Abstract
Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of which she cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant harms. One way to react to this problem is by requiring arguers to set up argument structures and allocate roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would then habitually have to take on roles that require them to divert time and energy away from the goals that they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers should be able to legitimately devote their time and energy towards their own goals. This creates a problem: On the one hand, structures that create morally significant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement for some arguers will often create the morally significant harms for their interlocutors. There are two possible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be required to reach free, consensual agreements on the structure they will adopt for their argument and the way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and practically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead, we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Arguers should abide by moral side constraints to their role taking. They should feel free to take roles that will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative goals, but only if this does not create a situation in which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that that they cannot effectively play.
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Notes
And will therefore remain on my side for the remainder of the paper.
Maybe the reader can even relate to this: Despite being a philosopher, most of the time, I argue in situations like the one with the dishes. I have a definite opinion and some kind motivation for proving myself right. I have some reasons for that opinion (in different stages of development). I am a little hazy on the reasons-situation overall. I anticipate some pushback. I do not value winning high enough for physical violence and would like to avoid fights if possible. Sometimes, what I argue about will affect third parties, but here I will concentrate on arguments that do not, for simplicity sake.
I follow Jackson’s description of structural argument design: Jackson describes argument design as the activity whereby we choose and create the ways we assemble and order argumentative content. Structural argument design happens on a general level—as when we adopt a proponent-opponent structure and the associated norms for how to behave during the argument. (On a more specific level, there is argumentative message-design.) Structural design can be done purposefully to create (institutionalized) structures that are especially functional for some argumentative goal. We might, for example, try to figure out what kind of structure people should argue in (what kinds of norms they should follow) to maximize reason-reflectiveness in professional mediation. Everyday structural design is what people do when they adopt structures during naturally occurring arguments without much planning.
See Cohen (2007) for the different kinds of epistemic gains we might get from argumentation. I am using the term “epistemic” widely here, and do not mean to imply that the only epistemic gains we can make come in terms of the relationship our beliefs have to the truth.
Paglieri and Castelfranchi (2010) provide an in-depth description of all the possible costs and dangers argumentation brings with it.
The use of “argument” here refers, depending on how it is used, to either a product—the arguments we use—or a process—the argument we are in. I think the context is clear enough for the reader to identify which is used where. See O'Keefe (1977) for a discussion of the two concepts of argument. It is arguments as processes that I want to say can be reasons-reflective.
The term “reasons-reflective” has been chosen to be reminiscent of the term “reasons-responsive” that authors like Fischer and Ravizza (1998) developed to refer to the ability of agents to respond to reasons available to them. The concept of reasons-reflectiveness as a property of arguments between arguers is related to and inspired by the concept of reasons-responsiveness as a property of agents, but it is not the same concept, at least as I understand reasons-responsiveness: agent respond to reasons when, for example, the availability of a reason appropriately influences their actions and beliefs. Arguments reflect reasons when the availability of a reason is reliably correlated with the reason being adequately represented during the process of argumentation between parties, and with it having an adequate impact on the result of the argument.
I will say that a reason is available if at least one of the arguers is epistemically situated in such a way that she can gain epistemic access to the reason within the time and resource limits given by the context of the argument.
This means that reasons-reflectiveness is (among other things) influenced by structural argument design.
Or we were very unlucky. Not all applicable reasons are available to the arguers, and sometimes arguers simply make mistakes. The influence of such bad epistemic luck on an argument can lead to the above scenario even if the argument was very reasons-reflective.
I think we may be optimistic and assume that reasons-reflective arguments do this because they are pretty successful at leading to the right conclusion about who should do (or believe) what. I do not want to give a definition of what it means to make unjust practical gains or suffer unjust practical losses. What this means will depend on what the right theory of justice is. I am sure the reader has some kind of intuitive understanding of what is referred to here, and that is enough for my purposes.
Notice that this makes reasons-reflectiveness only instrumentally valuable, not in itself valuable. I am not assuming that reasons-reflectiveness is a good in itself here. However, I argue elsewhere that intentionally aiming at creating reasons-reflectiveness makes arguments procedurally just, thereby giving value to results of reasons-reflective arguments even when those results are substantially lacking because bad luck stopped the arguers from producing an accurate representation of the applicable and available reasons (Stevens 2019).
