Abstract
The contemporary situation within the realm of ethical theories is quite complicated. Were it not enough that many classical ethical theories are evolving into the new modern forms (such as virtue or discourse ethics), new types of ethical theories are arising, as well. The main aim of the paper is to introduce this issue of ethical theories which are known under the term hybrid ethical theories. A secondary aim of the paper is to describe and characterize the contemporary ethical theory of ethics of social consequences, and look for the answer whether it can be an example of this type of theory. To achieve the scope, the paper begins with a short introduction into the issue of contemporary consequentialism, followed by a presentation of the concept of hybrid ethical theories and its examples. Later the variability of consequentialism and ethics of social consequences are presented. The normative basis of this theory is subsequently analysed and explored in the context of hybrid ethical theories. Finally, the study clarify that the ethics of social consequences might be considered as a hybrid ethical theory.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See e.g. Tim Mulgan (2001) The demand of consequentialism, where he claims that the move to hybrid theory is one of the ways of responding to objections of consequentialism.
Ethics of social consequences was formed more than 25 years ago and to this day it is possible to identify three dominant phases. The first phase of development between years 1992–1999 can be characterized as a period when the theory was formed and distinguished from other forms of consequentialism, particularly from utilitarianism. The second phase, from 2003 to 2008, is marked by criticism (e.g. Münz 2002; Kišš 2006) and discussions about the future of the theory and its direction. In 2011 (Gluchman et al.) a collective volume of more than a dozen different authors was published. This publication indicated the end of the second and the beginning of a new phase. The last phase of the development of this ethical theory can be characterized with three marks. The first one is openness and the spread of the theory which is now used in many different ethical fields (e.g. from political and social ethics to applied) (e.g. Švaňa 2015). The second, which is connected to first, is the overlapping of the theory to spheres of applied and professional ethics (as a theoretical background) (e.g. Dubiel-Zielińska 2015; Domagala 2015). The third one is the deepening effort of the theory to find its position within ethical theories on the constitutive level (e.g. Misseri 2015), and this paper is an effort to shift this attempt. The latest publication and an example of these efforts is a collective monograph Ethics of Social Consequences: Philosophical, Applied and Professional Challenges (Gluchman et al. 2018).
It must be stated that up to the present day, there is no clear and accepted definition of what kind of ethical theory might be called hybrid or even a list of the positions which must be fulfilled to help us identify a theory as hybrid. There are still only a few papers on this topic, from recent ones (Hill (2009) which studied hybrid theories in comparison to moderate probabilism, or Davson-Galle (2016) who suggests the existence of a hybrid normative ethical view in context of professional ethics as a mean of overcoming the value conflict in it. Another one is a collection of essays Having it both ways which investigates hybrid theories on a meta-ethical level (Fletcher and Ridge 2014) and a chapter called Hybrid theories by Christopher Woodard (2016) discussing the issue of well-being. Unfortunately, none of them are particularly beneficial for this paper.
It is important not to confuse it with pluralism, which might support the belief that more than one factor has weight in its own right, but would not believe that there actually is a single theory that generates all of the relevant factors. Woodard wrote that hybrid theories are a product of the temptation to think that some opposing views each capture part of the truth. Coming from this assumption, hybrid theories are a product of our effort to make progress by combining feature of these opposing views in new ways (2016: 161).
Most likely it was Scheffler at the beginning of the ‘80s who established use of the term hybrid ethical theory.
As Alan Thomas notes, before the publication of this work, the lines in normative ethics were very clear. It was a battlefield between various versions of consequentialists, deontologists and virtue-focused rivals (Thomas 2009: 183).
Nagel’s search for a normative ethical position based on an attempt to accommodate two different positions of act justification was one of the first efforts at establishing a hybrid ethical theory.
Critiques which accentuate the demandingness of utilitarianism are very old and can be traced to the origins of the concept. The idea that one of the problems which utilitarianism needs to resolve is that it leaves too little room for the agent’s own interests was an object of concern even back in Henry Sidgwick’s works in the nineteenth century. His concern was the conflict of demandingness towards egoism which was understood as rational – an issue of the dualism of practical reason.
In addition to the integrity of an agent (objection of demandingness) he focuses on objection related to distributive justice which is intentionally overlooked in this paper as it is superfluous to the topic.
The most notable examples are those derived from Philippa Foot’s writings, such as those which are known today as ‘organ harvesting doctors’ or ‘transplant surgeons’ (Foot 1978).
Agents are alienated from those projects and interests that make their lives enjoyable and meaningful.
The simplest theory of good – the theory of quantitative hedonism (Jeremy Bentham) was criticized and superseded by John Stuart Mill’s (2000, 1863) qualitative hedonism. This theory was greatly criticized by George Edward Moore (1912) and still is by Fred Feldman (1997). Among contemporary representatives of the critique, the most famous is Amartya Sen (1979) with his welfarist version of the understanding of good. A solution (consensus) is still (and probably never will be) nowhere to be found.
Non-utilitarian consequentialism is understood as a version of consequentialist theory, which does not associate good solely with welfare/well-being. Non-utilitarian does not equal non-consequentialist. Non-utilitarian form of consequentialism is consequentialism which holds, that value of some things is at least partially independent of their impact on well-being. In addition, non-utilitarian consequentialism might deviate from classical consequentialism (utilitarianism) by declining its other characteristics. Ethics of social consequences is an example of this variation of consequentialism.
Even though these questions are very compelling, it is not the aim of this paper to answer them, and they are used only as a remark of the importance of the issue of agency.
Pettit’s conception can be identified as an example of this position. He claims that if we refrain from the position that rightness can be achieved only by an agent-neutral position, then we can mark even typically non-consequentialist theories as consequentialist. As an example, he indicates agents who decided to promote values (not just to honour them) but they did not refrain from relativisation of those values towards their own future, towards their children and so on (Pettit 1997: 129–130).
Another example of the moderate approach would be Samuel Scheffler’s integrationist hybrid view which endorses agent-centred prerogatives to allow agents to assign weight to their own interests (Scheffler 1994).
Sometimes referred as an account of well-being.
Ben Bradley, questioning the issue of this taxonomy (on objective and subjective views), states that subjectivism asserts that all things that are good for an individual involve that individual’s desires in some way. Objectivism asserts about well-being that some of the things that are good for an individual do not in any way involve that individual’s desires (2014: 236–237).
This new view must additionally be derived from a standpoint which was considered incompatible or (even) contradictory.
It is not necessary to overcome all of them as they are not necessarily interconnected.
Provided that purely egoistic acts are excluded, as Dreier states in his paper, it is that being that sort of agent who has overriding commitment to promote agent-neutral good precludes commitments to other valuable merits such as friendship, love and other (1993: 34).
The issue of maximization is closely connected to the agent-neutral position. Both principles are closely connected to each other especially in the classical form of consequentialism – utilitarianism. The impartial position is reflected in the duty to consider everyone’s interests, aggregate them and produce the best total outcome. Utilitarianism is impartial and therefore can assign every moral agent the same (common) mutual aim, to maximize the common utility. Therefore, not holding the position of impartiality inter alia permits ethics of social consequences to retreat from maximization locus.
As well as other positions in contemporary consequentialism, Slote’s view did not remain uncriticized. For future references see, Ben Bradley (2006).
See the footnote number 15.
The role and purpose of values in the ethics of social consequences is given by their ability to contribute to reaching and realizing the moral good (Gluchman 2003: 7–19). In ordinary circumstances values (by their order) and resulting principles are a starting point of the reasoning and acting of a moral agent. In extraordinary circumstances, the agent does not need to consider all the requirements resulting from the full value structure of the theory. Values are realized in relation to their priority. Primary values are realized prior to secondary ones, and realization of positive social consequences (or at least minimizing negative one), takes priority over primary values. Ethics of social consequences accepts the intrinsic as well as instrumental character of values, depending on a particular situation, in which the moral agent realizes the given values (Gluchman 2012: 16–17).
The best example would be Kantian respect for people based on the special status of humanity and dignity. For a different understanding of the same value see e.g. David Cummiskey (2008).
This issue is known as the theory of right, and alongside the theory of value it is considered a fundamental aspect of ethical theory.
Another noted consequentialist Pettit says that ‘consequentialism is a theory that the way to tell whether a particular choice is the right choice for an agent to have made is to look at the relevant consequences of the decision; to look at the relevant effects of the decision on the world’ (1993a, b: xiii).
Motives and intentions are, for now, not distinguished in the theory; even discussions on the issue have already begun.
As mentioned before, the issue of maximization is closely connected to the agent-neutral position.
Even though the principle of maximization remains currently rejected in ethics of social consequences, the discussion stays open as a result of the insufficient understanding found in critiques (Mulgan 2001: 143–144). This approach suggests that the maximization principle in ethics of social consequences was rejected as a result of its improper understanding which originally focused only on the outcome’s attributes – the agent’s contribution to the outcome or the outcome itself. Moreover, contemporary discussions focus on the effort of an agent – the cost of their actions. The effort of the moral agent which could be expressed by the cost of the act for the agent is suggested as an additional (auxiliary) criterion for a more proper evaluation and possible reconsideration of the issue (Kalajtzidis 2014: 28–30).
