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A Concealed Wrongdoing of Corporate Philanthropy: Evidence from China

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Abstract

The paper is trying to examine the changes between rational and irrational charitable donation of Chinese listed corporations under the background that an increasing number of Chinese listed corporations register charity foundations in recent years. Considering corporate income tax ratio as a proxy for tax preference, whether products are exposed to consumers directly or indirectly, as well as gross profit margin, debt financing scale and debt maturity structure as proxies for the reputation effect and strategic advantage, the indicators of rational charitable donation consist of the five factors mentioned above; The indicator of irrational charitable donation is disposal accrued profits calculated by Extended Jones Model. By the regression of data of charitable donations from Chinese A listed corporations during the year from 2008 to 2013, findings show that the behavior of rational charitable donation is weakened gradually, while, in contrast, the irrational charitable donation is strengthened. The listed corporations have strong motivation to transfer profits through registering and establishing charity foundations, which is a new tendency of transferring interests.

Résumé

Le présent article tente d’étudier les changements entre les dons de bienfaisance rationnels et irrationnels des entreprises chinoises cotées avec, en trame de fond, la constatation qu’un nombre croissant de celles-ci ont enregistré des fondations de bienfaisance au cours des dernières années. En considérant le rapport d’impôts d’entreprise comme mandataire fiscal préférentiel, que les produits soient offerts directement aux consommateurs ou non, ainsi que la marge bénéficiaire brute, l’échelle de financement de la dette et la structure de maturité de la dette comme mandataires relatifs à l’effet sur la réputation et l’avantage stratégique, les indicateurs des dons de bienfaisance rationnels sont les cinq facteurs mentionnés précédemment et l’indicateur des dons irrationnels est représenté par les profits accumulés répartis calculés par le modèle Jones élargi. Les résultats de la régression des données relatives aux dons de bienfaisance des entreprises chinoises cotées de 2008 à 2013 démontrent que le comportement des dons rationnels s’affaiblit progressivement, tandis qu’à l’opposé, celui des dons de bienfaisance irrationnels est renforcé. Les entreprises cotées sont hautement motivées à transférer des profits par l’entremise de fondations de bienfaisance enregistrées et établies, une nouvelle tendance dans le transfert des intérêts.

Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag versucht, die Änderungen zwischen den rationalen und irrationalen wohltätigen Spenden chinesischer börsennotierter Unternehmen vor dem Hintergrund zu untersuchen, dass eine zunehmende Zahl dieser Unternehmen in den vergangenen Jahren wohltätige Stiftungen angemeldet hat. Wenn man die Körperschaftsteuerquote stellvertretend für eine Steuerbegünstigung betrachtet, sei es dass die Produkte direkt oder indirekt an die Verbraucher gebracht werden, und die Bruttogewinnspanne, die Schuldenfinanzierungsskala und die Schuldenfälligkeitsstruktur stellvertretend für den Reputationseffekt und strategischen Vorteil ansieht, bestehen die Indikatoren für rationale wohltätige Spenden aus den fünf oben genannten Faktoren. Der Indikator für irrationale wohltätige Spenden ist der gemäß dem Extended-Jones-Modell kalkulierte Veräußerungserlös. Durch die Regression der Daten zu wohltätigen Spenden seitens chinesischer börsennotierter Unternehmen der Kategorie A von 2008 bis 2013 zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass das Verhalten rationaler gemeinnütziger Spenden schrittweise geschwächt wird, während die irrationalen gemeinnützigen Spenden gestärkt werden. Die notierten Unternehmen sind stark motiviert, die Gewinne durch die Anmeldung und Gründung von gemeinnützigen Stiftungen abzutreten, was einen neuen Trend der Anteilsübertragung darstellt.

Resumen

El presente documento trata de examinar los cambios entre las donaciones benéficas racionales e irracionales de corporaciones chinas que cotizan en Bolsa bajo el prisma de que un número creciente de corporaciones chinas que cotizan en Bolsa registran fundaciones benéficas en los últimos años. Considerando el ratio del impuesto de sociedades como una muestra de la preferencia fiscal, estén expuestos los productos a los consumidores directa o indirectamente, así como el margen de beneficio bruto, la escala de financiación de la deuda y la estructura de vencimiento de la deuda como muestras del efecto de la reputación y la ventaja estratégica, los indicadores de la donación benéfica racional consisten en los cinco factores mencionados más arriba. El indicador de la donación benéfica irracional es la enajenación de beneficios acumulados calculada mediante el modelo de Jones ampliado. Mediante la regresión de datos de donaciones benéficas de las corporaciones chinas que cotizan en la Bolsa A durante los años 2008 a 2013, los hallazgos muestran que el comportamiento de la donación benéfica racional se debilita gradualmente, mientras que, como contraste, la donación benéfica irracional se fortalece. Las corporaciones que cotizan en Bolsa tienen una fuerte motivación para transferir beneficios mediante el registro y el establecimiento de fundaciones benéficas, que es una nueva tendencia de la transferencia de intereses.

摘要

本文试图检查在最近几年中国上市公司注册慈善基金会数量逐年增加的背景下,这些上市公司合理与不合理慈善捐赠之间的变化。考虑将企业所得税的比例作为税收优惠的替代,产品是否直接或间接地面对消费者、以及毛利率、债务融资规模和债务期限结构作为口碑效应和战略优势的替代,合理慈善捐赠的指标包括上述五个因素;不合理慈善捐赠的指标是通过扩展琼斯模型计算出的处置应计利润。对中国 A 股上市公司自 2008 年至 2013 年慈善捐赠数据进行回归分析,调查结果显示合理的公益性捐赠行为正在逐渐减弱,而与此相反,不合理慈善捐赠不断增强。上市公司具有通过注册和建立慈善基金会来转移利润的强烈动机,这也是转移利益的新趋势。

ملخص

يحاول البحث دراسة التغيرات بين التبرع الخيري العقلاني والغير عقلاني من الشركات الصينية المذكورة تحت خلفية أن عدد متزايد من الشركات الصينية مذكور في تسجيل المؤسسات الخيرية في السنوات الأخيرة. إعتبار نسبة ضريبة الدخل على الشركات كبديل لتفضيل الضرائب، سواء كانت المنتجات مكشوفة للمستهلكين مباشرة أوغير مباشرة، فضلا” عن هامش الربح الإجمالي، حجم تمويل الديون وهيكل إستحقاق الديون كبدائل للتأثير على السمعة والميزة الإستراتيجية، مؤشرات التبرع الخيري العقلانية تتكون من العوامل الخمسة المذكورة أعلاة؛ مؤشر التبرع الخيري الغير عقلاني هو التخلص من الأرباح المستحقة يحسب عن طريق تمديد نموذج(Jones). عن طريق إنحدار البيانات من التبرعات الخيرية من الشركات الصينية أ المذكورة خلال العام 2008-2013، تشير النتائج إلى أن سلوك التبرع الخيري العقلاني تضعف تدريجيا”، بينما، على العكس، التبرع الخيري الغير عقلاني يقوى. الشركات المذكورة لديها حافز قوي لتحويل الأرباح من خلال تسجيل وإنشاء المؤسسات الخيرية، هذا إتجاه جديد لتحويل المصالح.

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Correspondence to Shuxia Zhang.

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Xu, L., Zhang, S., Xu, P. et al. A Concealed Wrongdoing of Corporate Philanthropy: Evidence from China. Voluntas 28, 721–744 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9842-4

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