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Persistence in corporate networks through boards of directors? A longitudinal study of interlocks in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

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Abstract

This article studies, over the period 2006 to 2019, both the structure and the evolution of corporate networks built on shared board directors between the largest listed firms of three European countries: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. It offers a longitudinal and up-to-date analysis of the state of links between companies through examining interlocking directorates. Contrary to previous studies which have emphasized a decline of interlocks when analyzed at the board director level, we observe relative stability of these networks at the corporate level with a number of connected firms remaining quite stable despite a decline of board ties. As a result, the most central companies remain mainly the same at the national and international level over the considered period. Our findings provide evidence for the resource perspective: access to key resources seemingly pushes firms to continue their network participation despite strengthened national regulations on directors with multiple board seats. This evolution echoes the concept of weak ties of Granovetter (Am J Sociol 78: 360–1380, 1973). Lastly, it is worth noting that it cannot be affirmed that there has been an emergence of a cross-national network which operates to substitute national board ties.

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Notes

  1. European refers to the EU, the UK being part of the EU throughout all the period covered by the sample.

  2. Database offering information on boards and executives in European companies, http://corp.boardex.com

  3. For example, the intersection of column i (company A) and of row j (company B) shows the number of common directors to companies A and B for the given year.

  4. Loi relative aux nouvelles régulations économiques (NRE).

  5. London Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance for Main Market and AIM Companies (White Page, 2012).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Finance, Accounting and Law Department, CEREN EA 7477, Burgundy School of Business Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, Burgundy School of Business (BSB), Dijon, France

    Bénédicte Brullebaut & Isabelle Allemand

  2. LaRGE Research Center UR 2364, EM Strasbourg Business School, University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France

    Enrico Prinz

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Florence Thépot

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  1. Bénédicte Brullebaut
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  2. Isabelle Allemand
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  3. Enrico Prinz
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  4. Florence Thépot
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Correspondence to Bénédicte Brullebaut.

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Brullebaut, B., Allemand, I., Prinz, E. et al. Persistence in corporate networks through boards of directors? A longitudinal study of interlocks in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Rev Manag Sci 16, 1743–1782 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-021-00490-9

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