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Swinburne on Aquinas’ View of Faith

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Abstract

In recent decades, Richard Swinburne has offered an influential view of the relationship between faith and reason. In doing so, he focused to a considerable extent on Aquinas’s view of faith. For Swinburne, Aquinas’ view of faith is that to have faith in God is simply to have a belief-that. In contrast, it is another view of faith, which Swinburne calls ‘Lutheran,’ that involves both theoretical beliefs-that and a trust in the Living God. In this article, I argue that Swinburne’s view is not faithful to Aquinas’s doctrine of faith. In the first section, I will explain Swinburne’s view of belief in detail and its application to Aquinas’s doctrine of faith. In the second section, I will bolster my argument by showing that Swinburne’s reading is inconsistent with Aquinas’ statements regarding three relationships, which are essential to Aquinas’s faith. I am referring to the relationships between faith and will, between faith and merit and between faith and doubt.

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Notes

  1. In this article, I will focus on his book entitled Faith and reason whose first edition was published in 1981 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). My citations will be from the second enlarged edition, which was released in 2005: Richard Swinburne, Faith and reason, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

  2. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 2.

  3. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 138. This resembles what John Hick wrote decades earlier, saying that Aquinas’ view could appropriately be seen as ‘the dominant Western tradition of thought on the subject,’ susceptible of being ‘accepted today by many both Catholic and Protestant Christians, as well as by the agnostic and atheist critics of Christianity.’ (John Hick, Faith and Knowledge. A Modern Introduction to the Problem of Religious Knowledge (1957) (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock 2009), p. 12).

  4. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 138.

  5. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 139.

  6. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 27.

  7. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 14.

  8. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 8.

  9. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 25.

  10. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 138.

  11. See above, note 10.

  12. See R. Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982), chapters 5 and 6.

  13. This is the translation that Swinburne offers of a passage from Summa theologiae II-II q. 6 a. 1, where Aquinas focuses on the causes of faith (see Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 138). In this connection, let me point out that I will normally use the translation of Summa theologiae by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, second and revised edition (London: Oates and Washbourne, 1920), hereafter: Summa theologiae. (The Latin text of Aquinas’ works will always be that of the Leonine Edition [Rome 1888–1948]). In some cases, however, this translation is not satisfactory. Here, for example, Swinburne adheres more to Aquinas’ text. Unlike the Dominican Fathers, Swinburne renders into English the expression ‘cadunt in contemplatione hominis’ with ‘becoming aware’ instead of ‘coming to man’s knowledge.’ Swinburne’s choice is more appropriate, because ‘knowledge’ is also used to translate Aquinas’ scientia, that is, knowledge by demonstration, which in the case in question, would be inappropriate.

  14. See above, note 10.

  15. See Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 241.

  16. Summa theologiae II-II q. 6 a. 1.

  17. See below, note 46.

  18. Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 9.

  19. Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 2.

  20. Peter J. Riga, ‘The act of faith in Augustine and Aquinas,’ The Thomist 35 (1971), p. 168.

  21. The believer is moved to believe for many reasons, such as miracles and arguments. However, s/he is moved mainly ‘by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation (interiori instinctu Dei invitantis)’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 9 ad 3).

  22. Summa theologiae II-II q. 6 a. 1 ad 1.

  23. Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 3.

  24. Swinburne, Faith and reason, p. 140.

  25. Swinburne, Faith and reason, p. 146.

  26. See Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 7.

  27. See Summa theologiae I-II q. 62 a. 4.

  28. See Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2. For more on this, see below, notes 60ff.

  29. Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 5.

  30. See below, notes 60ff.

  31. Summa theologiae I q. 1 a. 1. That is what Aquinas teaches throughout his works, as Ralph McInerny emphasized: ‘Early, middle and late in his writings, St. Thomas speaks of a twofold knowledge of God, one that was achieved by pagan philosophers and which is based on knowledge of material things, another that results from God’s revealing Himself to men’ (Ralph McInerny, ‘On Behalf of Natural Theology,’ Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, 54 [1980], p. 64).

  32. See Summa theologiae II-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 2.

  33. Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 10.

  34. Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 10 ad 2.

  35. See below, note 59.

  36. John Bishop, ‘Faith.’ In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=faith (accessed on 15 July 2019).

  37. See Creighton Rosental, Lessons from Aquinas: A Resolution of the Problem of Faith and Reason (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2011).

  38. Rosental, p. 229, my emphasis. The passage he cites from On Truth is the following one: ‘Someone can begin to believe what he did not believe before but which he held with some hesitation (existimatio debilis).’ (On Truth, tr. by J. V. McGlynn [Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953], q. 14 a. 9 ad 9).

