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Mission-Driven Agency and Local Policy Innovation: Empirical Analysis from Baoding, China

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Abstract

The use of policy experiments or innovations, especially at the local level, since the opening and reform in China is well documented. Less understood is why and how these innovations are developed. This paper further enriches our existing understanding by bringing to light an institutional element that has been relatively under-studied: the role of mission-driven local government agency. Informed by detailed on-site ethnography and process-tracing, I use meso-level and micro-level analyses of Baoding (Hebei) to illustrate how such an organization ushered in unique changes to local governance to facilitate two prolonged instances of policy innovation since the early 2000s: clean energy industry cluster and low-carbon city. Building on the insights from the literatures on communities of practice and experimentalist governance, I argue that the ways in which the local agency engendered and sustained the innovations can best be described as “collective” experimentalist governance. The analyses suggest that local innovations in China cannot always be understood as an epiphenomenon of centrally-coordinated policy experimentation, cross-regional competition or learning, or local leadership that previous studies have frequently emphasized. The findings contribute to recent scholarship that has revealed varieties of local governance in contemporary China.

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Notes

  1. Naughton [61]; Qian and Xu [69]

  2. Xu [94]; Heilmann [30]

  3. Teets and Hurst [82]; Also see Mei and Wang [52] in this issue that documents the evolution in the kinds of local policy innovations over time.

  4. Florini et al. [24]

  5. Ma [50]; He [26]

  6. Young [95]

  7. Tao and Mah [80]; Zhang et al. [97]; Jiang et al. [33]

  8. Wang et al. [88]; Lo [49]

  9. Teets [81]; Wu, Ma and Yang [92]

  10. Economy [21] [2004]; Economy [20]; Wu et al. [93]; Ran [70]

  11. Ma [51]; Teets [81]

  12. Corbridge et al. [13]

  13. For classic examples of such a treatment, see Oi [62] and Walder [85].

  14. See, e.g., Arcuri and Dari-Mattiacci [1]; Hutchcroft [32]; List and Gerking [45]

  15. Edin [22]; Huang [31]

  16. Nahm [58]; Tsui and Wang [84]; Oi [62]

  17. Li and Zhou [38]; Edin [22]; Huang [31]

  18. Whiting [89]

  19. Tsui and Wang [84]; Montinola et al. [57]; Oi [62]; Wong [91]

  20. Birney [7]; Heberer and Trappel [29]; Oi [63]

  21. Xu [94]; Heilmann [30]; Qian and Xu [69]

  22. Teets [81]; Teets and Hurst [82]; Florini et al. [24]. However, they are mostly still viewed as in response to the center’s guidance, demands, or steering.

  23. Xu [94]; Heilmann [30]

  24. Xu [94]

  25. Heilmann [30]

  26. Zhao et al. [98]; Price et al. [68]

  27. Zhang et al. [97]; Jiang et al. [33]

  28. Wang et al. [88]

  29. Wang [86]; Zhao et al. [98]; Price et al. [67]; Dai [14]; Birney [7]; Heberer and Trappel [29]

  30. Heberer and Senz [28]

  31. Wong and Karplus [90]

  32. Economy [21] [2004]; Economy [20]; Ran [70]

  33. Wu et al. [92]

  34. Liu et al. [47]

  35. Eaton and Kostka [18]; Economy [20]; Lo and Tang [48]

  36. Gilley [25]; Zhan et al. [96]; Liebman [46]; Liu and Zheng [42]; Li and Chan [39]

  37. Ma [51]; Xu [94]; Shen et al. [73]. The actual protagonists can be the regions themselves, their leaders, or specific government agencies.

  38. Damanpour [15]; Downs [17]

  39. Tsui and Wang [84]; Oi [62]; Walder [85]

  40. Ma [51]

  41. These assumptions also run counter to other well-known narratives about Chinese political system, such as fragmentation and incoherence [41, 54, 70].

