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Formality, typologies, and institutional design

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Abstract

This symposium presents a rich set of concepts, data, and testing of relationships regarding the apparent explosion of informal governance activities in world politics. The authors theorize and describe a wide variety of modes of informal governance. I summarize key contributions of this literature and suggest new paths for further research.

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Notes

  1. According to the dimensions above, the GATT was: transparent, binding, state-centric, and had moderately formal decision-making procedures, hierarchy, and institutional structure. Thus it was not a TGI (non-state actors were excluded) and did not fit any of the other ideal types of informality considered in this symposium. Yet it arguably is one of the most consequential “informal” international agreements of the twentieth century.

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Correspondence to Lisa L. Martin.

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Martin, L.L. Formality, typologies, and institutional design. Rev Int Organ 16, 175–182 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09375-9

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