Abstract
The experience of one’s body as one’s own is normally referred to as one’s “bodily sense of ownership” (BSO). Despite its centrality and importance in our lives, BSO is highly elusive and complex. Different psychopathologies demonstrate that a BSO is unnecessary and that it is possible to develop a limited BSO that extends beyond the borders of one’s biological body. Therefore, it is worth asking: what grounds one’s BSO? The purpose of this paper is to sketch a preliminary answer to the ‘grounding question.’ Thus, I begin by briefly presenting some contemporary competing hypotheses concerning the ‘grounding question’ and explain why they seem unsatisfying. Second, I discuss the “dual-aspect” of bodily awareness, which is manifest in every normal tactile experience and consists in a subject-object structure of awareness. I then argue that the “dual-aspect” of bodily awareness has the potential of explaining BSO and can, therefore, be considered its grounds. Taking the “dual-aspect” of bodily awareness as the grounds of BSO manages to escape difficulties faced by contemporary hypotheses concerning BSO, fulfills certain necessary demands upon any account of BSO, and explains relevant empirical findings and psychopathologies. Consequently, I argue that it is a hypothesis worth pursuing.
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Notes
See de Vignemont 2020. The Deflationary (Bermúdez, 2011) and the Cognitive (Alsmith, 2015) hypotheses will not be discussed here, both for reasons of space limitations and because they seem to deny, or remain uncommitted to the idea, that there is a phenomenology of bodily ownership to begin with (though there are exceptions to this generalization, see, e.g., Martin 1995).
There is even a third sense for “bodily awareness” (Sartre, 1986: 339; Moran 2010: 43–44): the scientific conception of the body. That is, the body as an idealized material object (e.g., the body as it is for the physician). However, since this conception of the body is irrelevant for our BSO, it will not be discussed here.
The use of tools in general is applicable here. For example, the case of a blind-cane is similar, in important respects, to the case of exploring a surface with a screwdriver’s tip to find a screw one has trouble seeing.
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the importance of clarifying this part of the DA-hypothesis.
For instance, future investigations should investigate the differences between those who develop a limited sense of ownership and those who do not develop a sense of ownership at all, given the instantiation of only one aspect of DA of bodily awareness in the relevant body part.
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Lotan, G. Grounding Bodily Sense of Ownership. Philosophia 50, 2617–2626 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00554-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00554-4