  42. Birney [7]

  43. Osborne [65]; Wang [87]; Lewis [37]

  44. Osborne and Gaebler [64]; Davis et al. [16]; Palmer and Short [66]

  45. This was the case in Baoding, as shown below.

  46. Various interviews (e.g., Interview 12302010A; Interview 12302010B; Interview 11,032,010)

  47. Various interviews (e.g., Interview 07272012; Interview 09172012; Interview 08212013A; Interview 08212013B)

  48. Various interviews (e.g., Interview 08212013A; Interview 10,272,011; 12302010A)

  49. Brown and Duguid [9]; Lave and Wenger [36]

  50. Sabel and Zeitlin [71, 72]

  51. Stilgoe [79]; Callon et al. [10]

  52. Simpson [77]; Elkjaer [23]

  53. For an overview of the literature, see Sabel and Zeitlin [71, 72]. See, also, Eckert and Börzel [19] for a critical review of the debates in the context of European Union.

  54. Sabel and Zeitlin [72]

  55. Generally speaking, the recursive process of collective governance described in this paper has many characteristics similar to the process of muddling-through. The conceptual framework of muddling-through was developed in the literature on organizational decision-making, particularly as it relates to joint decision-making under uncertainty or high risk. This includes, among others, [43, 44] work on the science of muddling through, [8] notion of disjoint incrementalism, [56] work on the theory of “unstructured” strategic decision processes, and [76] behavioral theory of the firm, which emphasize satisfying the constraints rather than maximizing the end goals.

  56. In 1958, Hebei’s provincial capital seat was transferred to Tianjin; then in 1966, it was returned to Baoding again, only to lose it again to nearby Shijiazhuang in 1968 (Hebei Province Economic Yearbook 1985 [27], p. 164).

  57. See, e.g., Song [78] and Li [40]—two of the earliest proponents and architects of the Torch Plan.

  58. Baoding Economic Statistical Yearbook 1995 [3]

  59. Baoding High-Tech Administrative Committee, Office of Archives (internal documents)

  60. Baoding Yearbook 1995–1997 [6]

  61. Particularly its subsidiaries, Tianwei Wind Turbine and Tianwei Solar

  62. Baoding High-Tech Administrative Committee 2014 annual report

  63. Then recently restructured from National Commission of Science and Technology (NCoST).

  64. Torch Center/MoST [83]

  65. Interview 09192011

  66. MoST [55]. As far as I can tell, this seems to be the first time that NCoST/MoST had ever developed a relatively specific set of evaluation criteria for the national-level HTZs since their inception.

  67. Interview 11,172,012

  68. Interview 06032011

  69. Interview 01122012B; Interview 12232011B; Interview 12232011C

  70. Interview 06012011E

  71. Undoubtedly, they were willing to talk about the incident openly only because they have managed to escape the crisis and turn the HTZ around.

  72. Baoding Guojia Gaoxinjishu Chanye Kaifaqu Zhujing Lianluochu

  73. E.g., head of a division (buzhang) like investment division

  74. Interview 04012011; also, Interview 12302010A

  75. Zhongguo Fengneng Xiehui

  76. Zhongguo Ziyuan Zonghe Liyong Xiehui Kezaisheng Nengyuan Zhuanye Weiyuanhui

  77. Zhongguo Taiyangneng Xuehui. It later changed its name to “China Renewable Energy Society” (Zhongguo Kezaisheng Nengyuan Xuehui).

  78. In fact, it is difficult to delineate which linkages were first made and which ones came last, as there were a lot of movements back and forth and from one to another. The various linkages are separately detailed in this article merely for analytical purposes. The discussion does not suggest any level of primacy or sequencing.

  79. Such as research institutes under the CAS system or energy labs at top universities like Tsinghua.

  80. In the mid-2000s, for instance, Zhonghang was the largest blade supplier to Goldwind (Jinfeng), one of the largest global players in the wind turbine and wind-farm system market. It came to occupying 90% of the domestically-produced blade market at one point.

  81. Considered “large scale” at the time in China.

  82. Interview 07042011B; Interview 12,152,011

  83. In fact, this practice also included its highest level officials in the beginning. During the first half of 2001, the director and each of the vice directors spent several months visiting various national-level HTZs.

  84. Interview 12302010A; Interview 12302010B

  85. Interview 09252011

  86. Stilgoe [79]; Callon et al. [10]

  87. Interview 05202011A

  88. For example, from 2001 to 2002, it formed “Baoding Comprehensive Regional Economic Innovation Research Committee” with China Enterprise Reform and Development Research Association and Peking University’s Founder Group.

  89. Interview 03262013

  90. Interview 12302010A. According to my interview subjects, this internal discussion indeed began in 2003. The first national Renewable Energy Law was subsequently ratified in 2005.