Blair (2011) makes roughly this argument in his paper on the question of whether there is an ethics of argumentation. I think the connection of reasons-reflectiveness to the just distribution of practical gains and losses and to epistemic gains might be one reason why argumentation theorists evaluate argumentation by its reasonability or rationality (see, e.g., Johnson 2000; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; Wohlrapp 2014). Jacob’s (2002) discussion of the first of two concepts of openness is, I think, his way to connect reasons-reflectiveness with moral requirements in argumentation. Another reason might be that reasonability, rationality, or epistemic betterment is the inherent telos or function of argument. I do not want to get into the discussion whether such a thing exists. Goodwin (2008) makes some interesting objections to function-claims about argument that could be extended to telos-claims. Those argumentation theorists who think there is such a telos or function often identify it with reasonability, rationality or epistemic betterment (under their own definition of what that means): Aberdein (2010) claims it is the spreading of true beliefs. Johnson (2000) thinks it is the manifestation of rationality, Bailin and Battersby (2017) suggest coming to a reasoned judgement and then take over the goal of bettering our cognitive systems from Cohen (2015). Cohen and I follow them and use the term “epistemic betterment” as the name for the telos that the virtuous arguer follows (Stevens and Cohen 2018).
To Wohlrapp (2014) this is one of the main reasons to engage in argumentation—to give ourselves a chance to correct the mistakes in our very subjective world-view by confronting it with another subjective world-view, thereby overcoming our subjectivity, at least by a little bit.
How great a burden this would be is illustrated by Johnson’s claim that good argumentation has a dialectical tier in which the arguer deals with the relevant objections to the argument. Govier has argued that given the number of possible relevant objections to an argument, this would leave almost no real-world good arguments (see e.g., Govier 1999, p. 233).
“(1) It is unethical to use in an argument grounds one believes to be false” (Blair, 2011, p. 23). “(2) It is unethical deliberately to invite the interlocutor to commit or be deceived by what one believes to be a fallacy—that is, is it unethical to offer an argument one believes to be fallacious as if it were legitimate or to make a fallacious argumentative move on purpose” (Ibid. p. 24). “(3) It is unethical deliberately to overstate the epistemic status of claims used in argumentation.” (Ibid.).
The difficulties I discuss here have been described for cis-feminine-gendered people. Trans-feminine-gendered people—and minorities in general—will suffer from additional, other, and often more significant obstacles when they argue.
Arguers can gain epistemically when others engage seriously with the arguments they present, whether or not their reasons are good or bad ones, simply because others may come up with new objections that need to be met, or further details that can be added to the construct of reasons the arguer already has. This is a well-known and often exercised idea, most famously, I think, in Mill (2007, re-print).
Their interlocutors, too, may well suffer all or some of these losses, especially if the adversarial structure was not selected intentionally to hold the feminine-gendered arguer back.
See, e.g., Gilbert (2014) on the impact of ethos in argument.
That is, an argument similar to the persuasion dialogue as Walton (1998) describes it.
I follow Jackson’s description of everyday structural argument design (Jackson, 2015). See footnote 3 for a more detailed explanation of what I mean by argument design.
This is not to diminish the harm that the politeness norms cause to the identity of feminine-gendered persons. In the situation of argumentation, this harm manifests (among others) in the experience of being forced into an identity that is harmfully restrictive (an experience that will be familiar from other contexts). The restriction here is especially serious because it frustrates the feminine-gendered arguer’s full realization of herself as an agent of inter-subjective reason. (I thank Michael Baumtrog for this thought.).
Gilbert (1997) developed his cooperative model of “coalescent” argumentation for all arguers.