  39. ‘To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man’s beatitude. … This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching.’ (Summa theologiae I q. 2 a. 1 ad1). As noted above (see note 13), the authors of this translation mistakenly render with ‘knowledge’ various terms that for Aquinas have different meanings. In this case, Aquinas employs ‘cognitio.’

  40. Alvin Plantinga refers to atheists like Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins and affirms that ‘Aquinas would apparently include them among those who have a natural knowledge of God’ (Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief [New York: Oxford University Press 2000], p. 177).

  41. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 135.

  42. See Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 26.

  43. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 142.

  44. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 27.

  45. Herbert McCabe, Faith within reason, ed. by Brian Davies (London: Continuum, 2007), p. 5.

  46. See above, note 17.

  47. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 111.

  48. See above, notes 4 f.

  49. See Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 8. See also Aquinas’ Disputed Questions on Truth, where he claims that ‘faith is more certain than any understanding [of principles] and scientific knowledge (omni intellectu et scientia)’ (On Truth, q. 14 a. 1 ad 7). John Jenkins, while commenting on this passage, suggests that according to Thomas ‘the faithful hold the articles of faith with greater conviction than the principle of non-contradiction’ (John Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], pp. 167 f.).

  50. McCabe, Faith within reason, p. 10.

  51. See above, note 33.

  52. See McCabe, Faith within reason, p. 9.

  53. Aquinas, Super Boethium De Trinitate, q. 2, tr. by Rose E. Brennan (NewYork: Herder and Herder, 1946), q. 2 a. 3.

  54. McCabe, Faith within reason, p. 10.

  55. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 140.

  56. See above, note 44.

  57. See above, note 33.

  58. Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 9. See also above, note 18.

  59. For Aquinas, charity ‘is the principle of merit’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 9 ad 1).

  60. Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2.

  61. Their faith, so he says, is ‘quodammodo coacta ex signorum evidentia’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 1).

  62. According to William Mann, Aquinas seems to ‘suggest that the evidence is so clear for the demons as to make their assent involuntary.’ Obviously, ‘if Aquinas accepts this position, then he is forced to concede that the demons do not believe; they know’ (William Mann, ‘Theological virtues.’ In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by E. Craig, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 9, p. 328). The same view is held by Paul O’Grady (Aquinas’s Philosophy of Religion (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), p. 78), Serge Bonino (Angels and Demons. A Catholic Introduction, trans. by M. J. Miller (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), p. 295), and Creighton Rosental (Lessons from Aquinas: A Resolution of the Problem of Faith and Reason (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2011), p. 128). However, if the signs are so compelling, it should be said, as John Hick does, that the faith of demons contradicts Aquinas’ doctrine of faith (see John Hick, Faith and Knowledge: A Modern Introduction to the Problem of Religious Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 21). A possible solution is provided by Eleonore Stump. She argues that the evidence that the demons have at their disposal motivates, rather than compels, them. This also can be said of humans (see Eleonore Stump, ‘Aquinas on Being and Goodness.’ In Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. by S. MacDonald (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), pp. 190 f.).

  63. See Summa theologiae II-II q. 1 a. 4 ad2.

  64. Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 3.

  65. See above, note 29.

  66. Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 3.

  67. Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 2.

  68. Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 2.

  69. If someone objects that Aquinas is using the word affectus, and not will, it may be mentioned that he employs affectus, as well as related words or phrases such as affective or per affectum, to refer not only to passions, but also to all appetitive acts, whether sensitive or rational.

  70. According to Gregory Dawes, ‘the faith of demons is not, it seems, unformed faith, since even unformed faith is shaped by "a certain affection for the good" and is in this sense a gift of God’ (Gregory Dawes, ‘The Act of Faith: Aquinas and the Moderns.’ In Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 6 [New York: Oxford University Press, 2015], p. 70, note 21). While commenting on James 2:19 (‘even the demons believe [pisteuousin] that, and shudder’), Wilfred C. Smith says that in the passage in question ‘pisteuo’ simply does not refer to the Christian faith (Wilfred C. Smith, Belief and History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1977), p. 74).

  71. ‘We distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called (communiter sumpta), which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 1).

  72. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 140.

  73. Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 4.

  74. Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 4 obj. 1.

  75. Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 1.

  76. While responding to another objection, Aquinas adds that ‘some submit to it [the first truth] with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater in one than in another’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 2).

  77. See above, note 33.

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    Roberto Di Ceglie

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Di Ceglie, R. Swinburne on Aquinas’ View of Faith. Philosophia 49, 617–631 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00239-w

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