Abstract
Dennett (Synthese, 53(2), 159–180, 1982, 1991, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9–10), 19–30, 2003, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6, 247–270, 2007) proposes and defends a method called heterophenomenology. Heterophenomenology is a method to study consciousness from a third-person objective point of view as opposed to a first-person subjective point of view or (auto)-phenomenology. The method of heterophenomenology serves a necessary role in Dennett’s schema of bridging the gap between the manifest and the scientific image of the world. In this paper, I attempt to present a limited critique of the method of heterophenomenology. The objection raised in this paper is limited to one of the steps involved in the method, i.e., the interpretation of the heterophenomenological text as analogous to novelist fiction. I attempt to show that the assumptions made by Dennett about the interpretation of fiction are contradictory in nature and therefore the same cannot be applied to the interpretation of a heterophenomenological text. The assumptions fail in justifying the interpretation of fiction itself and hence exporting them by analogy to interpret a heterophenomenological text is a mistake.
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Notes
Following Kuhn’s (1962) famous remark about all observations being theory-laden, one can raise a general criticism against Dennett’s overall project of reconciling the manifest with the scientific image of the world. It is often overlooked in such endeavours that the scientific image of the world does not consist of just independent-out-in-the-world facts but it is a joint product of these facts and the value judgments of a scientist. (Norton, 2003).
Philosophical zombies are proposed as beings who are behaviourally indistinguishable from a conscious human being but they themselves are not conscious and do not have any inner subjective experience whatsoever. The term zombie in this sense was first used by Kirk (1974). Chalmers (1996) is credited to having popularised this idea. Dennett (1995) is one of the earlier works where Dennett has criticized the possibility of such beings. Dennett (1982) while proposing the method of heterophenomenology argues that maintaining the metaphysical minimalism would save heterophenomenology from the objection arising out of the possibility of philosophical zombies.
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Acknowledgements
I thank Prof. Ranjan Kumar Panda for his suggestions and feedback on my work. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions. I am also thankful to Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Gol Park Kolkata as the first version of this paper was presented in a conference organized by the institute in March 2023.
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Yadav, A. Heterophenomenology: A Limited Critique. Philosophia 52, 87–99 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00711-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00711-x