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Integration without integrated models or theories

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Abstract

It is traditionally thought that integration in cognitive science requires combining different perspectives, elements, and insights into an integrated model or theory of the target phenomenon. In this paper I argue that this type of integration is frequently not possible in cognitive science due to our reliance on using different idealizing and simplifying assumptions in our models and theories. Despite this, I argue that we can still have integration in cognitive science and attain all the benefits that integrated models would provide, without the need for their construction. Models which make incompatible idealizing assumptions about the target phenomenon can still be integrated by understanding how to draw coherent and compatible inferences across them. I discuss how this is possible, and demonstrate how this supports a different kind of integration. This sense of integration allows us to use collections of contradictory models to develop a consistent, comprehensive and non-contradictory understanding of a single unified phenomenon without the need for a single integrated model or theory.

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Notes

  1. Marcin Miłkowski, following Ioannis Votsis, refers to such attempted integrated models in cognitive science as “monstrous”. Specifically, a model or theory is considered monstrous “if it contains ‘isolated islands’ that are confirmationally disconnected, i.e., what these ‘islands’ imply is completely disjoint.” (Miłkowski, 2016, p. 21).

  2. Special thanks to a blind referee for emphasizing this objection.

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Acknowledgements

Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the 2019 meeting of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science, and at the Philosophy of Minds, Brains, and Machines Colloquium Series at the University of Nebraska Omaha. I am greatly indebted to the fantastic discussions, criticisms, and constructive feedback I received at both events. I would also like to thank the blind referees who were instrumental in helping to strengthen the paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria, 3800 Finnerty Road, Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2, Canada

    Eric Hochstein

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Hochstein, E. Integration without integrated models or theories. Synthese 202, 76 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04298-w

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