As mentioned above, core values of ethics of social consequences (humanity, moral right and dignity) could be found more often in writings of non-consequentialists than consequentialists.
On the one hand, there is the purely consequentialist position of focusing on consequences and promoting values (rather than just their honouring). On the other hand, there is the agent-relative position and therefore the classically deontological point of view which is closer to common-sense morality than consequentialism.
References
Adams, R. M. (1976). Motive Utilitarianism. The Journal of Philosophy, 73(14), 467–481.
Kalajtzidis, J. (2014). Ethics of social consequences and the principle of maximization. In Ethical thinking on past & present (ETPP 2013), ed. by Vasil Gluchman, 26–31. Prešov: Publishing House of University of Prešov.
Bradley, B. (2006). Against satisficing consequentialism. Utilitas, 18(2), 97–108.
Bradley, B. (2014). Objective theories of well-being. In B. Eggleston & D. E. Miller (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to utilitarianism (pp. 220–238). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brink, D. O. (2006). Some forms and limits of consequentialism. In D. Coop (Ed.), The oxford handbook of ethical theory (pp. 380–423). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Broome, J. (1991). Weighing goods. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Cummiskey, D. (2008). Dignity, contractualism and consequentialism. Utilitas, 20(4), 383–408.
Dancy, J. (1993). Moral reasons. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Davson-Galle, P. (2016). Reason and professional ethics. London: Routledge.
Domagala, J. (2015). Vasil Gluchman’s ethics of social consequences and the professional ethics of a polish police officer. Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 5(1–2), 115–118.
Dreier, J. (1993). Structure of normative theories. The Monist, 76(1), 22–40.
Dreier, J. (2006). Contemporary debates in moral theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Dubiel-Zielińska, P. (2015). Consequentialist and non-consequentialist overtones of the code of ethics of an academic staff member in light of ethics of social consequences. Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 5(1–2), 105–113.
Feldman, F. (1997). Utilitarianism, hedonism, and desert. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fletcher, G., & Ridge, M. (2014). Having it both ways. Hybrid theories and modern metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foot, P. (1978). Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Frey, R. G. (1980). Interests and rights: The case against animals. London: Oxford University Press.
Frey, R. G. (2005). Act-Utilitarianism. In H. La Follette (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to ethical theory (pp. 165–183). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Gluchman, V. (1994). Angažovanosť, solidarita, zodpovednosť [Involvement, solidarity, responsibility]. Prešov: UNIVERSUM.
Gluchman, V. (1995). Etika konzekvencializmu [ethics of consequentialism]. Prešov: ManaCon.
Gluchman, V. (1996). Etika sociálnych dôsledkov – Jej princípy a hodnoty [ethics of social consequences – Its principles and values]. Filozofia, 51(12), 821–829.
Gluchman, V. (1999). Etika sociálnych dôsledkov v kontexte jej kritiky [Ethics of social consequences in the context of its critique]. Prešov: L.I.M.
Gluchman, V. (2001). Teória správneho v etike sociálnych dôsledkov [theory of right in ethics of social consequences]. Filosofický časopis, 49(4), 633–654.
Gluchman, V. (2003). Human being and morality in ethics of social consequences. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.
Gluchman, V. (2005a). Idea humánnosti v kontextoch súčasnej etiky [idea of humanity in contexts of contemporary ethics]. Filozofia, 60(7), 512–531.
Gluchman, V. (2005b). Miesto humánnosti v etike sociálnych dôsledkov [the place of humanity in ethics of social consequences]. Filozofia, 60(8), 613–623.
Gluchman, V. (2008). Etika a reflexie morálky [ethics and a reflection of morality]. Prešov: FF PU.
Gluchman, V. (2012). Ethics of social consequences: Methodology of bioethics education. Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2(1–2), 16–27.
Gluchman, V. (2016). Disaster issues in non-utilitarian consequentialism (ethics of social consequences). Human Affairs, 26(1), 52–62.
Gluchman, V., et al. (2011). Hodnoty v etike sociálnych dôsledkov [values in ethics of social consequences]. Prešov: Grafotlač.
Gluchman, V., et al. (2018). Ethics of social consequences: Philosophical, applied and professional challenges. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Godwin, W. (1793). An enquiry concerning political justice, and its influence on general virtue and happiness. London: G.G.J. & J. Robinson.
Hare, R. M. (1993). Essays in ethical theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hare, R. M. (1996). Foundationalism and Coherentism in ethics. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong & M. Timmons (Eds.), Moral knowledge? New readings in moral epistemology (pp. 190–199). New York & London: Oxford University Press.
Hill, J. (2009). Probabilism today: Permissibility and multi-account ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87(2), 235–250.
Hurka, T. (1993). Perfectionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, F. (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics, 101(3), 461–482.
