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An experimental study of the generosity game

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Abstract

We study ultimatum and dictator variants of the generosity game. In this game, the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between the players within a given interval, knowing that her own share is fixed. Thus, the first mover is not confronted with the typical trade-off between her own and the other’s payoff. For each variant of the game, we study three treatments that vary the range of potential pie sizes so as to assess the influence of these changes on the first movers’ generosity. We find that removing the trade-off inspires significant generosity, which is not always affected by the second mover’s veto power. Moreover, the manipulation of the choice set indicates that choices are influenced by the available alternatives.

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Correspondence to M. Vittoria Levati.

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Güth, W., Levati, M.V. & Ploner, M. An experimental study of the generosity game. Theory Decis 72, 51–63 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9253-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9253-8

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