: Fraser's Magazine.
Miller, C. (2013). Moral character: An empirical theory. Oxford University Press.
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.
Perrine, T. (2020). Consequentialism animal ethics and the value of valuing. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 37(3), 485–501. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12399
Rashdall, H. (1885). Professor Sidgwick’s utilitarianism. Mind, 10(38), 200–226.
Ross, W. D. (1930). The right and the good. Clarendon Press.
Russell, L. (2007). What even consequentialists should say about the virtues. Utilitas, 19(4), 466–486.
Slote, M. (2004). Driver’s virtues. Utilitas, 16(1), 22–32.
Acknowledgements
For helpful comments, I thank Ben Cross and an anonymous reviewer of the journal.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interests
The author declares no competing interests.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Perrine, T. Value Approaches to Virtue and Vice: Intrinsic, Instrumental, or Hybrid?. Acta Anal 38, 613–626 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00542-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00542-z