Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Environmental governance as a new runway of promotion tournaments: campaign-style governance and policy implementation in China’s environmental laws

  • Research Article
  • Published:
Environmental Science and Pollution Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The inefficient enforcement of environmental policies cannot address global environmental challenges. As a result, China's government has implemented the Central Environmental Protection Inspection (CEPI) to overcome the policy-implementation gap between higher and lower levels of government. The existing literature has examined the positive effects of CEPI on environmental pollution, but has not explained the mechanisms for its success. To examine these mechanisms, this article uses a series of regression analyses on an empirical data set of 282 prefecture-level cities from 2010 to 2018. The results identify the mechanism for the effective implementation of CEPI, from the perspective of the campaign-style governance of local officials at local levels. This study also shows the heterogeneity of the campaign-style governance behavior of local officials, including position types and professional and cultural backgrounds. And finally, this study demonstrates that the campaign-style governance behavior of local officials has a moderating effect on the relationship between environmental pollution and local officials’ promotion. Ultimately the article proposes that higher government levels should adopt the effective incentives policy to address gaps between environmental policy and implementation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See, “Environmental Protection Law of the people's republic of China”: 1–2.

  2. The State Environmental Protection Administration of China (SEPA).SEPA of China had changed name and administrative level for several times over the past decade. In 2018, the name was changed to the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. To avoid confusion, SPEA is used throughout this article.

  3. SEPA issued the “Establishing Plans for Inspection Centers for Environmental Protection” in 2006, and established six regional inspection centers in East China, South China, Northwest China, Southwest China, Northeast China, and North China.

References

  • Blanchard O, Shleifer A (2001) Federalism with and without political centralization: China versus Russia. IMF Econ Rev 48(1):171–179

    Google Scholar 

  • Bo Z (2004) The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups. J Contemp Chin 13(39):223–256

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cai H, Treisman D (2005) Does competition for capital discipline governments? Decentralization, globalization, and public policy. Am Econ Rev 95(3):817–830

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen J, Luo D, She G, Ying Q (2017) Incentive or selection? A new investigation of local leaders’ political turnover in China. Soc Sci Q 98:341–359

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen ZF, Zhang XY, Chen FL (2021) Have driving restrictions reduced air pollution: evidence from prefecture-level cities of China. Environ Sci Pollut Res 28:3106–3120

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cheng TJ, Tsai CM (2009) Powering rent seeking in the electricity industry. Rent Seek China:117–144

  • Feng GF, Dong M, Wen J, Chang CP (2018) The impacts of environmental governance on political turnover of municipal party secretary in China. Environ Sci Pollut Res 25:24668–24681

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gao Q, Lei P (2016) Does the industrial upgrading based on resource and environmental conservation help official promotion? Ecol Econ 32(7):29–33

    Google Scholar 

  • Hodler R, Raschky PA (2014) Regional favoritism. Q J Econ 129:995–1033

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hsu A (2013) Environmental reviews and case studies: limitations and challenges of provincial environmental protection bureaus in China’s environmental data monitoring, reporting and verification. Environ Pract 15(03):280–292

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jia K, Chen S (2019) Could campaign-style enforcement improve environmental performance? Evidence from China's central environmental protection inspection. J Environ Manag 245:282–290

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kamp DSVD (2017) Clean air at what cost? The rise of blunt force regulation in China. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley

  • Kostka G (2014) Barriers to the implementation of environmental policies at the local level in China. Policy Research Working Paper; No. 7016. World Bank Group, © World Bank, Washington, DC. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7016

  • Kostka G, Nahm J (2017) Central-local relations: Recentralization and environmental governance in China. China Q 231:567–582

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kostka G, Zhang C (2018) Tightening the grip: environmental governance under Xi Jinping. Environ Polit 27:769–781

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kung JK, Ma C (2014) Can cultural norms reduce conflicts? Confucianism and peasant rebellions in Qing China. J Dev Econ 111:132–149

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Landry PF, Lü X, Duan H (2018) Does performance matter? Evaluating political selection along the Chinese administrative ladder. Comp Polit Stud 51(8):1074–1105

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear E, Sherwin R (1981) Rank-ordered tournaments as optimal labor contracts. J Polit Econ 89:841–864

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li H, Zhou LA (2005) Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China. J Public Econ 89:1743–1762

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liu EM, Meng J, Wang JT (2014) Confucianism and preferences: evidence from lab experiments in Taiwan and China. J Econ Behav Organ 104:106–122