I think that this kind of morally significant harm is a harm that affects a person specifically in her capacity as an arguer. If this harm comes about intentionally or negligently through the behavior of others, that constitutes a moral wrong that affects a person specifically in her capacity as an arguer. Finally, if this harm is the result of some kind structural injustice, as for example in the case of feminine-gendered persons, then this is an injustice affecting people specifically in their capacity as arguers. As such, this harm constitutes an argumentative injustice, a term coined by Bondy (2010), who adapted the concept of epistemic injustice from Fricker (2007) for argumentation.
Another example is illustrated by Gilbert’s description of the argumentative situation a student faces when she enters a professor’s office. “If a student enters my office to discuss an essay, she is not entering the equivalent of a geographic or situational tabula rasa. To the contrary, she is entering a professor’s office, and when she enters she brings her entire set of luggage that contains our historical relationship, her desires and needs regarding the course, her career, and on and on.” (Gilbert 2007, p. 4) The way in which roles we have outside of argumentation may influence what we can and cannot do inside of argumentation is very interesting and deserves its own discussion—but considerations of clarity and conciseness counsel to postpone this discussion to a later time.
This problem with adversarial structures has also been described in feminist argumentation theory (Cohen 1995; Gilbert 1994; Moulton 2003). I have argued elsewhere that whether arguers should adopt an adversarial or a cooperative structure should depend on how well they understand their own and other’s reasons (Stevens 2016).
This is just a further example of how this kind of harm can come about—I am sure the reader can come up with more if they think about it.
This is why it is often called the DAM (dominant adversarial model). See, for example, (Bailin and Battersby 2017).
If Mercier and Sperber’s (2011, 2017) conclusions, based on their research, turn out to be correct, then this idea has some truth to it, but only under very felicitous circumstances—exactly those circumstances that are usually absent, as feminist argumentation theorists have pointed out. It is, for example, the basis of the pragma-dialectical model of argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004).
See Walton (1998) on deliberation and inquiry for suggested models of these argumentative structures.
Elsewhere, Cohen and I argued that even if reaching the outcome supported by the best available reasons is the main goal for which an arguer enters the argument, adopting a cooperative role will not always be the best choice (Stevens and Cohen 2018). The context of the argument, like for example the adversarial attitude of the other arguers, might create a situation in which arguing cooperatively actually diminishes the reasons-reflectiveness of the argument. This happens because not enough energy is spent to defend the side that the adversarially-minded arguers are attacking.
Foss and Griffin’s (1995) cooperative idea of an invitational rhetoric has been criticized by Lozano-Reich and Cloud (2009) because oppressed people might not be able to argue in this way with their oppressors. (To be fair, though, Foss and Griffin explicitly say that they do not want to suggest that invitational rhetoric is always the right choice). There are also non-argumentative roles that could make cooperative argumentation costly—someone in a leader-role where leadership is contested, for example, might suffer high practical costs if she argues too cooperatively with those who question her leadership. A demand for cooperative argumentation might then be, at the same time, a demand for her to make herself more vulnerable than she can afford to.
Such a structure might well be a more complicated one than a simple opponent-proponent structure. Maybe an adjudicator or mediator role would be needed.
This would mean to give them a duty to be a virtuous arguer, as Cohen and I (Stevens and Cohen 2018) describe them.
I cannot here give an exhaustive list of argumentative roles, among other reasons also because I assume that different cultures will generate different argumentative roles that I might not know about. But here are some examples: Advocate roles require arguers to concentrate on finding arguments for a pre-selected conclusion or claim and to defend this claim against objections. An opponent role requires an arguer to inspect the arguments of another for flaws and point them out. A deliberator role requires arguers to find arguments for all available possible standpoints regarding an issue and offer them to their interlocutors, as well as to help their interlocutors to develop arguments. Then there are “supportive” roles, like the role of adjudicator in an argument, which requires both the final evaluation of the representation of the balance of reasons other arguers have produced and the enforcement of argumentative norms if arguers try to violate them. Alternatively, there is the role of mediator, which presumably includes the latter task, but not the former. All these role-descriptions are made on the basis of my own studies and experiences and are definitely open for revision and in need of further research.
