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The Strategy of Escalation and Negotiation: The Iran Nuclear Dispute

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Abstract

The strategic decisions and resulting consequences surrounding the conflict between the United States of America (US) and Iran regarding the Iranian nuclear program are formally investigated using a flexible decision methodology called the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR). This highly controversial dispute caught the world’s attention as concerns were growing that Iran would reach a position where it would be able to build nuclear weapons, thereby posing a risk to world security. While Iran insisted on its rights for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, the international community, led by the US, tried to discourage the nuclear activities of Iran to ensure its obligations to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This led to an escalation of tension on both sides, with an extension of the nuclear program by Iran and an increase in sanctions by the US, before it was possible to arrive at a negotiated agreement. As demonstrated in this paper, a systematic GMCR investigation provides valuable strategic insights into this important conflict. Further, it illustrates ways in which the conflict could have evolved, as well as mechanisms for stopping an escalation like this in the future.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to sincerely thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions that improved the clarity and quality of this paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

    Tobias W. Langenegger

  2. Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Keith W. Hipel

Authors
  1. Tobias W. Langenegger
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  2. Keith W. Hipel
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Correspondence to Tobias W. Langenegger.

Additional information

Tobias W. Langenegger is lecturer at the Department of Management, Technology, and Economics at ETH Zurich. He has an academic background in natural sciences (B.Sc. and M.Sc. from ETH Zurich) and obtained his doctoral degree from ETH Zurich for his work on the mathematical modeling and simulation of conflicts. His research interests include conflict dynamics, mathematical modeling, simulations, international politics, and environmental negotiations. Beside his activities in research, teaching, and training, Dr. Langenegger further works on the development of practical negotiation approaches and has experiences in negotiation consulting for administrations and governments on a national and international level.

Keith W. Hipel is university professor of systems design engineering at the University of Waterloo; Officer of the Order of Canada; Former President of the Academy of Science within the Royal Society of Canada (RSC); Senior Fellow of the Centre for International Governance Innovation; and Fellow of the Balsillie School of International Affairs. His research interests are the development of conflict resolution, multiple criteria decision analysis, time series analysis and other decision-making methodologies for complex interdisciplinary engineering problems lying at the confluence of society, technology and the environment, with applications in water resources management, hydrology, environmental engineering, energy, and sustainable development.

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Langenegger, T.W., Hipel, K.W. The Strategy of Escalation and Negotiation: The Iran Nuclear Dispute. J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng. 28, 434–448 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-019-5421-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-019-5421-0

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