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liu NN, Lo CWH, Zhan X (2015) Campaign-style enforcement and regulatory compliance. Public Adm Rev 75:85–95

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mao WX, Wang WP, Sun HF, Luo D (2020) Barriers to implementing the strictest environmental protection institution: a multi-stakeholder perspective from China. Environ Sci Pollut Res 27:39375–39390

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • March (1994) A primer on decision making: how decisions happen. Free Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Maskin E, Qian Y, Xu C (2000) Incentives, information and organizational form. Rev Econ Stud 67(2):359–378

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Migrom P, Roberts, Economics J (1992) Organization and management. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs

    Google Scholar 

  • Pu Z, Fu J (2018) Economic growth, environmental sustainability and China mayors' promotion. J Clean Prod 172:454–465

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ran R (2013) Perverse incentive structure and policy implementation gap in China's local environmental politics. J Environ Policy Plan 15:17–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ran R (2017) Understanding blame politics in China's decentralized system of environmental governance: actors, strategies and context. China Q 231:634–661

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Seligsohn D, Liu M, Zhang B (2018) The sound of one hand clapping: transparency without accountability. Environ Polit 27:804–829. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1452522

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shin K (2018) Environmental policy innovations in China: a critical analysis from a low-carbon city. Environ Polit 27:830–851

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • UNEP (2019) Environmental rule of law: first global report. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Rooij B (2006) Implementation of Chinese environmental law: regular enforcement and political campaigns. Dev Chang 37(1):57–74

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Rooij B (2010) The people vs. pollution: understanding citizen action against pollution in China. J Contemp China 19(63):55–79

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Rooij B, Stern R, FüRst K (2016) The Authoritarian logic of regulatory pluralism: understanding China’s new environmental actors. Regul Govern 10(1):3–13

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Rooij B, Zhu Q, Na L, Qiliang W (2017) Centralizing trends and pollution law enforcement in China. China Q 231:583–606

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wang AL (2013) The search for sustainable legitimacy: environmental law and bureaucracy in China. Harv Envtl L Rev 37(2):365–440

  • Wang H, Di WH(2002) The determinants of government environmental performance: an empirical analysis of Chinese townships. Policy Research Working Paper; No.2937. World Bank Group, © World Bank, Washington, DC. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2937

  • Wang L, Liu XF, Xiong Y (2019) Central environmental protection inspector and air pollution governance: an empirical analysis based on micro-panel data of prefecture-level cities. China Industr Econ 10:5–22 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Wong C, Valerie J K (2017) China’s war on air pollution: can existing governance structures support new ambitions? China Q 231:662–684. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017000947

  • Wu J, Deng Y, Huang J, Morck R, Yeung B (2014) Incentives and outcomes: China’s environmental policy. Capitalism & Society 9(1):1–41

  • Xing F (1995) The Chinese cultural system: implications for cross-cultural management. SAM Adv Manag J 60(1):14–20

    Google Scholar 

  • Yang B (2012) Confucianism, socialism, and capitalism: a comparison of cultural ideologies and implied managerial philosophies and practices in the P. R. China. Hum Resour Manag Rev 22:165–178

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhang X (2017) Implementation of pollution control targets in China: has a centralized enforcement approach worked? China Q 231:749–774

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhang B, Chen X, Guo H (2018) Does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement? Quasi-experimental evidence from China. J Public Econ 164:70–90

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhao C, Qu X, Luo S (2019) Impact of the InnoCom program on corporate innovation performance in China: evidence from Shanghai. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 146:103–118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zheng S, Kahn ME, Sun W, Luo D (2014) Incentivizing china's urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities: the role of the central government and public environmentalism. Soc Sci Electron Publ 47:61–71

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

Not applicable.

Funding

This research is funded by Research on the Relevance of the National Self-Technology Fund Project, Institutional Arrangement and the Owner’s Organizational Governance Ability—Based on a Multidimensional Analysis of Institutional Elements (71774107); Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Innovation Fund of Graduate Student “Government Environmental Governance and Citizen Participation Based on the Perspective of Happiness Research” (CXJJ-2019-369).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China

    Min Wang

Authors
  1. Min Wang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Contributions

Min Wang who completed all the work of the paper is responsible for the paper.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Min Wang.

Ethics declarations

Ethics approval and consent to participate

Yes

Consent for publication

Yes

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Additional information

Responsible editor: Baojing Gu

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Wang, M. Environmental governance as a new runway of promotion tournaments: campaign-style governance and policy implementation in China’s environmental laws. Environ Sci Pollut Res 28, 34924–34936 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-13100-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-13100-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation