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If consciousness causes collapse, the zombie argument fails

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Abstract

Many non-physicalists, including Chalmers, hold that the zombie argument succeeds in rejecting the physicalist view of consciousness. Some non-physicalists, including, again, Chalmers, hold that quantum collapse interactionism (QCI), i.e., the idea that non-physical consciousness causes collapse of the wave function in phenomena such as quantum measurement, is a viable interactionist solution for the problem of the relationship between the physical world and the non-physical consciousness. In this paper, I argue that if QCI is true, the zombie argument fails. In particular, I show that if QCI is true, a zombie world physically identical to our world is impossible because there is at least one law of nature, a fundamental law of physics in particular, that exist only in the zombie world but not in our world. This shows that philosophers like Chalmers are committing an error in endorsing the zombie argument and QCI at the same time.

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Notes

  1. Different versions of the zombie argument can be found in the literature—for an extensive list, see (Kirk 2015). Here, I focus on Chalmers (1996, pp. 94–99, 2003, pp. 105–106, 2010).

  2. There are several proposals about the relationship between consciousness and quantum physics. Two interesting summaries reflecting the diversity of these proposals can be found in Atmanspacher (2017) and Pylkkänen (2018). It should be mentioned that some of these proposals are physicalist. Penrose (1989, 1994), for instance, aims to explain consciousness in terms of quantum physics in general and collapse of the wave function in particular.

  3. It should be mentioned that not all interpretations of quantum mechanics are “collapse interpretations.” For instance, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation and Bohm’s hidden variables interpretation do not embrace collapse. Moreover, QCI is only one of the collapse interpretations—and not a very popular one (Schlosshauer et al. 2013). For instance, Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory of spontaneous collapse is also a collapse interpretation but consciousness plays no role in it.

  4. The physical correlates of consciousness (PCC) in a zombie is the part of her brain that if she was her human twin, her consciousness would nomologically supervene on it.

  5. Woodward (2005, pp. 208–209), for instance, argues that “Nothing can travel faster than the speed of light” is not a causal explanation for the subluminal speed of an electron (cf. Skow 2014, pp. 455–457).

  6. As noted by many, whether or not a claim receives confirmation from evidence is always sensitive to the background beliefs (see, for instance, Lange 2000, p. 112; Sober 1988, p. 19). If we adopt representationalism, zombies cannot have beliefs because beliefs are some kind of mental state. Therefore, they cannot really confirm their beliefs. But since, ex hypothesi, zombie’s behavior perfectly resembles their human counterparts, here I adopt the dispositionalist view of belief according to which beliefs should be understood in terms of behavioral dispositions. For more on this distinction, see Schwitzgebel (2019).

  7. The example is from Lange (2017, p. 6).

  8. It is worth mentioning that some hold that even in the course of our world’s history, laws of nature change and evolve (Peirce 1891; Smolin 2013).

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Acknowledgment

I am grateful to Andrew Brenner, Joshua Barthuly, Liz Jackson, Sebastian Murgueitio Ramirez, Jeff Speaks, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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  1. University of Notre Dame, 453 Geddes Hall, Notre Dame, IN, 46556, USA

    Mousa Mohammadian

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Mohammadian, M. If consciousness causes collapse, the zombie argument fails. Synthese 199, 1599–1615 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02828-4

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