Abstract
In this paper, I defend the view that only practical reasons are normative reasons for belief. This requires viewing beliefs as the predictable results of our actions. I will show how this fits with our intuitions about mental autonomy. The remainder of the paper consists in a defense against a series of objections that may be expected against this position. The paper concludes with a metaphilosophical explanation about our conflicting intuitions regarding the normativity of rationality.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I will use the ‘belief’ as encompassing explicit beliefs, in which we sometimes include occurrent beliefs (Bogdan 1986) and dispositional beliefs, and implicit beliefs (Dennett 1987; Peels 2017). The way I use the term, then, will include cases in which an agent believes p because that person would quickly come to view p as true if he were to consider p. While not explicitly made to do so, my arguments apply the same to partial beliefs.
Some varieties of evidentialism are worded in terms of evidence while others in terms of epistemic reasons and this might. This has brought some philosophers to hold that the terms “evidence” and “epistemic reasons” are not the same (Foley 1991). This difference doesn’t matter to the crux of this paper and I use the terms interchangeably.
Now it should be noted that Rinard herself does not explicitly commit to the view that epistemic reasons are not normative. She writes that she is more than happy to admit that epistemic reasons may sometimes be the reason why someone believes. This puts her in the classical pragmatism camp, although I believe a radical pragmatist might make good use of her arguments.
This relates to some observations made by Hamid Vahid (2006). He notes that Davidson’s charity principle requires that we attribute to others the same beliefs we have regarding our immediate environment, but also that we attribute to others a requirement of total evidence for inductive reasoning. By this, he means that we attribute to others the same reaction to total evidence we would ourselves have.
This position, which is a more extreme form than that which was historically defended by Blaise Pascal, is shared by Anne Meylan (2016, 2018). It is also akin to that of Susanna Rinard (2018). While Rinard claims that some epistemic reasons are explanatory reasons for belief, I claim that epistemic reasons cannot be anything other than explanatory reasons.
Rik Peels (2014) gives a convincing case of believing at will in which the agent believes a certain proposition (partly) for practical reasons. The thought experiment he presents does not affect the bulk of the present discussion as it borders on science fiction, even it has much to say on the conceptual possibility of believing at will.
Susanna Rinard (2015) also frames the question in terms of states and also end up defending a pragmatist view of belief normativity. One the main divergence between the view she defends in her paper and mine is that she argues that practical reasons can make a belief rational. This is not what I hold, and I tend to avoid using the concept of rationality.
The inclusion of the term ‘reasonable’ aims to discard situations in which the agent would be held responsible for a belief he might have changed by taking unreasonable means. It is not appropriate to blame someone for his or her belief because he or she might have changed it by undergoing some ludicrous procedure. What is reasonable for an agent to do in order to acquire or revise a particular belief will most likely depend on both the strength of the practical reasons to acquire or revise said belief, and on how difficult it is to do so.
One way to argue against this proposal would be to say that the dying man ought not to acquire the religious belief and should be blamed but is excused by virtue of the circumstances. I strongly disagree with this line of argument. Excusing someone should be exceptional. Let us suppose that doing X warrants blame, but that someone doing X in a particular circumstance c is systematically excused. It seems to me then that the rule regarding the proper use of blame here is not guided by “Doing X is forbidden”, but should rather be understood as “Doing X, if not under the circumstance c, is forbidden”. In such a case, the dying man is not excused for acquiring epistemically unsupported beliefs, but rather is not to blame in the first place. Excusing someone, in my view, is similar to forgiving; it is a grace that is not guided by a set of rules that surround what the agent has done, but is rather guided by the virtues of the person who excuses the other.
Andrew Reisner (2008), for instance, has suggested a way to incorporate practical and epistemic reasons for belief in an all-things-considered judgment by making use of “defeating functions”. When the strength of a practical reason reaches a certain point, then this practical reason for belief defeats any epistemic reasons for belief. Although I think that this is an elegant response to the incommensurability thesis, I think it fails. Historically, luminaries such as Clifford (1999) have defended the position that the epistemic reasons always defeat practical reasons for belief. Claiming that practical reasons sometimes defeat epistemic reasons will require some defense, which will most likely concern the practical advantages we have of holding true beliefs. Furthermore, even when one has strong epistemic reasons for the belief that p and no practical reason for that belief, it does not follow that the agent should believe p. The famous case of “the next emerald” (Kelly 2003; Leite 2007; McCain 2014) seems to exemplify such a case.