Everything I say in this paper about roles and argument structures could also be translated into the vocabulary Searle (1995) has erected around his concept of status functions. I stick with “roles” and “structures” because the term “role” is intuitively familiar, gets used by most of the scholars whose research I want to use, and appears at least in the two big dialectical argumentation theories, Walton’s theory of dialogue types (2008) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (2004) pragma-dialectical theory.
She also has doubts about whether there is a single function to argumentation in the normative sense, asking those who assume there is to produce positive reasons for their claims.
Keep in mind that I am here arguing about whether we should create a moral duty, not whether we should prima facie value arguing in roles that will make the argument as reasons-reflective as possible as morally praiseworthy. I do not see any problem with doing the latter. The reader might here disagree with me, taking, for example, a strong utilitarian position according to which we should always devote our time and energy to the goals that will create the most good and the least harm overall. Dealing with this kind of disagreement would lead me too far afield and distract from the current point.
Paglieri and Castelfranchi (2010) list these under the “costs” of arguing.
At one point, Aikin describes argument as “(…) a pacifistic replacement for truly violent solutions (…)” (Aikin 2011, p. 256).
Those who are not convinced by this and do not share this assumption of the paper might want to read it as an argument that even if we take this interest seriously, moral constraints still apply to choices of argument roles and of structural argument design.
For the adversarial proponent-role that I want to take in the dish-washing example, those might include that I have to provide arguments for my position, come up with objections against yours and admit when I have no good objections to yours. Maybe they even include that I admit defeat if my arguments fail and yours are especially good. But they do NOT include that I must help you come up with arguments.
Cohen (2015) and Bailin and Battersby (2017) disagree on whether arguers should always be required to tell each other if they know of a good objection to their own conclusion. This is an interesting question, but I suspect that in many arguments the effect of arguers taking adversarial roles is not that they keep things from each other (though that may happen), so much as that they concentrate only on finding and developing arguments for their side. Taking a thoroughly and unrestrictedly deliberative argument-role requires more than just telling others when we already know of an argument—it requires developing arguments in all directions.
Some of these tasks necessarily need to be taken care of for argumentation to take place (like formulating reasons into arguments), others are not necessary but important and common (like finding or replying to objections), others become relevant just sometimes (like engaging in meta-argumentation about the merits of a certain argument-form that was just used).
See Footnote 38 for an incomplete list of argument roles and some associated tasks.
For a descriptive and normative treatment of the advocate role see Goodwin (2013).
Of course, you might start a confrontation on the meta-level about how I argue. But that is costly. It may cost you ethos and/or face and it may strain our relationship much more than the argument about the dishes would. Hample (2005) and Gilbert (1996, 2007) write about how important face- and relationship-goals are for arguers, and how much pressure an arguer may feel not to pursue a strategy that promises to be effective on the object-level if it is also likely to lead to face- and relationship losses. More on this below.
The main authors of these theories are aware of the impact that choices about the structural design of argument have. The pragma-dialecticians point out that strategic maneuvering is necessary also at the preparatory stages of an argument (van Eemeren 2010). Walton defines a fallacy in relation to the rules that come with the choice of one of his dialogue types: fallacies are illicit shift in dialogue type, the making of arguments according to the norms of a dialogue type other than the one agreed upon by the participants (Walton 1995).
A list of all the different things to be decided in the confrontation and opening stage can be found in Krabbe (2007)
For example, Atkinson et al. (2013) discuss the differences between a Waltonian persuasion and a Waltonian deliberation dialogue and show how the tasks, goals and commitments of the argues differ depending on the structural design they have adopted through choosing a dialogue type, and the role they have within the structure.
Unfortunately, it would lead me to far afield to pursue this idea, but I suspect that Walton’s (1995) description of what a fallacy is can be summarized as a breach of the duty to stay within the agreed upon role in the agreed upon dialogue type unless some condition for a “licit” shift is fulfilled. Indeed, Atkinson et al. (2013, p. 123) give an example of an “illicit”, i.e., fallacious shift in dialogue type that describes the taking of a not-agreed upon role. I quote at length because I think the formulation here is very interesting: “A second way in which an agent may try to shift from deliberation to persuasion is through attempting to assume the role of O [opponent]. The object here is to arrogate the decision-making power for itself [sic]. If the shift is successful, it will be able to use its own preference rule as the collective rule and foist a burden of proof on the other agents. (…) Thus, shifts from one dialogue type to another are something that participants in a dialogue need to be aware of, and avoid, if they are to avoid having different rules from those they intended applied to their utterances and if the objectives of the dialogue are to remain constant” (Atkinson et al. 2013, p. 123).
