Abstract
I propose and defend the hypothesis that understanding is the norm of (the speech act of) explanation. On this proposal, an explanation should express understanding. I call this the understanding account of explanation. The understanding account is supported by social and introspective observations. It is also supported by the relationship between knowledge and understanding, on the one hand, and assertion and explanation, on the other.
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Turri, J. Understanding and the Norm of Explanation. Philosophia 43, 1171–1175 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9655-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9655-x