Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Venturinha and Epistemic Vertigo

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper critically explores Nuno Venturinha’s (2018) discussion of the Wittgensteinian notion of epistemic vertigo in the context of the radical sceptical problematic, at least as that notion has been recently articulated by Duncan Pritchard (e.g., 2016).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For the main statement of my Wittgensteinian treatment of radical skepticism, including the notion of epistemic vertigo, see Pritchard (2016: passim). For more on my treatment of the notion of epistemic vertigo itself, see Pritchard (2019, forthcoming-a).

  2. For more on this point that ignorance is inapplicable to our lack of knowledge of hinge commitments, see Pritchard (forthcoming-b). For an overview of recent work on hinge epistemology, see Pritchard (2017).

  3. In particular, I claim that a hinge epistemology, properly understood, is the antidote to the kind of ‘closure-based’ radical skepticism that has been much discussed in contemporary epistemology (though I also claim that it fails to engage with the closely related, but distinct, ‘underdetermination-based’ contemporary formulation of the radical skeptical problem). For the details, see Pritchard (2016: passim).

  4. With this point in mind, it should be epistemic acrophobia, strictly speaking, but for presentational reasons I elected to stick with the more user-friendly epistemic vertigo.

  5. This is why I have characterized epistemic vertigo as an alief—see Gendler (2008)—rather than a belief, in that it is a propositional attitude that can co-exist with beliefs with opposing contents (e.g., one can alieve that one is in danger even while fully believing that there is no danger). See Pritchard (2016: part four).

  6. This is another reason for employing the ‘vertigo’ metaphor, since one can think of this alienation as being the result of a kind of epistemic ‘ascent’ away from our everyday epistemic practices, and which thus prompts the giddy feeling of epistemic insecurity, even despite our intellectual assurances that the radical skeptical problem is in fact illusory.

  7. I explore this idea in more detail in Pritchard (2019, forthcoming-a). For more on the distinctive features of Wittgensteinian quietism, see McDowell (2009).

  8. Wittgenstein (1969: § 402) approvingly quotes Goethe in this regard: ‘In the beginning was the deed.’

  9. Recall—see note 3—that I am here focusing on the closure-based formulation of the radical skeptical problem, and thereby bracketing related contemporary formulations, such as the underdetermination-based formulation.

  10. Thanks to Nuno Venturinha.

References

  • Gendler, T. S. (2008). Alief and belief. Journal of Philosophy, 105, 634–663.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (2009). Wittgenstein’s “quietism”. Common Knowledge, 15, 365–372.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pritchard, D. H. (2016). Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pritchard, D. H. (2017). Wittgenstein on hinge commitments and radical scepticism in On certainty. In H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman (Eds.), A companion to Wittgenstein (pp. 563–575). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pritchard, D. H. (forthcoming-a). Epistemic vertigo. In B. Brogaard & D. Gatzia (Eds.), Ambivalence. London: Routledge.

  • Pritchard, D. H. (forthcoming-b). Ignorance and inquiry. American Philosophical Quarterly.

  • Pritchard, D. H. (2019). Wittgensteinian epistemology, epistemic vertigo, and Pyrrhonian scepticism. In J. Vlasits & K. M. Vogt (Eds.), Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus (pp. 272-292). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Venturinha, N. (2018). Description of situations: An essay in contextualist epistemology. Cham: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (ed. G. E. M. Anscombe & R. Rhees; trans. G. E. M. Anscombe). Oxford: Blackwell.

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On certainty (ed. G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright; trans. G. E. M. Anscombe & D. Paul). Oxford: Blackwell.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

    Duncan Pritchard

  2. School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK

    Duncan Pritchard

Authors
  1. Duncan Pritchard
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Duncan Pritchard.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Pritchard, D. Venturinha and Epistemic Vertigo. Philosophia 48, 1699–1704 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00138-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00138-9

Keywords

Search

Navigation