Kagan, S. (1998). Normative ethics. Boulder: Westview.
Kagan, S. (2009). Well-being as enjoying the good. Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1), 253–272.
Kišš, I. (2006). Sociálna etika [social ethics]. Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského.
Komenská, K. (2016). Bioetické reflexie pohrôm a katastrof – nové výzvy pre súčasnú etiku [bioethical reflection of disasters – New challenges for contemporary ethics]. Filosofický časopis, 64(5), 761–770.
McNaughton, D., & Rawling, P. (1991). Agent-relativity and the doing-happening distinction. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 63(2), 167–185.
McNaughton, D., & Rawling, P. (1992). Honoring and promoting values. Ethics, 102(4), 835–843.
Mill, J. S. (1863). Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son and Bourn, West Strand.
Mill, J. S. (2000). Bentham. Utilitarizmus [Bentham. Utilitarianism]. Prešov: LIM Prešov.
Miller, C. (2011). The continuum companion to ethics. London: CIPB.
Misseri, L. E. (2015). Consequentialism, humankind and dignity: From renaissance moral philosophy to Gluchman’s ethics of social consequences. Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 5(3–4), 197–203.
Moore, G. E. (1912). Ethics. London: Williams & Norgate.
Moore, G. E. (1999). Etika [Ethics]. Prešov: LIM Prešov.
Mulgan, T. (2001). The demands of consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mulgan, T. (2014). Understanding Utilitarianism. London: Routledge.
Münz, T. (2002). Etika sociálnych dôsledkov Vasila Gluchmana [Vasil Gluchman’s ethics of social consequences]. Filozofia, 57(4), 275–284.
Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, P. (1989). Consequentialism and respect for persons. Ethics, 100(1), 116–126.
Pettit, P. (1991). Consequentialism. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics (pp. 230–241). Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd..
Pettit, P. (1993a). Introduction. In P. Pettit (Ed.), Consequentialism (pp. xiii–xxix). Aldershot: Dartmouth Press.
Pettit, P. (1993b). Consequentialism. Aldershot: Dartmouth Press.
Pettit, P. (1997). The consequentialist perspective. In W. B. Marcia, P. Pettit, & M. A. Slote (Eds.), Three methods of ethics (pp. 92–175). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Pettit, P. (2000). Non-consequentialism and universalizability. The Philosophical Quarterly, 50(199), 175–190.
Rachels, J. (2013). Ethical egoism. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Ethical theory an anthology (pp. 193–200). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Scarre, G. (2002). Utilitarianism. London: Routledge.
Scheffler, S. (1994). The rejection of consequentialism: A philosophical investigation of the considerations underlying rival moral conceptions. Oxford: Clarendon.
Sen, A. (1979). Utilitarianism and welfarism. Journal of Philosophy, 76(9), 463–489.
Sen, A. (2000). Consequential evaluation and practical reason. The Journal of Philosophy, 97(9), 477–502.
Shaw, W. H. (2006). The consequentialist perspective. In J. L. Dreier (Ed.), Contemporary debates in moral theory (pp. 1–21). Oxford: Blackwell.
Sidgwick, H. (1907). Methods of ethics. London: Macmillan & Company.
Singer, P. (2011). Practical ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge university press.
Slote, M. (1985). Common sense morality and consequentialism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Slote, M. A. (1997). Virtue ethics. In W. B. Marcia, P. Pettit, & M. A. Slote (Eds.), Three methods of ethics (pp. 175–239). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Slote, M., & Pettit, P. (1984). Satisficing consequentialism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (supplementary volume), 58, 139–163 165–176.
Švaňa, L. (2015). War, terrorism, justice and the ethics of social consequences. Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 5(3–4), 211–225.
Švaňa, L. (2016). On the modern hybrid forms of consequentialism. Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 6(3–4), 157–166.
Thomas, A. (2009). Thomas Nagel. Stocksfield: Acumen.
Vallentyne, P. (2006). Against maximizing act consequentialism. In J. L. Dreier (Ed.), Contemporary debates in moral theory (pp. 21–37). Oxford: Blackwell.
Woodard, C. (2016). Hybrid theories. In G. Fletcher (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of philosophy of well-being (pp. 161–174). London: Routledge.
Acknowledgements
The paper is supported by VEGA [Vedecká grantová agentúra MŠVVaŠ SR a SAV] project 1/0629/15 Etika sociálnych dôsledkov v kontexte súčasných etických teórií [Ethics of social consequences in the context of contemporary ethical theories].
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Kalajtzidis, J. Ethics of Social Consequences as a Hybrid Form of Ethical Theory?. Philosophia 47, 705–722 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0013-7
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0013-7