Abstract
This essay explores the case against strict liability offenses as part of the more general debate about proportional punishment. This debate takes on a very different look in light of a formal result derived by the authors elsewhere, that is briefly summarized and whose implications are pursued here. Traditional objections that consequentialists have mounted against the deontologists’/retributivists’ defense of proportionality fall by the wayside, but a new threat to the proportionality requirement replaces it: the ease with which any such requirement can be circumvented.
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Katz, L., Sandroni, A. Strict Liability and the Paradoxes of Proportionality. Criminal Law, Philosophy 12, 365–373 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-017-9437-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-017-9437-6