Krabbe attempts to solve these problems by moving decisions about premises into the argumentation stage and questions about the argument-schemes into meta-dialogues. On meta-dialogues, see Krabbe (2003).
Jacobs illustrates how arguers do this with the example of a conversation between four students who determine the correct way to order objects in an assignment: “(1) A: What’d you have for number one? (2) B: I ranked oxygen first. (3) C: Yeah, me too. (4) D: I had oxygen. (5) A: Okay—I had food concentrate second.” (Jacobs 2017, p. 6).
Jacobs points out that in move (1), A seems to ask a question and at the same time initialize a procedure. The others fall in line with it. If an agreement can be said to be reached at all, then only after move four and not prior to the conversation. Jacob’s move to reject the idea of a distinct argumentative stage for decisions about the structural design of the argument and role allocations is in line with other design-theorists and normative pragmatists in argumentation theory (see, e.g., Goodwin 2001; Kauffeld 1998).
I assume that given the outcomes of the consent debate with respect to sexual intercourse, this claim needs no further support. I would like to remark, though, that I think the idea of consent is an important one in argumentation, especially given the varying capacities of people to recognize fallacious (intentional or not) use of arguments and the potential that being engaged in argument at the wrong time and with the wrong arguer can have serious epistemic and practical repercussions. For some discussion on the relationship between persuasion, manipulation and consent in argumentation, see Nettel and Roque (2012).
The result is that the ethics of argumentation appears as double-layered: First, there are the morals of structural argument design. Second, there are the morals of fulfilling the norms associated with specific argument roles. Fulfilling these norms is then only morally required if the chosen structural design is morally acceptable. For more on this see (Stevens 2019).
Cohen and I already described the mechanism with which we think an arguer can influence the argumentative structure through role-taking (Stevens and Cohen 2018). Here I expand on that description.
We may even learn roles without having had to play them ourselves. For the different ways in which we learn a role before we play it and how we then progress through the stages of mastering a role once we do get to play it, see (Thornton and Nardi 1975). See Goodwin (2013) for a discussion of the norms associated with being an advocate.
I might have learned that the advocate role comes with stereotypical forceful and assertive behavioural displays, but I will be well-advised if I am more forceful if I argue at the APA than if I argue at the WCPA. The conferences of the American Philosophical Associations (APA) have been called “bloodsport” by Aikin (2011), the conferences of the Western Canadian Philosophical Associations (WCPA) are generally relaxed and sometimes playful meetings. In each case, the speaker is more or less expected to advocate for the thesis they presented in their paper during question and answer period, but how these periods proceed is probably usually still pretty different.
I assume that most often, this is not based on a specific structural-design plan I have in my head for the argument, but rather out of some vague sense for how I would like to argue given my goals. But if I should take a role with the specific and conscious intent to make you take a (specific) complementary role, then role theorists call this alter-casting (Pratkanis 2000; Weinstein and Deutschberger 1963). Maybe we can get some impression of how powerful role-taking is in getting others to adopt a complementary role if we think of the fact that according to Pratkanis’ (2000) research, the possibility to alter-cast others through the mere taking of a role is why con-artists are so effective.
Actually, it is different in three ways: Because role-making is ongoing and because it is always possible for one participant to switch roles and for the other to follow, the argument structure is not fixed like it is after an explicit preparatory stage, but instead remains changeable.
For the sake of simplicity, I am here talking as if argumentation always happens between two arguers. Of course, this is not the case, and things are bound to get much more complicated the bigger the group of arguers becomes. It would be an interesting project to work out the implications of my argument here for larger groups of arguers.
