Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Institutionalizing from the Middle: the Impacts of Provincial Legislation on Rural Grassroots Democracy in China

  • Published:
Studies in Comparative International Development Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Nominal democratic institutions under non-democratic regimes vary across countries. This study intends to advance our understanding of such institutions by exploring the relevance of one aspect of the authoritarian regimes, government hierarchy. Focusing on village-level democratization in China, we investigate the intermediary role of the provincial level governments in shaping the variant outcomes of grassroots democracy across the country. Through an analysis of a national sample, we find that divergent provincial legislative interpretation of central policies is a key determinant of public access to power and democratic governance of village-level governments. Our finding suggests that authoritarian states can employ various institutions to gather information, accommodate local variations, and thus contain potential intra-government disagreement.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. It is interesting to note that this strategy is also common in economic legislation (see Lin 1992; Cho 2006; Chung 2011).

References

  • Alpermann B. The post-election Administration of Chinese Villages. China J. 2001;46(Jul.):45–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alpermann B. Institutionalizing Village governance in China. J Contemp China. 2009;18(60):397–409.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boix C, Svolik MW. The foundations of limited authoritarian government: institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships. J Polit. 2013;75(2):300–16.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chan S. Research Notes on Villagers' Committee election: Chinese-style democracy. J Contemp China. 1998;7(19):507–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cho YN. The politics of lawmaking in Chinese local People's congresses. China Q. 2006;187:592–609.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chung JH. Studies of central-provincial relations in the People's Republic of China: a mid-term appraisal. China Q. 1995;142:487–508.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chung JH. Central control and local discretion in China: leadership and implementation during post-Mao Decollectivization. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chung JH. Central-local dynamics: historical continuities and institutional resilience. In: Heilmann S, Perry EJ, editors. Mao's invisible hand: the political foundations of adaptive governance in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2011. p. 297–320.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Eckholm E China's Party Bosses Thwart Local Leaders. The New York Times. 2002.

  • Gandhi J, Lust-Okar E. Elections under authoritarianism. Annu Rev of Polit Sci. 2009;12:403–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guo Z, Bernstein TP. The impact of elections on the village structure of power: the relations between the village committees and the party branches. J Contemp China. 2004;13(39):257–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huang, Y. Central-local relations in China during the reform era: the economic and institutional dimensions. World Dev. 1996; 24(4):655–72.

