Abstract
Utilitarianism has often been understood as a theory that concerns itself first and foremost with the rightness of actions; but many other things (e.g., moral rules, motives, laws, etc.) are also properly subject to moral evaluation, and utilitarians have long understood that the theory must be able to provide an account of these as well. In a landmark article from 1976, Robert Adams argues that traditional act utilitarianism faces a particular problem in this regard. He argues that a on a sensible utilitarian account of the rightness of an agent’s motives, right motives will sometimes conflict with right actions, leaving the theory internally incoherent. The puzzle Adams raises has received a good deal of attention but few proposed solutions. Fred Feldman, however, has offered a solution that seems to be gaining adherents. In this paper I argue that Feldman’s approach cannot succeed. At bottom, it relies on a version of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’—and subsequently an account of an agent’s alternatives—that is far too restrictive to be plausible. Despite the failure of this solution, however, I argue that the conflict Adams develops is not as theoretically troubling as he suggests. While traditional act utilitarianism may fail for other reasons, it will not fail due to the conflict between acts and motives.
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Notes
There are of course alternative utilitarian accounts of the good. As far as I can tell, nothing in this paper turns on which version is chosen. Indeed, nothing in the paper turns on whether utilitarianism or some other consequentialist theory is chosen.
Feldman develops a helpful interpretation of the case, one that makes the conflict vivid. First, he labels the relevant motives and actions as follows:
“Mmax: The motive of wanting to maximize utility.
Msee: The motive of wanting to see as much as possible at the cathedral.
A1: The act of studying the cathedral during the morning with motive Mmax.
A2: The act of studying the cathedral during the morning with motive Msee.
A3: The act of leaving early in the afternoon.
A4: The act of staying in the cathedral in the afternoon.”If we assign A1 a utility of 5; A2 a utility of 10; A3 a utility of 2; and A4 a utility of -2, then the conflict becomes apparent. MSee is the right motive (with a utility of 8, one more than MMax's 7), but it leads Jack to perform A4, which is the wrong act. See Feldman (1993: 205).
Parfit later considers the possibility that “Psychological Determinism” is false, and argues that the conflict between act and motive in Clare’s case remains. I discuss this alternative below.
Louise (2006) seems to criticize them for assuming that motives causally determine actions, but here they are simply adopting the assumption originally made by Adams and Parfit. Dancy and Mason do go on to raise questions with Parfit’s assumption of “psychological determinism.” As noted above, Parfit argues that even if such determinism is false the conflict between act and motive in Clare’s case remains. I discuss this alternative below.
Parfit explicitly defends this form of compatibilism in his more recent work. See Parfit (2011: 260).
It is interesting to note that Louise, despite opposing Feldman and Dancy’s rejection of the conflict cases, seems to follow them here in assuming such incompatibilism. See Louise (2006: 79).
See, for example, Railton’s (1984) development of “sophisticated consequentialism.”
Consider an analogy: The primary goal of a professional tennis player is to win matches; it is not primarily to hit has many optimal shots as possible, or even worse, never to hit a bad shot.
This concern may also help explain Adams’ choice of the example of Jack in the Cathedral to illustrate the conflict he develops. We wouldn’t normally think that a decision between spending the afternoon in the cathedral and finding a room is a moral decision at all. The fact that act utilitarianism implies that Jack does something morally wrong in staying late and condemning himself to an uncomfortable night illustrates by itself the way in which Adams thinks the theory has trivialized the concept of moral obligation.
Mill famously suggests this view in Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism: “We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience” (Mill 1979: 93).
We might consider here a further analogy. Presumably a good citizen will hold a general and profound concern for the law and the legality of her actions (provided, perhaps, that her society’s laws are substantially just). This need not imply a profound concern for the slightest violation of even the most trivial laws. Even good citizens, it seems to me, will on occasion break the law and not care.
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Skidmore, J. Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Might’? How (not) to Resolve the Conflict between Act and Motive Utilitarianism. Philosophia 46, 207–221 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9908-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9908-y