Abstract
Using data on the U.S., we study the effects of employer-sponsored health insurance on dynamic employment substitution between 1990 and 2007 by exploiting the interindustry variation in health care coverage. We find that industries with a high health benefit structure in 1990 have experienced faster employment growth of full-time workers relative to part-time workers, while the relative wage of full-time to part-time workers has declined more in such industries. We argue that considering the dynamic responses of both firms and workers to the benefit structure is crucial to understanding our empirical findings.
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18 November 2021
The original version of this article was updated. Starting second paragraph under Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 has been changed to upright position.
Notes
Total fringe benefits as a proportion of total compensation were around 30% between 1991 and 2003 (BLS). Health insurance comprises the largest portion of fringe benefits, followed by paid leave and retirement benefits.
One might argue that employers bearing high health benefits can adjust by paying lower wages, and thus, the overall rising cost of ESHI is not a burden for firms. For instance, Gruber (1994) shows that when maternity benefits are mandated towards women of childbearing age, the wage of the targeted group is reduced, indicating substantial shifting of the costs of the mandate in the form of lower wages. However, when we consider wage adjustments inter- or between- firms or industries, rather than within- firms or industries (as in Gruber (1994)), the studies that attempt to investigate the trade-off between wage and ESHI find a positive correlation, as high-paying jobs often provide generous health benefits (Currie and Madrian 1999). Our empirical strategy relies on interindustry variation in health benefits and thus does not necessarily contradict Gruber (1994) who considers within-firm wage adjustment upon providing mandated benefits.
There might exist other channels through which employers can respond to rising health benefit costs; for instance, switching to high-deductible health plans (HDHP) might be one alternative. Koh (2018) finds that during the Great Recession, firms in industries that experienced severe recession shocks exhibit a higher growth of the enrollment rate of HDHP among workers covered by ESHI. While switching to HPDP can be an option for employers, the HDHP enrollment rate was relatively low (lower than 5% in 2006) before the Great Recession (Fig. 1 of Koh (2018)) so that the switching channel is likely to be weak in our sample period.
66% of those aged 16–64 have private health insurance that comes through employment (March Current Population Survey, 2001–2010).
We restrict the sample period up to 2007 to remove the effect of the Great Recession that occurred at the end of 2007.
Importantly, this view is consistent with recent empirical evidence by Borjas and Ramey (2000) and Shim and Yang (2018): They show that a competitive view of the labor market to explain interindustry wage differentials cannot generate the pattern observed in the data. For instance, Shim and Yang (2018) show that an initially high-wage industry has adopted new technology to replace labor more aggressively than a low-wage industry does, which cannot be explained by the standard assumption that workers are heterogenous but can be explained by the non-competitive view of the labor market. However, this does not mean that we undervalue the importance of unobserved heterogeneity across workers; rather, what we would like to emphasize is that non-competitive factors can play important roles in explaining the dynamics of the labor market.
Firms’ response to wage structure is similar to Shim and Yang (2018).
A similar labor supply equation can be found in Borjas and Ramey (2000).
The share of workers with health insurance is higher among full-time employees than part-time employees (66% vs. 7% based on the 1991 March Current Population Survey) and is persistent over time (Fig. 3).
The information on the share of full-time workers with health benefits is available from 1980, while the information on employer contribution is available from 1991.
The Census system up to the 1990 Census was based on the structure of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). This classification was replaced in 1997 by the NAICS and the 2000 Census industrial classification system was therefore based on the structure of the NAICS.
This specification does not allow our estimate to be interpreted as a causal effect; rather, the estimate is a partial correlation.
We do not use industry fixed effects in our specification as there is not much variation in the ESHI coverage within-industry over time.
To calculate the share of full-time workers with ESHI, using the sample of full-time workers, we create a dummy variable indicating whether an individual was a policyholder in a group health insurance plan to a job that the person had during 1990. We then take the average of this variable at the industry level.
That is, \(\Delta {y}_{i1990,2007}=\left[\frac{Full- time\ worker{s}_{i,2007}}{Part- time\ worker{s}_{i,2007}}-\frac{Full- time\ worker{s}_{i,1990}}{Part- time\ worker{s}_{i,1990}}\right]/17\), where Full – time workersit is the number of full-time workers in industry i at time t.
For the union membership database, see Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) for details.
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Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the Yonsei Signature Research Cluster Program of 2021 (2021-22-0011). We thank Jaesung Choi, Do Won Kwak, and Haishan Yuen for helpful comments. Lisa Chan and Seoyoon Jeong provided excellent research assistance.
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Data and codes are available on request.
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This research was supported by the Yonsei Signature Research Cluster Program of 2021 (2021-22-0011).
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This research was supported by the Yonsei Signature Research Cluster Program of 2021 (2021-22-0011). We thank Jaesung Choi, Do Won Kwak, and Haishan Yuen for helpful comments. Lisa Chan and Seoyoon Jeong provided excellent research assistance.
Appendices
Appendix
Appendix A (Data Appendix for Fig. 1) The data are spliced from a variety of sources to form one continuous time series. Real health premiums are constructed by dividing nominal health insurance premiums by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
1980–1985: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994 and 1999 editions, Washington D.C., available from.
https://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html.
Average health insurance premium per capita is calculated by dividing health insurance income by population (also from the Statistical Abstract). Missing years (1981 and 1985) are interpolated by first deflating the data by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI to account for inflation. The CPI data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015) Washington D.C., CPI Detailed Report, Table 24, accessed in August 2015, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables.
1986–1988: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Compensation and Working Conditions (2002), Employer Costs for Employee Compensation Historical Listing (Annual), 1986–2001, Table 3, p. 12, Washington D.C., available from: http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecechist.pdf.
1989–1995: U.S. General Accounting Office (February 1997), Employment-Based Health Insurance, Costs Increase and Family Coverage Decreases, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Children and Families, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, GAO/HES-97-35, U.S. Senate, Washington D.C., Appendix II, p. 33, available from: http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/223812.pdf.
1996: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2012) California, U.S., Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey Archives, various issues, accessed in January 2015, http://kff.org/health-costs/report/employer-health-benefits-annual-survey-archives.
1997: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2013) Rockville, Maryland, Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, accessed in January 2015, http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/survey_comp/Insurance.jsp.
1998–2010: Kaiser (2012). Kaiser (2015) California, U.S., Premiums and Worker Contributions Among Workers Covered by Employer-Sponsored Coverage, 1999–2014, accessed in January 2015, http://kff.org/interactive/premiums-and-worker-contributions.
Appendix B (Collection of Proofs)
Given the firm’s problem introduced in Eqs. (1) and (2), one can derive the following first-order conditions:
By dividing Eq. (A.1) by (A.2) and rearranging the terms, one would get the Eq. (3) in the main text. Differentiating Eq. (3) with respect to wage would yield the following equation, which proves Proposition 1.
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Hahn, Y., Shim, M. & Yang, HS. Industry Variations in Health Plans and Dynamic Employment Substitution. J Labor Res 42, 449–467 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-021-09325-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-021-09325-8