This is also supported by Nikolaj Nottelmann (2013).
Except, of course, if the formation of that intention was the predictable results of some deliberate actions.
Of course, this crude compatibilist position will run into objections on its own. My goal here is not to dwell on the debates of free will, but rather to show that my position has some elbow room to face a number of objections. Lack of autonomy comes in many flavors. It is more than likely that some situations in which the agent lacks autonomy with respect to his intention will be absolved from any blame regarding his actions (such as when an agent, under hypnosis, acquires, against his will, the intent to X), while it may not be so in other situations (such as when an agent forms the intent to do X due to object-given reasons).
This is not a total exoneration of Jane, however. A case might be made that she can be blamed for her actions when they are intentional and caused by her racist beliefs. But blaming Jane for her actions is distinct from blaming her for her beliefs, particularly if they are caused by something such as a brain-washing. Patrick Bondy (2015) makes a similar claim, defending that an agent in Jane’s situation cannot be blamed for her belief as long as she does not accept her belief.
Another option would be to deny the claim that failing to follow your evidence is irrational (Rinard 2017). While this view is coherent with mine, I fear that it would quickly lead to other conflict of intuitions that I would like to avoid for now.
Saint Thomas Aquinas (2007), II a II ae q.2 a.3. See also the following passage from the same section:
Consequently, the perfection of the rational creature consist not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said above that man’s ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to Jo. Vi. 45: Everyone that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me. Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and everyone who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks that it behoves a learner to believe. Hence, in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him.
“From this time on, however, I now gave my preference to Catholic doctrine. I thought it more modest and not in the least misleading to be told by the Church to believe what could not be demonstrated […].” See: Saint Augustine (2008). The Confessions. Translated by Chadwick, H., Oxford: Oxford University Press. VI, 5, 7: CCL 27.
“If, for the purpose of fully satisfying the requirements of Reason, we recognize her right to assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely necessary being, this can be admitted only from favour, and cannot be regarded as the result of irresistible demonstration.” See: Kant, Immanuel (1878). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Miller, J. D. M., Harvard: G. Bell and Sons. p. 391.
“Therefore, anyone who wants to demonstrate the existence of God […] proves something else instead, at times something that perhaps did not even need demonstrating, and in any case never anything better.” See: Kierkegaard, Sören (1985). Philosophical fragments, Johannes Climacus. Translated by Hong, H. V., Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. p. 43.
I suspect that a similar metaphilosophical explanation can be applied to the debate regarding radical skepticism about the external world. The expression “S knows p” has most likely come into being with rules concerning its proper use akin to what we call the “closure principle” (if I know p, p is incompatible to q, then I know that q is not the case) and that knowing p came with the certainty that p. Furthermore, its common usage seems to imply that we do know things about the external world. However, it does appear that we are unaware of the fact that we are not in a given skeptical scenario. In my view, the reason why we feel such tension between our ordinary use of the term and the logical implications of the term’s correlated epistemic concepts is because those contradictions are built in the very concept of knowledge. It would not be surprising, as our ordinary use of the term was guided by practical considerations and did not bother with philosophical considerations such as that of evil demons or “envated” brains. The tenacity of radical skepticism, then, is that this concept is a construct of our ordinary languages and therefore, did not come with the coherence constraints usually demanded in philosophical inquiries.
References
Adler, J. E. (2002). Belief's own ethics. Cambridge: MIT.
Bogdan, R. (ed.) (1986). Belief: Form, Content, and Function. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bondy, P. (2015). Epistemic Deontologism and strong doxastic voluntarism: A defense. Dialogue, 54(4), 747–768.
Booth, A. R. (2014). Epistemic ought is a commensurable ought. European Journal of Philosophy, 22(4), 529–539.
Berker, S. (2018). A combinatorial argument against practical reasons for belief. Analytic Philosophy, 59(4), 427–470.
Clifford, W. K. (1999). The ethics of belief and other essays. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
Dennett, D. (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.
Feldman, R. (2000). The ethics of belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(3), 667.
Fischer, J. M., & Tognazzini, N. A. (2009). The truth about tracing. Noûs, 43(3), 531–556.
Foley, R. (1991). Evidence and reasons for belief. Analysis, 51(2), 98–102.
Hume, D. (2007). An enquiry concerning human understanding and other writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. (2007). The requirements of Rationality. Unpublished, Stanford University, August 2007, version 2.4.
