Abstract
Game theory has proven useful in clarifying Hobbes’s argument that the state of nature will inevitably devolve into a state of war. Mathematically-leaning philosophers, however, have paid little attention to Rousseau’s depiction of the state of nature as a peaceful, asocial state of solitary wanderers. This paper articulates Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes in formal terms, which pinpoints two crucial issues in Hobbes’s account: the lack of an exit option and an unrealistic depiction of human nature. Building upon recent game-theoretic treatments of Hobbes, we first construct a model that incorporates Rousseau’s criticisms by permitting an exit option and (partly) endogenizing human preferences and capacities. Second, we draw out the implications of Rousseau’s analysis for the question of political authority, which cannot be answered, as Hobbes believed, by invoking a hypothetical state of nature.
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Notes
All citations to Hobbes’s (1994 [1651]) Leviathan (henceforth L).
We follow Michael Huemer’s understanding of political authority as “the hypothesized moral property in virtue of which governments may coerce people in certain ways not permitted to anyone else and in virtue of which citizens must obey governments in situations in which they would not be obligated to obey anyone else” (2013, p. 5).
Henceforth, the Second Discourse will be abbreviated SD followed by the page number. Rousseau’s (2001) Social Contract (hercefort SC) shows the book and the chapter numbers. Translations are ours.
The vague notion of “human nature” is understood here to denote preferences and capacities. For Rousseau, human nature, understood as preferences and capacities, is highly plastic. It responds to, and shapes, the environment in which human beings exist and interact.
The symbol “≻” denotes a strict preference relation, often represented by the letter P.
For a good summary, see Barrett (2020, 337-339); Schaefer and Sohn (forthcoming).
Some notice that Hobbes has a more violent definition of war: “for a WAR consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known” (L 13:8). In this case, a state in which everyone cooperates with one another, but they are willing to fight with each other if the conditions change would be characterized as a state of war. Yet, in such a state, there might be industry, culture, arts, letters, etc.; even if minor events could trigger brutal war. It seems then that Hobbes uses two different definitions of war. One includes active violence; one only requires potential violence. We follow the former in this paper; the latter makes the state of war come cheap, in the sense that most civilizations in the world could be described as being in a state of war even if they live under a government.
The expression “laying low” comes from Kavka (1986, p. 111).
Albert Hirschman (1978, pp. 90–91) correctly notices the importance of this passage for his theory of exit. Crucial to Rousseau’s state of nature is that it assumes an exit option.
For more examples, see Hirschman (1978).
The outcome Isolation is actually several outcomes. It comprises any outcome where Player 1 chooses X at her first information set.
The new symbol “∼” represents the indifference relation. x ∼ y if and only if x is weakly preferred to y (xRy) and vice versa (yRx).
This proposition corresponds to Proposition 1.1 in the Appendix. For a formal statement and proof of this proposition, see Appendix, Sect. 1.
For proof that this is, indeed, an equilibrium for low values of α, see Proposition 1.2 in Appendix.
The justification for Rousseau’s revisionary account of human nature is discussed at greater length in Sect. 2.4.
Rousseau thus adopts the assumption of robustness and abandons that of dependence.
In the state of nature, Hobbes claims, “every man is enemy of every man [… and] men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal” (L 13:9).
And yet, Rousseau’s conjectures are inspired by actual cases of human beings that have been raised by animals: the kid of Hesse raised by wolves (found in 1344), the kid of Lithuania raised by bears (found in 1694), the kid of Hanover, and children of the Pyrenees in the eighteenth century. See SD 170n.
This quote seems to be the basis of Hirschman’s (1978) reflection on the importance of exit for Rousseau.
The impulse to spread into such environments results from human population growth, since otherwise less naturally fertile environments would lack appeal. As population expands, in other words, the marginal productivity of isolated hunting/gathering falls below that of more social modes, such as collective hunting and agriculture. For a formalization of this model, see Douglass North (1981, p. 75).
A more complete analysis is undertaken in the Appendix, Sect. 3.
See the Appendix, Proposition 2.1, for a formal proof of this claim.
For a formalization and proof of this claim, as well as the claims in the following paragraph, see Proposition 2.2 in the Appendix.
This claim is based on Propositions 1.1 and 2.2 in Appendix.
See Proposition 2.2 and Sect. 3 in Appendix for a formal statement and proof of this claim.
Alternatively, ⍴ can also represent the likelihood that a player has had extensive social interactions in the past. This alternative interpretation does not alter the logic of the model.
Both simplifying assumptions are relaxed in the Appendix, Sect. 3. The logic of unraveling remains similar, but the full analysis considers s1 = EC and also endogenizes α. Put simply, by raising the average αi, socialization has a dual, mutually reinforcing effect on cooperation: it simultaneously makes Player 2 more likely to cooperate when moderate, while also making Player 1 more likely to cooperate upon entering. If the process of autocatalytic socialization continues to raise the average level of αi as ⍴ increases, then Rousseau’s account is internally consistent.
See Appendix Proposition 3.3 for a formal analysis of the content presented in this paragraph.
See Appendix Proposition 3.3.
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Acknowledgements
The authors are thankful to the editors of this volume and two anonymous reviewers, whose acute comments and useful guidance were fundamental for improving this paper substantially. We also thank Jacob Barrett, Matt Jeffers, Otto Lehto, Alexandra Oprea, David Schmidtz, Peter Vanderschraaf, and Matt Zwolinski for their help and support during the writing of this article.
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Juarez-Garcia, M.I., Schaefer, A. Exit & isolation: Rousseau’s state of nature. Synthese 200, 252 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03736-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03736-5