  91. Considered a relatively large scale at the time in China.

  92. Interview 11242011B; Interview 12,162,011

  93. Baoding’s HTZ still remains as the only such “base” to this date.

  94. e.g., Underwriters Laboratories (UL), International Electro-technical Commission (IEC), and TÜV Rheinland certifications

  95. Wang et al. [88]; Chien [11]

  96. Baeumler et al. [2]

  97. The Climate Group [12]

  98. See, e.g., http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&type=99&nr=245&menu=20 (last accessed on October 13, 2014).

  99. In comparison, the municipal government’s spending on “science and technology expenditure” and “environmental protection expenditure” was 32.7 million RMB and 32.4 million RMB, respectively, in 2007.

  100. These statistics are also frequently cited by others, although it is hard to confirm whether any kind of third-party statistical verification was systematically conducted. See, e.g., 2010 Annual Review of Low-Carbon Development in China by the reputable Tsinghua University Climate Change Group [68].

  101. Baoding High-Tech Administrative Committee [4]

  102. Ibid.

  103. Baoding Municipal Government [5]

  104. Baoding Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), internal documents

  105. NDRC [59]. The group included five provinces and eight cities. This central policy was then further diffused to include one new province and 28 new cities in 2012 in the second batch of experimental regions and cities (NDRC [60]).

  106. Interview 11,032,010; Interview 09082013A

  107. This was corroborated by virtually everyone who participated in the project. Also, see Shin [75], chapter 2.

  108. And other localities that were also beginning to gain reputation in the clean energy field at the time, such as Dezhou (Shandong Province), Wuxi (Jiangsu Province), and Jiuquan (Gansu Province).

  109. To name a few, in addition to CWEA, CREIA, and CSES, they include such institutions as China Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Group (CECEP), China Energy Research Society (CERS), China Energy Conservation Association (CECA), and Beijing Center for Energy Efficiency and Environmental Technology Transfer (BCEEE).

  110. It was especially so because of the torrid economic growth and the associated growth in energy consumption at the time. During the mid-2000s, China’s energy intensity (i.e., energy consumption per GDP) was in fact increasing for 3–4 years.

  111. Interview 11,032,010

  112. Interview 07272012

  113. Interview 07272012

  114. In contrast, it was decided that deploying wind turbines was not sensible in Baoding, even though the local wind energy firms were much more mature and technologically advanced than the solar energy firms were at the time.

  115. Of course, technically speaking, it is debatable whether renewable energy industries are less environmentally polluting. This mostly depends on how manufacturing is actually carried out. However, the point here is that the actors themselves framed the issue in such a way.

  116. HTZ’s Bureau of Public Works (BPW)

  117. A type of optical test equipment that measures and evaluates important attributes of LED products such as wavelength, color temperature, color spectra, color reproduction index (CRI), radiant power, among others.

  118. Most interviewees pointed this out as one of the most intractable problems in their respective sectors (Interview 12,162,011; Interview 12142011B; Interview 12,152,011; Interview 12,172,010). It is also for the same reason that many Chinese companies use their own internal standards for their own products, resulting in a fragmented system as a whole (Interview 12,172,010).

  119. In some cases, like the small-scale PV power plants, there were separate management companies.

  120. Interview 12302010B

  121. Interview 11,292,012

  122. See, e.g., King et al. [34]

  123. Mertha [53, 54]; Teets and Hurst [82]

  124. Shin [74]

  125. Kostka and Hobbs [35]; Interview 03262013; Interview 07272012; Interview 05312011A

  126. Interview 12072010A

  127. Interview 09102016; Interview 09082013A; Interview 09302010

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Edward Steinfeld, Michael Piore, Richard Locke, Jessica C. Teets, Nick Smith, Jonas Nahm, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts. The research for this article was generously supported by the U.S. Department of Education, Institute of International Education, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, U.S. National Security Education Program, U.S. Department of State, Blakemore Foundation, and The MIT-Japan International Studies Fund. These institutions do not represent the views presented in this paper. All errors are mine only.

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    Kyoung Shin

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Table 4 Types of Interviews, 2008–2015
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Shin, K. Mission-Driven Agency and Local Policy Innovation: Empirical Analysis from Baoding, China. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 22, 549–580 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-017-9514-7

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