James, W. (1951). The Will to Believe. In D. A. Castelli (Ed.), Essays on Pragmatism. New York: Harper.
James, W. (1899). The Will to believe and other Essays in popular philosophy. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l’Etranger, 47, 223–228.
Kant, Immanuel (1878). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Miller, J. D. M., Harvard: G. Bell and Sons.
Kelly, T. (2003). Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(3), 612–640.
Kelly, T. (2002). The rationality of belief and some other propositional attitudes. Philosophical Studies, 110(2), 163–196.
Kelly, T. (2007). Evidence and normativity: Reply to Leite. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75(2), 465–474.
Kierkegaard, Sören (1985). Philosophical fragments, Johannes Climacus. Translated by Hong, H. V., Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kiesewetter, B. (2017). The normativity of rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
King, Matt (2017). Tracing the Epistemic Condition in Robichaud and Wieland 2017.
Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern. Critical Inquiry, 30(2), 225–248.
Lehrer, K. (1986). The coherence theory of knowledge. Philosophical Topics, 14(1), 5–25.
Leite, A. (2007). Epistemic instrumentalism and reasons for belief: A reply to tom Kelly’s “epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75(2), 456–464.
Locke, J. (1996). An essay concerning human understanding. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Compagny.
Lycan, W. G. (1988). Judgement and justification. Cambridge University Press.
Marušić, B. (2011). The ethics of belief. Philosophy Compass, 6(1), 33–43.
McCain, K. (2014). Evidentialism, Explanationism, and beliefs about the future. Erkenntnis, 79(1), 99–109.
McCormick, M. S. (2015). Believing against the evidence: Agency and the ethics of belief. Routledge.
McHugh, C. (2013). The illusion of exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy, 23(1).
McHugh, C. (2014). Exercising doxastic freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(1), 1–37.
McHugh, C. (2015). Attitudinal control. Synthese, 194(8), 2745–2762.
Meylan, A. (2016). The consequential conception of doxastic responsibility. Theoria, 82(4), 4–28.
Meylan, A. (2019). The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation. Erkenntnis, 84(4), 877–893.
Moser, P. K. (2017). Knowledge and evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nottelmann, N. (2013). The deontological conception of epistemic justification: A reassessment. Synthese, 190(12), 2219–2241.
Papineau, D. (2013). There are no norms of belief. In T. Chan (Ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (2011). On what matters: Two-volume set. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pascal, B. (1814). Pensées. Harvard College Library, New York.
Peels, R. (2014). Believing at will is possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(3), 524–541.
Peels, R. (2017). Responsible belief: A theory in ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reisner, A. (2008). Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief. Philosophical Studies, 138(1), 17–27.
Rinard, S. (2015). Against the New Evidentialists. Philosophical Issues, 25(1), 208–223.
Rinard, S. (2017). No exception for belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94(1), 121–143.
Rinard, S. (2018). Believing for practical reasons. Noûs, 4, 763–784.
Rinard, S. (2019). Equal treatment for belief. Philosophical Studies, 176(7), 1923–1950.
Saint Augustine (2008). The Confessions. Translated by Chadwick, H., Oxford: Oxford University Press. VI, 5, 7: CCL 27.
Saint Thomas Aquinas (2007). Summa Theologica. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Cosimo Publisher.
Shah, N. (2006). A new argument for evidentialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56(225), 481–498.
Shah, N., & Velleman, D. J. (2005). Doxastic deliberation. Philosophical Review, 114(4), 497–534.
Sher, G. (2009). Who knew?: Responsiblity without awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. (2009). Knowing full well: The normativity of beliefs as performances. Philosophical Studies, 142(1), 5–15.
Steup, M. (2011). Belief, voluntariness and intentionality. Dialectica, 65(4), 537–559.
Vahid, H. (2006). Aiming at truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals. Philosophical Studies, 131(2).
Vargas, M. (2005). The trouble with tracing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29, 269–291.
Way, J. (2016). Two arguments for Evidentialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(265), 805–818.
Wood, A. (2008). The duty to believe according to the evidence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 63, 7–24.
Zimmerman, M. J. (1997). Moral responsibility and ignorance. Ethics, 107(3), 410–426.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Montplaisir, S. Radical Pragmatism in the Ethics of Belief. Philosophia 49, 403–419 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00256-9
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00256-9