This should demonstrate that the description developed here is in harmony with the claims of design-theorists. According to these scholars, the norms by which arguers evaluate their argument are established through the choice of messages and speech acts during the argument. See, for example, Goodwin (2001), discussing Kauffeld (1998) who explained how arguers can initiate argumentation and influence its structure through the speech acts of proposing and accusing. According to Goodwin (following Kauffeld), performing the speech acts of proposing or accusing obligates the speaker to advocacy. Accusations make it especially likely that the following exchange will be adversarial.
When a power-imbalance is great enough for this is a question that points to a threshold-problem, and the answer to it will depend on a host of factors. Trying to delineate this would be an interesting project but lead us too far afield here.
Or they might lead to you losing the conflict when it is made explicit.
Aikin (2011) builds a defense of adversarial argumentation as cooperative at its basis on this point.
Moller Okin describes how and why the person with the better exit-options in a relationship (and I think that arguing with each other is entering a kind of temporary relationship) has more power to shape the relationship according to her wishes (Moller-Okin 1989, p. 193).
The power imbalance itself might constitute a moral harm, but that discussion would carry us too far afield.
It is important to acknowledge that my actions might have pressed you into a problematic argumentative role in a situation in which I had no way of knowing or recognizing that they might do so, and without me ever intending to do so. This is then a form of moral bad luck [which Fricker also recognizes for epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007, p. 33/41)]. I think that this does not mean that the moral side-constraints does not apply to me—just that I am less (or not) blameworthy if I overstep them because I had no or very little way of knowing what I was doing. What the moral consequences are for you when you recognize me overstepping in this way is an interesting question that I discuss in Stevens (2019).
See Applbaum (2000), Dare (2016), Hardimon (1994), and Luban (1988). Even Andre (1991) who is chiefly concerned with how acceptable roles generate obligations, adds this condition at the end of her paper. Disagreements exist mostly on the basis that role-ethicists usually talk about relatively stable, often institutional roles that are not determined each time an activity is started anew, like for example the role of the lawyer, which is “donned by an individual, like a suit of clothes already tailored and sewn” (Dare 2016, p. 706). The role-set must then be justified by justifying the existence of the institution. The contentious question is how far the justification of the institution can reach in justification of the role-obligations and role-directed behaviors, and when it ceases to be enough. We do not have this problem here. We could say that argumentation is an “institution” that is justified, but the very question that interests us arises because argumentation can be structured differently, and in different role sets. Further, we are talking about naturally occurring argumentation, where roles can be taken, given, and made each time anew, even if people who argue often may fall into a rut. Therefore, the justification of the chosen role-set can take the special context of the specific argument into account.
See Footnote 73 on the possibility of bad luck. My honest best judgement should also be informed by verbal and non-verbal cues you give me about how comfortable you are with the role.
Sometimes, it may be enough to change the way I play the role through role-making. For example, scaling down the aggressiveness with which I play an advocate role might already help.
It is important to remember, here, that morally significant harms are only those harms that the arguer should not suffer. Argumentation can cause harms that are not morally problematic. Imagine, for example, the person who realizes through argument that a relationship they have so far thought of as enjoyable and advantageous is really exploitative, and that they have mistreated the other person for a long time. This will cause some harm (negative feelings such as shame, and possibly the loss of the advantages that the exploitation brought), but the harm is not morally relevant because it is harm that the arguer should be exposed to.
There may be exceptions, especially in teaching situations. Forcing someone to play a role they are not comfortable with, like that of proponent, in a teaching situation may help them discover that they are capable of this after all. I thank Michael Baumtrog for this thought.
We may here treat reasons-reflectiveness as the “function” of the argument without running into the objections raised by Goodwin (2008) because it is the imbalance in reasons-reflectiveness (caused by the inappropriate role allocation) that is responsible for the morally significant harms.
I realize that the question arises what should be done if I shirk these duties—and what your rights and duties are in a situation in which you are harmed by my immoral behavior. This is an important and complex question that I try to address in Stevens (2019).
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Stevens, K. The Roles We Make Others Take: Thoughts on the Ethics of Arguing. Topoi 38, 693–709 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09659-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09659-0