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Do human rights violations hinder counterterrorism cooperation? Evidence from the FBI’s deployment abroad

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Abstract

The impact of human rights on counterterrorism cooperation has been the subject of speculation, but not of systematic analysis. This study offers such an analysis by examining an important channel of cooperation against terrorism: international police liaisons, such as the FBI agents deployed worldwide. It is hypothesized that police liaisons are less likely to be sent to countries where human rights violations are widespread, since repressive governments see threat in foreign agents stationed on their territory. Survival analysis finds support for this hypothesis. An FBI presence does not require democratic government or a strong rule of law in the host country; but human rights abuse reduces the likelihood of an FBI deployment. These findings substantiate a link between human rights and counterterrorism cooperation, offering insights for the study of cross-border law enforcement and transgovernmental networks.

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Notes

  1. Combating crime is an important part of the FBI’s work and of the Legats’ mission. Nonetheless, this study focuses on the counterterrorism mission of the Legats, rather than their efforts against crime. The reason is that counterterrorism became the FBI’s “overriding priority” following the 9/11 attacks , and it is also the Legats’ top priority (FBI 2004; U.S. Department of Justice 2004, iv). Indeed, some Legats – especially in Latin America and the Caribbean – are primarily occupied with criminal investigations. Yet counterterrorism constitutes most of the workload in many of the Legats established during the period considered here.

  2. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

  3. Source: CIA World Factbook.

  4. Source: Global Terrorism Database.

  5. Source: State Department’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports.

  6. Source: Foreign trade data of the U.S. Census Bureau.

  7. Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants.

  8. Source: Polity IV.

  9. Source: Law and Order rating from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).

  10. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).

  11. Source: data compiled by the Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists; U.S. Department of State (2012).

  12. Source: aid data from U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants; GDP data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

  13. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004). See Kaczmarek and Newman (2011).

  14. Source: Global Terrorism Database.

  15. Source: Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP).

  16. Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2007).

  17. Source: Strezhnev and Voeten (2013).

  18. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

  19. Source: KOF Index of Globalization.

  20. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Similar results are obtained when the World Bank’s measure of energy production is used.

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Acknowledgments

I thank Amnon Cavari, Anna Getmansky, Eliav Lieblich, Barak Mendelsohn, Assaf Moghadam, Alex Quiroz Flores, Doug Stinnett, the editor of RIO, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and advice. Guy Freedman, Einat Gedalya, Yotam Kreiman, and Tal Tzurel provided research assistance.

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  1. Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy and Institute for Policy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel

    Asif Efrat

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Correspondence to Asif Efrat.

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Efrat, A. Do human rights violations hinder counterterrorism cooperation? Evidence from the FBI’s deployment abroad. Rev Int Organ 10, 329–349 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9202-8

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