  • Kennedy JJ. The face of 'Grassroots Democracy' in rural China: real versus cosmetic elections. Asian Surv. 2002;42(3):456–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li L. The politics of introducing direct township elections in China. China Q. 2002;171:704–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li L, O’Brien KJ. The struggle over village elections. In: Goldman M, MacFarquhar R, editors. The paradox of China's post-Mao reform. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1999. p. 129–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lin S. A new pattern of decentralization in China: the increase of provincial powers in economic legislation. China Information. 1992;7(3):27–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lu J. Varieties of electoral institutions in China's grassroots democracy: cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence from rural China. China Q. 2012;210(Jun.):482–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Magaloni B, Kricheli R. Political order and one-party rule. Annu Rev of Polit Sci. 2010;13:123–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malesky E, Schuler P. Nodding or needling: analyzing delegate responsiveness in an authoritarian parliament. Am Polit Sci Rev. 2010;104(3):482–502.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manion M. Democracy, community, trust: the impact of elections in rural China. Comp Polit Stud. 2006;39(3):301–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manion M. How to Assess Village elections in China. J Contemp China. 2009;18(60):379–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manion M. Information for autocrats: representation in Chinese local congresses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2015.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Montinola G, Qian Y, Weingast BR. Federalism, Chinese style: the political basis for economic success in China. World Polit. 1995;48(1):50–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Naughton BJ, Yang DL, editors. Holding China together: diversity and National Integration in the post-Deng era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2004.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Brien KJ. Chinese People's congresses and legislative embeddedness: understanding early organization development. Comp Polit Stud. 1994;27(1):80–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Brien KJ. Local People's congresses and governing China. China J. 2009;61(Jan.):131–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Brien KJ, Han R. Path to democracy? Assessing Village elections in China. J Contemp China. 2009;18(60):359–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oi JC, Rozelle S. Elections and power: the locus of decision-making in Chinese villages. China Q. 2000;162:513–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pastor RA, Tan Q. The meaning of China’s village election. China Q. 2000;162:490–512.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Remick EJ. The significance of variation in local states: the case of twentieth century China. Comp Polit. 2002;34(4):399–418.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shi T. Village committee elections in China: institutionalist tactics for democracy. World Polit. 1999;51(3):385–412.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Solnick SL. The breakdown of hierarchies in the soviet union and China: a Neoinstitutional perspective. World Polit. 1996;48(2):209–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tan Q. Building institutional rules and procedures: village election in China. Policy Sci. 2004;37(1):1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tan Q. Village elections in China: democratizing the countryside. New York: Edwin Mellen Press; 2006.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tan Q, Xin Q. Village election and governance: do villagers care? J Contemp China. 2007;16(53):581–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wang Y. Tying the Autocrat's hands: the rise of the rule of law in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2014.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright J. Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and investment. Am J Pol Sci. 2008;52(2):322–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Xia M. The People’s congresses and governance in China: toward a network mode of governance. New York: Routledge; 2008.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yu L. Xiuding wanshan 'cunweihui zuzhi fa' zhi wo jian [my opinion on ammending and improve Organic law of village committee]. Beijing: Center of Policy Research, Ministry of Civil Affairs; 2008.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhao Y, Guo W. Qianyi woguo cunmin zizhi mianlin de wentt yu duice [on problems and policies of villagers' self-governace]. Beijing: Center of Policy Research, Ministry of Civil Affairs; 2007.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhong, Y, Chen J. To vote or not to vote: an analysis of peasants' participation in Chinese village elections. Comp Polit Stud. 2002; 35(6):686–712

  • Zhou S `Cunguan' weihe yao cizhi? [Why did `village officials' resign?]. People's Daily. 2001 (03/21/2011).

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 16 Richmond Street, G1 1XQ, Glasgow, UK

    Narisong Huhe

  2. Institute of Political Science, School of Public Economics and Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 511 Wuchuan Rd, Shanghai, 200434, China

    Min Tang

Authors
  1. Narisong Huhe
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Min Tang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Min Tang.

Additional information

This research is supported by Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71203130) and Program for Innovative Research Team of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Appendices

Appendix A: The MoCA Survey

The village-level data used in this study are drawn from MoCA’ nationwide survey of China Rural Self-governance Survey (zhongguo nongcun cunmin zizhi zhuangkuang diaocha), which was carried out by the Chinese Academy of Social Science China from 2005 to 2006. In this survey, the samples were selected with a combination of probability proportional to size (PPS) and multistage sampling techniques. In the first stage, county-level units were selected within each provincial unit using the PPS technique, in which the probability of selection is proportional to the population size of the province based on China’s 2005 census data. In this sampling step, a total of 130 county-level units were randomly chosen. In the second stage, a total number of 260 township-level units were randomly selected from the 130 country-level units. In the third stage, within each township-level unit, two villages or residential communities were randomly selected, and a total of 520 village-level units (i.e., urban residential communities and VCs) were randomly selected, in which there were 370 villages. In the fourth stage, one village official of each selected village was interviewed using the village-level questionnaire, and 371 of 375 questionnaires were completed, with a response rate of 98.9%. Current and retired high school teachers were employed as field interviewers. They had been trained by project members in field interviewing techniques before the actual survey.

The key sociogeographic attributes of the sampled villages as well as socioeconomic attributes of provinces are described in Table 5.

Table 5 Descriptives of key sociogeographic and socioeconomic variables
Full size table

Appendix B: Detailed Information about Provincial Legislation

Table 6 Provincial legislation on village self-governance
Full size table

Appendix C: Provincial Distribution of Surveyed Villages

Table 7 Provincial distribution of surveyed villages
Full size table

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Huhe, N., Tang, M. Institutionalizing from the Middle: the Impacts of Provincial Legislation on Rural Grassroots Democracy in China. St Comp Int Dev 52, 372–393 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-017-9249-7

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-017-9249-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation