Abstract
This paper presents a novel theory of artifact functions, drawing from persistence-based accounts of social functions, according to which the function of an artifact consists in those of its effects that contribute to the persistence of its kind. First, the paper argues that artifact functions have an underacknowledged “interventionist task”: functional ascriptions have implications for the ways that users have reason to use technologies, and how they have reason to intervene when technologies have undesired effects. Then, it argues that the ways that users have reason to use technologies and intervene are informed by the present persistence conditions of artifact kinds. It is therefore useful to incorporate these persistence conditions into the artifacts’ functions. By focusing on the social and political embedding of artifacts, the theory also allows for fruitful connections between the theory of artifacts, the political philosophy of technology, and the literature on functions in the philosophy of social science.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Likewise, Houkes and Vermaas (2010) describe their view as a “function-ascription formulation” rather than a “function-as-property formulation” (p. 78).
I owe this example to an anonymous reviewer.
Or, failures to produce desired effects. I take these to be two sides of the same coin and use them interchangeably.
This may mean that the effect itself is a part of the artifact’s function, or that it’s not a part of the function but is nevertheless compatible with the function. In either case, intervening would not mean making the artifact better at its current function.
While the focus of the present paper is the functions of artifacts, interventionist normativity appears in a variety of contexts. For example, Justin Garson (2010, 2022) has argued for the importance of disciplined use of function talk in psychiatry. Mental disorders are often described as dysfunctions in the sense that they have maladaptive effects. However, some mental disorders may also have (either direct or derived) proper functions based on selected effects. Because dysfunction suggests a need to restore an original or natural state of working order, describing mental disorders as dysfunctional distorts the goal of treatment. Here, too, function talk can be evaluated by the usefulness of its prescriptions for intervention.
The “prima facie” here is important. Ultimately, I accept a pluralistic approach to artifact functions (see Perlman, 2009). Such an approach seems necessary, as different accounts of artifact functions seem to be meant to perform different kinds of descriptive and explanatory work. My point is simply that informing interventions is one type of work that the notion of function performs.
This is noteworthy because social entities, like artifacts, often have both intentional design and histories of selection. Nevertheless, these are not typically taken to exhaust their functions.
I borrow this terminology from Franssen (2006), though it is somewhat non-standard. In analytic metaphysics, kinds are typically said to have members, while types have tokens. However, Franssen uses artifact “kind” as a technical term, which he describes as a variety of artifact “type” (though Franssen also makes use of a narrower notion of artifact type) (p. 48). Thus, kinds have tokens, for Franssen, because they are a type in the sense typically used in metaphysics.
In more distant possible worlds in which cellphones persist but do not depend on providing profit to companies to do so, they might have different persistence conditions. Because the view under consideration defines functions—and in turn artifact kinds—by their effects that promote their persistence under present selection pressures, cellphones in these possible worlds would have a different function and therefore be a different kind of artifact than cellphones in the present.
Whether or to what extent it is the case that the app’s persistence was conditioned on its producing these effects is an empirical question for social scientists. The point of the present paper is that the functions of artifacts depend on such counterfactuals in this way.
There might, nevertheless, be fine-grained distinctions within kinds. Wooden and metal spoons share some persistence conditions, and don’t share others. This is true on other accounts as well, however (see Franssen, 2006 on types and kinds).
References
Benjamin, R. (2019). Race after technology: Abolitionist tools for the new Jim code. Polity Books.
Bhattacharyya, D., & Subramaniam, B. (2020). Technofascism in India. n+1. Retrieved April 14, 2022, from https://www.nplusonemag.com/online-only/online-only/technofascism-in-india/.
Bigelow, J. (1998). Functionalism in social science. In The Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. Taylor and Francis. Retrieved April 15, 2022, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/functionalism-in-social-science/v-1.
Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1987). Functions. Journal of Philosophy, 84(4), 181–196. https://doi.org/10.2307/2027157
Bijker, W., & Pinch, T. J. (1987). The social construction of facts and artifacts: Or how the sociology of science and the sociology of technology might benefit each other. In W. Bijker, T. Hughes, & T. Pinch (Eds.), The social construction of technological systems. MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.1177/030631284014003004
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1988). Culture and the evolutionary process. University of Chicago Press.
Davis, J. L. (2020). How artifacts afford: The power and politics of everyday things. MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/11967.001.0001
Dipert, R. (1993). Artifacts, art works, and agency. Temple University Press. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist199578218
Dipert, R. (1995). Some issues in the theory of artifacts: Defining ‘artifact’ and related notions. The Monist, 78(2), 119–135. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist199578218
Durkheim, E. (1948). The elementary forms of religious life. Free Press.
Elder, C. (2007). On the place of artifacts in ontology. In E. Margolis & S. Laurence (Eds.), Creations of the mind: Theories of artifacts and their representation (pp. 33–51). Oxford University Press.
Elster, J. (1979). Ulysses and the sirens. Cambridge University Press.
Evnine, S. J. (2016). Making objects and events: A hylomorphic theory of artifacts, actions, and organisms. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779674.001.0001
Feenberg, A. (1999). Questioning technology. Routledge.
Franssen, M. (2006). The normativity of artefacts. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 37(1), 42–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.12.006
Franssen, M., Kroes, P., Reydon, T. A. C., & Vermaas, P. E. (2014). Artefact kinds: Ontology and the human-made world. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00801-1
Garson, J. (2010). Schizophrenia and the dysfunctional brain. Journal of Cognitive Science, 11, 215–246. https://doi.org/10.17791/jcs.2010.11.2.215
Garson, J. (2019). What biological functions are and why they matter. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108560764
Garson, J. (2022). Madness: A philosophical exploration. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197613832.001.0001
Hilpinen, R. (1993). Authors and artifacts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93, 155–178. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/93.1.155
Holm, S. (2017). The problem of phantom functions. Erkenntnis, 82(1), 233–241. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9814-x
Houkes, W. (2006). Knowledge of artefact functions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 37(1), 102–113. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.12.011
Houkes, W., & Vermaas, P. (2004). Actions versus functions: A plea for an alternative metaphysics of artifacts. The Monist, 87(1), 52–71. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist20048712
Houkes, W., & Vermaas, P. (2010). Technical Functions: On the use and design of artefacts (Vol. 1). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3900-2
Justus, J. (2008). Complexity, diversity, and stability. In S. Sahotra & A. Plutynski (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of biology. (Vol. 90). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470696590.ch18
Khan, A., & Perrigo, B. (2020). What Life Is Like Inside the World's Longest Lockdown. Time. https://time.com/5832256/kashmir-lockdown-coronavirus/
Lachney, M., & Dotson, T. (2018). Epistemological Luddism: Reinvigorating a concept for action in 21st century sociotechnical struggles. Social Epistemology, 32(4), 228–240. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2018.1476603
Latour, B. (1990). Technology is society made durable. The Sociological Review, 38(1, Suppl), 103–131. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954x.1990.tb03350.x
McLaughlin, P. (2000). What functions explain: Functional explanation and self-reproducing systems. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511498510
Merton, R. (1949). Social theory and social structure. Free Press.
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories: New foundations for realism. MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001
Mumford, L. (1964). Authoritarian and democratic technics. Technology and Culture, 5(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.2307/3101118
Naoe, K. (2008). Design culture and acceptable risk. In P. E. Vermaas, P. Kroes, A. Light, & S. Moore (Eds.), Philosophy and design: From engineering to architecture (pp. 119–130). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6591-0_9
Neander, K. (1991). Functions as selected effects: The conceptual analyst’s defense. Philosophy of Science, 58(2), 168–184. https://doi.org/10.1086/289610
Norman, D. (2013). The design of everyday things: Revised and expanded edition. Basic Books.
Odling-Smee, F., Laland, K., & Feldman, M. (2003). Niche construction: The neglected process in evolution (MPB-37). Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400847266
Papineau, D. (1984). Representation and explanation. Philosophy of Science, 51(4), 550–572. https://doi.org/10.1086/289205
Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. Free Press.
Parsons, T. (1959). The school class as a social system: Some of its functions in American society. Harvard Educational Review, 29(4), 297–318.
Perlman, M. (2009). Changing the mission of theories of teleology: DOs and DON’Ts for thinking about function. In U. Krohs & P. Kroes (Eds.), Functions in biological and artificial worlds: Comparative philosophical perspectives (pp. 17–36). MIT press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262113212.003.0002
Pettit, P. (1996). Functional explanation and virtual selection. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47(2), 291–302. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/47.2.291
Pettit, P. (2007). Resilience as the explanandum of social theory. In I. Shapiro & S. Bedi (Eds.), Political contingency: Studying the unexpected, the accidental, and the unforeseen (pp. 79–96). New York University Press.
Preston, B. (1998). Why is a wing like a spoon? A pluralist theory of function. The Journal of Philosophy, 95(5), 215–254. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564689
Preston, B. (2009). Philosophical theories of artifact function. In A. Meijers (Ed.), Philosophy of technology and engineering sciences (pp. 213–233). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-51667-1.50013-6
Preston, B. (2013). A philosophy of material culture: Action, function, and mind. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203069844
Scheele, M. (2006). Function and use of technical artefacts: Social conditions of function ascription. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 37(1), 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.12.004
Schulz, A. W. (2020). Structure, evidence, and heuristic: Evolutionary biology, economics, and the philosophy of their relationship. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003030249
Schulz, A. W. (2021). What’s the point? A presentist social functionalist account of institutional purpose. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 52(1–2), 53–80.
Van Eck, D., & Weber, E. (2014). Function ascription and explanation: Elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions. Erkenntnis, 79(6), 1367–1389. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9605-1
Vermaas, P. E., & Houkes, W. (2003). Ascribing functions to technical artefacts: A challenge to etiological accounts of functions. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54(2), 261–289. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/54.2.261
Walsh, D. M., & Ariew, A. (1996). A taxonomy of functions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26(4), 493–514. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717464
Winner, L. (1977). Autonomous technology: Technics-out-of-control as a theme in political thought. MIT Press.
Winner, L. (1980). Do artifacts have politics? Daedalus, 109(1), 121–136.
Wouters, A. (1995). Viability explanation. Biology and Philosophy, 10(4), 435–457. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00857593
Wright, L. (1976). Teleological explanations: An etiological analysis of goals and functions. University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520333697
Ziman, J. (2000). Technological innovation as an evolutionary process. Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Armin Schulz for his comments and mentorship throughout this project. I would also like to thank Sarah Robins, Corey Maley, John Symons, Michael Branicky, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
Funding
Funding was provided by University of Kansas.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The author has no competing interest to declare related to the content of this article.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Hurshman, C. Artifacts and intervention: a persistence theory of artifact functions. Synthese 202, 128 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04347-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04347-4